SOCIAL STRUCTURE and SUBJECTIVE CULTURE

A Macrosociological Inquiry into an Atlas of Affective Meanings



Haluk Soydan

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A Macrosociological Inquiry into an Atlas of Affective Meanings

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FOREWORD

It was in 1960 that our Center for Comparative Psycholinguistics at the University of Illinois began its cross-cultural research on affective meaning systems. In the prior decade, working ethnocentrically with samples of American English speakers and using the semantic differential technique, factor analysis of the judgments of diverse concepts against diverse bipolar scales had consistently yielded evidence for three massive scale factors — Evaluation (the Good-Bad of things), Potency (the Strong-Weak of things) and Activity (the Fast-Slow of things). Working anthropocentrically in the early 1960's, our initial motive was to test the generality of this E-P-A affective meaning system — is it a human-species universal that is being reflected in language? Over the past 15 years our sample of language-culture communities has expanded from an initial 6 to (now) 30 human societies around the world, and it has become clear that this E-P-A semantic system is, indeed, a human universal.

What this meant, of course, was that we had pierced what has been called "the language barrier", at least as far as this affective domain of meaning was concerned, and were in a position to construct comparable measuring instruments (short-form semantic differentials) for measuring what we have come to call "subjective culture" in our various human communities. Over the past 10 years we have been using such instruments in compiling an *Atlas of Affective Meanings* for some 620 translation-equivalent concepts tapping diverse aspects of subjective culture. This information — accessible via teletype connections from a computerized data base — is available to social scientists for testing various hypotheses about universals, subuniversals and uniquenesses across our sample of human communities.

Through the good offices of Professor Ulf Himmelstrand at Uppsala University, Sweden became one of our early communities for study, and collaborative research between the Sociological Institute at Uppsala and our Center has been continuing for over 10 years. It was Ulf Himmelstrand who proposed that our *Atlas* data could be utilized in cross-national studies of *social indicators* — in fact, providing a rigorously quantitative type of subjective *social indicator* to be related to the more familiar *objective* social indicators like GNP, number of automobiles or TV sets, and numbers of suicides.

The initial research using the *Atlas* data as a subjective social indicator was done under Himmelstrand's direction at the Sociological Institute in Uppsala, and the one who did this research en route to his doctoral thesis was Haluk Soydan. His thesis includes three major substantive analyses of relations between subjective (*Atlas*) and objective indices — a study of kinship patterning in relation to

socio-economic forces, a study of immigrant labor flow and unemployment in relation to labelling concepts, and a study of the relations between "basis" and "superstructure" concepts, as predicted from a materialist conception of society, leading to a general typology of social structures.

Soydan's research is clearly pioneering in character; there having been practically no research of a solid nature on relations between objective and subjective social indicators – in part because quantitative indicators of the latter sort have not been available. The studies presented in this dissertation not only demonstrate the usefulness of our *Atlas* data in social science research generally, but also they suggest the feasibility of macrosociological research and its fruitfulness in increasing our understanding of cross-national similarities and differences. I am looking forward to continued collaboration of our Centre with Ulf Himmelstrand and Haluk Soydan on the intensive study of subjective social indicators as a means of understanding social development and change.

Charles E. Osgood

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the present inquiry is to explore hypotheses relating to the *Atlas of Affective Meanings*. Such explorations can contribute to the understanding of relationships between subjective evaluation of objective reality and objective structural factors.

It should be stressed, even at this early stage, that this attempt to explore hypotheses and to develop a working framework for the purpose of this type of research is a pioneering contribution in many respects and should be considered as only a first step in this research area.

By subjective culture we understand meanings attributed by human beings to material and nonmaterial things, phenomena, feelings, values, etc. We suggest that there is an intimate connection between the *Atlas of Affective Meanings* as an indicator of subjective culture, and some macrosociological and economic aspects of a society. In this inquiry we shall attempt to take the first steps toward developing a working model designed to analyse the above-mentioned connection.

In general terms, the main reason for undertaking this inquiry is merely a desire to contribute to the understanding of the social determination of affective meanings and thought. In a sense, this is a desire to find alternative ways of constructing bridges between psychological data and sociology. Of course, we are not the first one to express such a desire. As an example we mention two prominent social scientists: in his 1939 article, "Language, logic and culture", C.W. Mills has nicely indicated the need for identifying such bridges (Mills 1967:423–438). *The Mass Psychology of Fascism,* the monumental work published in 1946 by Wilhelm Reich, points out the indispensability of such alternative bridges, and develops a very interesting one (Reich 1970).

In more particular terms, the reason for undertaking this inquiry could be given with reference to the historical background of the *Atlas of Affective Meanings*. As we know, the semantic differential (SD) technique, the instrument used in collecting the data utilized in constructing the *Atlas*, and the *Atlas* itself, have all been worked out basically by psychologists. Sociology's involvement with the SD technique has been limited. Yet, the subjective data collected through the SD technique and listed in the *Atlas* provides interesting research possibilities for sociologists. Therefore, a pioneer macrosociological inquiry into the present *Atlas* would seem worthwhile.

The inquiry will begin with a brief presentation of the SD technique and the *Atlas*. Thereafter, the research procedure and various methodological problems will be discussed. Then, the main problem and the objective of the study will be formulated. These are the tasks of Chapter 1.

Chapter 2 will be devoted to the presentation of a theoretical frame of reference. The claims and aims of the inquiry will also be elaborated in this chapter.

In the following three chapters we shall explore hypotheses relating to the *Atlas*. It should be indicated at this point that the selection of the concept areas which will be investigated is basically motivated by our personal interest. In Chapter 3 we shall focus on *kinship* concepts. In order sociologically to understand patterns of kinship concepts in the *Atlas*, we shall investigate social tensions and contradictions generated by the interaction between two variables—level of development of the productive forces and type of family structure.

In Chapter 4 we shall study *labelling* concepts through an analysis of social tensions and contradictions generated by the interaction of two variables—ethnic fractionalization and strain-generating unemployment.

In Chapter 5 we shall construct a macrosociological typology in order to classify the communities involved in the *Atlas*. The typology will be statistically related to various basis-superstructure AAM-concepts, embracing concepts from technology to ideology.

Chapter 6 summarizes questions which are suggested, but not answered by our inquiry. In this chapter we shall also indicate prospects for follow-up studies of the present study.

The present study should be considered as a first step toward developing a sociological framework for the purpose of understanding the relationship between subjective evaluation of objective reality and objective macrosociological variables. The results of the inquiry should not, however, be taken as ultimate conclusions but as a scientific contribution to be discussed, developed further and used in the context of future research projects which will further pursue the paths explored in our inquiry.

I should like to express my special indebtedness to my adviser, Professor Ulf Himmelstrand, for helping me throughout this work. I also owe special thanks to Dr. Björn Eriksson, who has followed the work and given valuable comments. Moreover, I should like to thank Professor Charles E. Osgood, Professor William H. May, Professor Constantina Safilios-Rothschild and Dr. Oliver C.S. Tzeng, who have read various parts of the thesis and contributed their valuable criticism and comments. I am also indebted to those friends who have read parts of the thesis and criticised them at Seminars. My gratitude also goes to the Institute of Communications Research Center for Comparative Psycholinguistics for having put the *Atlas* at our disposal. The Swedish Council for Social Science Research financed the research project.

CHAPTER 1
Aims and Claims of this Study

1.1. Introduction

In these introductory pages we shall attempt to clarify both the starting point and the claims of this inquiry, the main objective of which is to *explore hypotheses* with regard to relationships between subjective culture and structural variations in various social settings. We shall first describe the starting point, which in fact embraces two elements: access to the *Atlas of Affective Meanings* (henceforth abbreviated AAM), and scientific curiosity about AAM's *relations,* if any, to structural variations between countries. Secondly, we shall mention a few words about structural variations between countries. Thirdly, we shall touch on the idea of *relations* between AAM and structural variations between countries. Thereafter, we shall present methodological considerations regarding the research procedure, certain definitions, and finally, the cross-cultural comparative research.

1.2. A Presentation of the Material

1.2.1. General Characteristics

The AAM was constructed on the basis of data which was collected by means of the Semantic Differential technique (SD) (Osgood et al. 1957). Hence the necessity of presenting the SD in a few words. A short definition of semantic differentiation can be obtained from *The Measurement of Meaning,* 1957, the cardinal work by Charles E. Osgood and his associates about the technique in question. By semantic differentiation is meant

> the successive allocation of a concept to a point in the multidimensional semantic space by selection from among a set of given scaled semantic alternatives.
> (Osgood et al. 1957:26)

The multidimensional semantic space of the SD is defined by the three universal factors, Evaluation, Potency and Activity (EPA). The factors are *empirically determined* to be universal features of meaning. In a simple way, these affective features of meaning refer to the most common and natural aspects of human life: the first one asks if something is *good* or *bad* for me; the second one asks if something is *strong* or *weak* in relation to me; and the third one asks if something is *active* or *passive.* The affective differentiation is said to be small between two or more

concepts if these concepts are located close to each other in the semantic space, and the affective differentiation is said to be greater between two or more concepts if the distances between these concepts are large in the semantic space. The SD as a measure of attitude is highly reliable (the test-retest coefficient is around 0.91) and has adequate validity (Osgood et al. 1957:192–195).

This is a short presentation of the essential aspects of the Semantic Differential technique. Since a more detailed description of the technique is available in the literature there is no reason here to repeat what has already been written.[1]

1.2.2. Atlas of Affective Meanings

The material collected in the AAM is a result of the application of the SD on a cross-cultural level. The project started with a planning conference in late 1959. The present *Atlas,* after corrective retestings, dates from July 1971. A dilemma of significance in cross-cultural studies arose with regard to the question of sampling. The research team has to make a choice: approximate representativeness within each country or approximate equivalence across countries? Considering the scarcity of resources of different kinds—financial, time, human energy, etc., it was decided to compare "semantic systems as a function of gross differences in language and culture" (Osgood 1971:23) among restricted but roughly equivalent samples. Equivalence was brought about by using "teen-age male students in average high schools in urban settings" (Osgood 1971:24)[2]. The present *Atlas* includes 620 concepts, sampled in 23 language/culture communities. These concepts are classified in 47 concept categories, which in turn are divided into 12 super categories.[3]

Language/culture community (L/C community) is a special category, used in the *Atlas of Affective Meanings*. This term is adopted in order to overcome various methodological difficulties peculiar to cross-national comparative studies. The *Atlas of Affective Meanings* is mediated primarily by means of language. In a global perspective, however, distribution of language does not follow existing political boundaries, economic systems and geographic variations. The Spanish language is used in various countries on both sides of the Atlantic. On the other hand, there are countries where different languages are used within the same political and economic boundaries. For instance, the AAM embodies three different language groups within India. In addition, certain types of culture follow certain languages (or vice versa), so that there are great cultural similarities among, for instance, the Spanish-speaking countries. In India, on the other hand, there are different cultures appropriate to the languages used in different regions.

In order to eliminate this kind of difficulty which can lead to misunderstandings, the term language/culture community will refer to a particular region where a specific language and culture is dominant, without considering political boundaries and geographic variations. Thus, both Calcutta and Germany are considered as language/culture communities, in spite of the fact that the Calcutta-region is

not an autonomous political and economic entity. Furthermore, in the present study, L/C community and country will be used as synonyms.[4]

Some basic measures are given in the *Atlas* (see Table 1–1).

Table 1–1: Basic Atlas Measures

	Composite factor scores			Standardized composite scores								
American English	*E*	*P*	*A*	*E-Z*	*P-Z*	*A-Z*	*F-Z*	*D-O*	*P-I*	*P-G*	*CI*	*CI-Z*
Accept things	0.6	0.5	−0.1	−0.2	−0.5	−0.4	−0.4	0.9	1.4	0.6	0.8	1.4
Accident	−1.8	0.7	0.3	−2.5	−0.2	0.3	−0.4	1.9	1.6	1.2	0.4	−0.7
Adolescence	0.4	0.4	0.8	−0.5	−0.8	1.2	−0.2	1.0	1.5	0.5	1.0	2.4
Adultery	−1.4	1.2	0.2	−2.1	0.4	0.2	−1.5	1.9	1.7	1.1	0.7	0.7
Africa	0.1	1.4	−0.2	−0.7	0.6	−0.5	−1.2	1.4	1.7	1.1	0.5	−0.1
Aggressive, Being	1.0	1.8	1.1	0.1	1.2	1.6	0.2	2.3	1.8	1.3	0.5	−0.2
	Composite factor scores			Standardized composite scores								
Japan, Japanese	*E*	*P*	*A*	*E-Z*	*P-Z*	*A-Z*	*F-Z*	*D-O*	*P-I*	*P-G*	*CI*	*CI-Z*
Accept things	−0.6	0.0	−0.2	−1.0	−0.7	−0.5	−1.1	0.6	1.5	0.4	1.1	2.5
Accident	−2.0	0.8	0.9	−2.5	0.7	1.3	1.0	2.3	1.8	1.4	0.4	−1.4
Adolescence	1.7	1.1	1.3	1.4	1.2	2.0	0.4	2.4	1.9	1.4	0.5	−0.7
Africa	−0.4	1.2	−0.4	−0.8	1.4	−0.9	−1.7	1.3	1.5	0.7	0.8	0.9
Aggressive, Being	−0.1	1.3	1.0	−0.5	1.5	1.6	−0.2	1.6	1.8	0.9	0.9	1.5
Air pollution	−2.2	1.2	−0.1	−2.7	1.5	−0.4	0.6	2.5	2.0	1.4	0.6	0.0

Note: The table is adopted from Osgood 1971:43.

Commenting on the table, Charles E. Osgood describes these basic measures as follows:

> The first three columns give the raw composite scores (averages of the four scales representing each factor) and the second three columns give the E, P, and A scores as standardized within each community. The F-Z column is the standardized rating of the concept of the *familiar-unfamiliar* scale and the D-O column is simply the distance from the origin of the space, or the meaningfulness, of the concept. P-I is the average polarization of the concept on all scales, taken across all individuals regardless of sign and hence without cancellation; P-G is the group or cultural polarization, taken with regard to sign and hence liable to cancellation toward the mean to the extent that individuals within the culture disagree among themselves. Finally, CI is what we call an index of *cultural instability*—simply P-I minus P-G—and CI-Z is the standardization of these values. A high CI-Z may represent a locus of cultural conflict; it can also represent multiple senses of the term itself (particularly where homonyms are involved). The high CI-Z for AE teenagers on the concept ADOLESCENCE—and low E-Z compared with JP, for that matter—is presumably a valid case of conflict within the culture, as is the high CI-Z for JPs on ACCEPTING THINGS AS THEY ARE. You might also note the relatively high E value for BEING AGGRESSIVE for AE as compared with JP (and most other communities); as we all know, AE kids are encouraged to "be aggressive" in school, in sports, and in life generally—but what is really meant is "be competitive".
>
> (Osgood 1971:42)

In addition to these basic measures, there are various summarizing formats that are computed. For the purposes of the present study there is no need to penetrate into the details of these formats. It can, however, be mentioned that in this inquiry, we shall use, together with other basic measures, the so called Indigenous Distance Matrices. These matrices give the interconcept distances in semantic space for each concept category and language/culture community.

1.2.3. What Does the AAM Indicate?

A concise answer to this question is as follows. The *Atlas of Affective Meanings* indicates, within a certain language/culture community, the degree of *affective differentiation* between various concepts defined within a concept category. It can also be said that AAM indicates *parts of subjective culture.* The affective differentiation of a concept is given by the allocation of this concept to a point in the tridimensional (that is, Evaluation-Potency-Activity) semantic space. Affective differentiation of a group of concepts assessed by a certain group of individuals indicates what affective meanings these individuals attach to a group of concepts which deal with the most common and natural aspects of human life. This is done in terms of whether this group of concepts is good or bad for, strong or weak in relation to, and finally, active or passive with regard to, this group of individuals.

We have asserted that the AAM indicates parts of subjective culture. The next question, then, concerns subjective culture. *By subjective culture we understand the meanings attributed to material and nonmaterial things, phenomena, feelings, values, etc., by a specified group of people.*

In his article "Exploration in Semantic Space: A Personal Diary", Professor Osgood expresses the same idea:

> (C)omparisons across cultures are particularly difficult when what anthropologists term *nonmaterial* traits are under study. It is one thing to compare skull shapes, scraping tools, potsherds, and other artifacts; it is quite another to compare values, feelings, stereotypes, and most generally meanings—what I have come to call "subjective culture". Whereas elements of objective culture may leave their physical traces on and in the earth, elements of subjective culture certainly cannot.
>
> (Osgood 1971:20)

AAM is an indicator which, by means of three universal dimensions, Evaluation, Potency and Activity, describes certain aspects of subjective culture as they are assessed by groups of individuals in different societies. This definition of subjective culture implies several aspects that are crucial to distinguish:

a) The conception of subjective culture refers to the *subjective* grasp of something objective, which can be asserted here as objective reality. This would include all the *material* and *nonmaterial things* and *phenomena* which exist *objectively.*
b) The *Atlas of Affective Meanings* is an operationalization of certain (affective) aspects of subjective culture.
c) The AAM covers certain "domains" of (affective) subjective culture, that is,

the AAM embodies approximately 620 concepts, which is only a small but presumably rather representative portion of the wide range of human reality.

1.2.4. Advantage of the Atlas Data

The material gathered for the *Atlas* is primarily a very systematic assembly of distributions of usages of terms. Being collected with a hard-data method, the material gives the best possibilities currently available for a comparative study of affective meanings across different cultural communities. The fact that the informants themselves were not directly asked about relationships among the concepts and that all comparisons of concepts were done by post data collection analysis, increases the flexibility of the data for application to various research questions.

1.2.5. Some Shortcomings of the Atlas Data

The major methodological weakness of these cross-cultural data is that the subjects, being teen-age male students in urban settings, not only constitute a very homogeneous group in each cultural community but also a somewhat peculiar and variable selection of male teen-age urbanites, since patterns of school recruitment and urban immigration vary a great deal across countries. A concrete consequence of this is that such a group, firstly, cannot be considered as representative for the rest of the community in which it was sampled, and secondly, is equivalent across countries only in an *institutional* sense—not in terms of process. Being aware of this fact, the researcher must be careful in drawing conclusions from this material. Now, since the purpose of the present project is to *generate* and *explore* new hypotheses, and *not* strictly to verify or falsify hypotheses on the basis of the *Atlas* material, such a shortcoming is less significant, but should still be kept in mind.

Another weakness that one must be aware of is the translation failures which have occurred during the application of the SD to the "same" concepts in different cultures. Many of these failures, however, have been discovered and corrected in retests. The researcher should be aware of this shortcoming in order not to arrive at erroneous conclusions.

1.3. Structural Variations Between Countries

A commonly recognized fact in the social sciences is *structural variation* (relations of production, politico-ideological relations, family structures, etc.) between countries. Structural variations embrace, in the first place, economic, political and social domains.

Types of economic relations, i.e., relations of production, become more complex with increasing industrial development. Depending on what kind of relations of production are operating in various societies, they become more or less fraught with industrial conflicts. Economic development, measured in terms of different and commonly used indicators, such as gross national product, energy consumption, degree of industrialization, suggests the presence of concrete structural variation. Structural variation referring to the political domain is indicated not only in the established literature of political science; it also can be found in the real everyday world in different societies. Differences between the structures of family types, interest organizations, political organizations, economic organizations and other social institutions are the variations that interest us in the context of this study. In the present study, we shall of course concentrate entirely on the structural variations of the language/culture communities involved in the AAM.

1.4. Claims of the Study: Relations Between the AAM and Structural Variations

1.4.1. General

A general and primary assumption of this inquiry is that there is an intimate connection between the AAM as an indicator of subjective culture, and some macro-sociological and economic aspects of the society.

Connected with this primary assumption of the inquiry is the particular objective of the present cross-cultural comparative study: *to explore hypotheses, suggested by the AAM, that can contribute to the understanding of the relationship between objective structural factors and subjective evaluation of objective reality.*

As a brief glance at the *Atlas* matrices will show, there are interesting cross-national variations with respect to the affective meanings of various concepts. Given these data and a wide range of structural variation between different social settings, our scientific curiosity was aroused. To attempt to discover and assess types of relations between subjective culture as it is indicated by the AAM, and structural variation between societies then becomes natural.

Technically, this task will be achieved by generating and assessing hypotheses which can be considered as the *first* steps in establishing a more elaborate theory illuminating connections between subjective culture and structural aspects of societies. We must at this point stress once again that the aim of this inquiry is not, and cannot be, strictly to verify hypotheses by using the AAM.

A broader theoretical frame of reference will be presented in the next chapter. It can immediately be asserted that such a framework is not, strictly speaking, a mod-

el within which causal relations can be tested. One of the main functions of a theoretical framework such as ours is quite different: it is to outline an overall picture of the social reality that we claim to focus on. A more detailed discussion of this matter, however, is the task of the following chapter.

1.4.2. The Problem

A detailed and minute presentation of the main problem will not appear until the following chapter. In order, however, to introduce the reader to our main concern, we should like to say a few words about the cardinal problem of this inquiry. Let us illustrate this with the following diagram:

Diagram 1—1

Note: The arrows show that the origin of question-marks (wonderment) is the AAM. Do not confuse with arrows showing causal, and other types of, relations.

The *Atlas of Affective Meanings* is our starting material and reveals many questions. What kind of reality does the AAM refer to? What does the AAM denote? What factors condition variations of affective meanings, as they are indicated by the AAM? What are the socializing agents which influence such meanings?

The first type of questions concerns social reality and objects that the AAM refers to. In a way, this is the environment covered and reflected by the AAM. The second type of questions concerns factors that cause a specific outcome.

The question is, how does the AAM operate in a certain social setting? The figure and questions presented above can serve as introductory considerations in order to make the reader familiar with the kind of problems that will be examined during this inquiry. Elaborations of the figure and questions, yielding a theoretical frame of reference, will be the task of the following chapter.

1.5. The Research Procedure

An important question that must be examined as early as this introductory chapter concerns the research procedure to be followed. How shall we explore hypotheses referring to a relationship between subjective culture and structural variables? Or, what concrete method will be used in order to generate and assess hypotheses?

It is important to become acquainted with the central research procedure which will be *explicitly* presented in this section, since not every single element of the concrete research process can be reported in subsequent chapters, where we study given concept categories. On the contrary, only outlines and processes of the research method will be indicated there. The concrete research process of our inquiry is merely a pendulum oscillating between the subjective and objective data we are concentrating upon. Such a process is comprised of many details which, as they are implicit in the findings of the research, must be classified and systematized and thus made explicit. At this point, we should like to introduce Diagram 1—2, which indicates the method of generating and assessing hypotheses.

It should be noted that the process, schematized by the flow-chart, indicates the routine or the circuit which we have repeated many times before being able to generate and assess the hypotheses presented in this study. In any social scientific inquiry, one of the central starting points of the social scientist is a given picture (a frame of reference) about how society and human actions function. In a study such as ours, where we wish to examine a great amount of data indicating what people *feel* and think about different objects, it is indispensable, for the purpose of *exploring* relations between these subjective data and objective structural data, to have a *given* theoretical frame of reference. Thus, the first phase of the research process, or circuit, consists of a routine that may be named the *generation of comprehensive hypotheses within the general frame of reference.* In the next chapter, such a general frame of reference will be outlined. But here let us specify only how we methodologically use the general frame of reference. How do we use the general frame of reference to explore the data sets—unsystematized and almost chaotic as they are from a sociological point of view—provided by the *Atlas of Affective Meanings?* The answer is simple: the general frame of reference is like a compass when we look at these data sets and try to explore variances, invariances and sociologically meaningful patterns which may be systematized on a cross-national level. The researcher asks questions like: can a certain observed pattern in the objective data be understood and explained in terms of the general frame of reference? If so, which variables can be generated through the general frame of reference? Are such variables theoretically meaningful and fruitful?

Thus, exploring certain patterns in the subjective data and generating theoretically interesting variables through the general frame of reference, the researcher *designs* in his imagination a certain picture of the data and the social reality the data refers to. This is only a very preliminary theoretical model, generated through the general frame of reference.

The next step, then, consists of substantiation of such imaginary designs. Thus, having in mind such designs or images of data structures (that is, in our case of subjective culture), we enter the second phase, called *inductive assessment and generation of working hypotheses.* What we do during this phase is simply to search for single cases which may fit our design, i.e., our preliminary theoretical model designed through the general frame of reference. Now, if we through induction

Diagram 1–2: Flow-chart Showing the Research Process



Note: The flow-chart should be read from left to right.

find single cases which may fit and thus strengthen our preliminary theoretical model, we may move to the third phase, in the research process, called *tentative empirical testing*. If this fails, however, as is often the case, we must return back to phase 1, in order to revise the theoretical model and to generate other variables, which may be more successful in a theoretical sense.

In a way, tentative empirical testing is a quantitative continuation of phase 2. During phase 3 we attempt to discover whether *all* the cases (that is, language/-culture communities) involved in the *Atlas* can be understood in terms of the theoretical model generated under earlier phases of the research process. If the model receives further support and evidence, then it is worth keeping the model for future investigations (of more comprehensive data to be used in cross-cultural and cross-class comparisons) and assessing the generated hypotheses. On the other hand, if tentative empirical testing is unsuccessful, we must return (whether fortunately or unfortunately) to phases 1 and 2 in order to see what is wrong with the model and/or our understanding of the data.

As the reader realizes, this routine is repeated several times for each concept category chosen for investigation in the present study. The main principle of this method is, of course, a flexibility which allows the best possible interplay between empirical data and theoretical attempts. In a sense this is a trial-error method, with the weaknesses and strengths of such a method. We are naturally aware of the risks of overinterpreting "successful" trials, which later may turn out to be incidental or random.

1.6. Studying the Indigenous Distance Matrices

In addition to using the basic measures given in the *Atlas,* we shall focus our attention on the so called Indigenous Distance Matrices. These matrices provide the interconcept distances in semantic space for each concept category and language/-culture community. A systematic investigation of indigenous distance matrices requires a method through which the matrices can be systematically analysed. Otherwise, the task of studying these matrices becomes rather difficult, since they usually display a perplexing number of figures indicating interconcept distances. An adequate method of investigating these matrices is provided by the so called Hierarchical Cluster Analysis, described by G. Gruvaeus and H. Wainer, 1972. Thus, by studying indigenous distance matrices and matrices obtained through hierarchical cluster analysis, we obtain information on how the given concepts are distributed or configurated in semantic space. In order to secure a better understanding and assessment of such matrices we used various indices, calculated on the basis of results given by the hierarchical cluster analysis (see Chapter 4). In this context, two notions may be used in order to describe the configurations that

Diagram 1–3 (a–c): Figures Showing Nebulae and Clusters



Diagram 1–3 (a)



Diagram 1–3 (b)



Diagram 1–3 (c)

a certain group of concepts form in semantic space. These are the notions of nebula and cluster.

A *nebula* is a concept configuration formed in the semantic space by all the concepts of a given concept category. Each concept category is, then, a nebula. A *cluster* is formed within a nebula by a group of two or more concepts that are distributed in such a way that they are relatively nearer to each other than to the rest of the concepts in the same nebula.[5]

In principle, three fundamental types of concept formation are observable in semantic space. They are illustrated in Diagram 1–3 (a–c).

In Diagram 1–3 (a), concepts of a certain concept category are distributed such that a *nebula* is formed. But no distinct and *psychologically meaningful* secondary formations exist. In Diagram 1–3 (b), however, it is possible to see cluster formations within the nebula. Clusters *x, y* and *z* are shaped by concepts that come much closer to each other. Diagram 1–3 (b) also illustrates another concept, namely *polarized clustering.* We say that clusters *x, y* and *z* in Diagram 1–3 (b) are polarized. In particular, the degree of polarization between clusters *x* and *z* is high, since the concepts of cluster *x* have strong positive loadings, whereas the concepts of cluster *z* have strong negative loadings (high affective differentiation). High polarization of clusters is obtained whenever the affective differentiation of the concepts which shape these clusters is *strongly* loaded and in *different directions.*

The psychological meaning of the concept configurations is interpreted as being a similarity of affective meanings of the concepts of a certain cluster in a certain culture. In psychological terms the degree of polarized clustering indicates differentiation of affective meanings given to different concepts. Thus, a high degree of polarized clustering of *logically* connected concepts indicates that the concepts are attributed to different and/or opposite affective meanings. Similarly, a low degree of polarized clustering of logically connected concepts indicates that the concepts involved are attributed to similar or nearly identical affective meanings.

In Diagram 1–3 (c), we have a rather small nebula within which all the concepts stick closely to each other, so that *no* clusters are formed. In this nebula, all the concepts have similar affective meanings. The nebula itself is tightly clustered and thus may have a specific psychological meaning in given contexts.

1.7. Some Considerations Concerning Cross-National Comparative Research

The purpose of the present section is to point out, and briefly discuss, some aspects of cross-national comparative research. Here, we shall focus only on those aspects which are relevant to our inquiry.[6]

1.7.1. Improving Our Understanding of Social Phenomena

It should be clear by now that the main purpose of our study is to generate, explore and assess hypotheses. This does not mean that we verify or falsify them with the findings to be reported. Causal inference is appropriate primarily to experimental research. In this study we shall not be concerned with causal inferences but rather with *causal interpretations,* which may help us to acquire a better understanding of *already* existing theories or hypotheses, and of hypotheses *generated* in the context of the present inquiry. As Allardt writes:

> Cross-country research [as well as cross-national research] and for that matter macro-analyses of intra-country [and inter-country] variations provide no opportunities for controlled experiments. However, in cross-national research we can make *causal interpretations* on the basis of experience, existing explanatory hypotheses and other available information.
>
> (Allardt 1966:177)

The implications of this quotation are worth keeping in mind. Causal models or flow-charts in general, "really are models; they can never be actually established" (Allardt 1966:177). Causal interpretations are realized on a theoretical level. Furthermore, as stated by Allardt in the same context:

> Causal interpretations are maintained only if they are compatible with propositions in other successful causal models. Because causal models never can be either established or directly rejected, one is inclined to formulate and uphold only such causal models as seem relevant for a whole group of theoretically interesting problems.
>
> (Allardt 1966:177)

To our mind, then, what the orientation of cross-cultural comparative research should be is rather clear: *analysis of cross-national data should be oriented towards improving our understanding of social phenomena, and not towards testing hypotheses.*

In a brief paper prepared by Franklin, for the Political Theory Sessions of the Joint Sessions Workshops of the European Consortium for Political Research, 1974, this point was elegantly elaborated. The following quotation may serve to summarize the main argument:

> A sample survey constitutes an extremely valuable asset. It usually contains far more information about the interaction of social forces under investigation than is contained in the whole body of knowledge about these forces which is in common currency. To develop a theory or hypothesis on the basis of existing knowledge and then use the sample merely to test this theory seems to me an incredible waste. In a discipline as primitive as our own it would seem far more appropriate to use the information contained in the survey to refine and elaborate existing theories, and to develop new ones; and to leave the systematic testing of the results for a later date.
>
> (Franklin 1974:4–5)

1.7.2. Selection of Units in Cross-National Comparative Research

In cross-national comparative studies two main types of unit are used, namely,

social structure taken as a whole[7] (or "total society"[8]) and *specific aspects* (e.g., family structure, political system, social-care institutions) of society.[9] In the present study, both types are used: in Chapter 5, a macro-typology of societies is constructed by taking social structure as a whole, while in Chapters 3 and 4, specific aspects of society (family structure and productive forces in Chapter 3, and ethnic differentiation, unemployment, etc., in Chapter 4) are considered.

When the unit considered is a total social structure, one of the main problems of cross-national research is how to simplify this complex reality. Simplification of reality enables the researcher to grasp reality more easily, but at the same time one should avoid oversimplifying to the point where reality becomes unrecognizable. In cross-national study one must identify and clarify a system of theoretical tools which can be applied to all societies under inquiry.

> A comparative social science requires a generalized system of concepts which will enable the scientific observer to compare and contrast large bodies of concretely different phenomena in consistent terms.
>
> (David Aberle quoted by Frey 1970:187)

Robert M. Marsh (1966; see also Marsh 1967), when listing minimum requisites of any schema for comparative studies, demands, among other things, that a comparison and explanation in comparative studies "should be based on an adequate understanding of the *relevant aspects* of the societies being compared" (Marsh 1966:212, emph. added).

For the structural and historical setting of language/culture communities "'relevant' aspects mean that the comparativist need not try to know 'everything' about the societies he is comparing" (Marsh 1966:212). To try to find out in detail every institutional, structural and other type of phenomena taking place in the societies which are objects of inquiry would contribute to confusion rather than to an overall understanding of central factors operating in these countries. In the context of our macro-typology, relevant aspects are those components of the main theoretical frame of reference that are discussed in Chapter 5.

More space, however, is devoted to units referring to specific aspects of society. Investigation of kinship concepts and of so called labelling concepts required the selection of relevant units in the communities involved. Thus, for instance, in studying kinship concepts we collected data on types of family structure and on level of development of the productive forces, i.e., on two given structural patterns found in the countries involved.

It is interesting to quote Vallier in this connexion:

> . . . the study of the structure of complex, contemporary societies boils down to research on specific organizations, structural fields or sectors, inter-level relationships, lines of specialized activity and leadership, and many decision-making and control centers.
>
> From this perspective, the fashionable distinction between macro and micro disappears.
>
> (Vallier 1973 b:210–211)

We can agree with Vallier only in the sense that the researcher must delimit the number of study unit(s) in order more easily to obtain concrete information and knowledge on the unit(s) in question. Some scientific objectives demand investigation of one or few unit(s) only, without at first paying any attention to the larger macro-perspectives. This, however, should not mean that there is not an overall social structure. Clearly, for some scientific objectives the researcher must focus on the "overall social structure" which *becomes concrete* in terms of "concrete role systems, concrete sequences of problem-solving, and concrete collectivities and their environments" (Vallier 1973 b:215). That is, it is not exactly as Vallier writes:

> When we get right down to it, then, macro-structural inferences are actually subtle, intuitive aggregations about structural patterns in sub-societal contexts. There is not something 'out there' which can be called the 'overall structure' of American society, but only a diverse and specialized range of structural arrangements that involve concrete role systems, concrete sequences of problem-solving, and concrete collectivities and their environments.
>
> (Vallier 1973 b:215)

Depending on what we should like to know about social phenomena we can use either overall social structure or given parts of overall structure as study-units.

1.7.3. Problems of Comparability, Reliability, and Lack of Data in Collecting Cross-National Objective Data

Finally, we should like to mention three common problems confronted by the comparativist who works with secondary data—i.e., data collected and systematized by others for various purposes. These problems concern, firstly, the comparability of survey and other data across societies; secondly, access to information on the reliability of data due to the data collectors' scientific, technical and resource capabilities; and thirdly, missing data. Statistical and other types of objective data are often collected by individual researchers or domestic private or public agencies and institutions, and thereafter reported either privately in scientific contexts or to international organizations (e.g., UN-agencies). Although many routines for data collection are already standardized by international agencies, such routines are not fully utilized and applied by national collectors, owing mainly to variations in the latters' resources—human and organizational. Moreover, we have the additional problem generated by *different ways* of understanding and evaluating the same phenomena or societal issue in various societies. Probably one of the most interesting kind of data, in terms of comparability, is unemployment. A discussion of the comparability of unemployment data can be found in Chapter 4. Reliability is another problem in this context. The main question is whether we can have confidence in the data reported. Do data fully refer to reality? Or, are data deficient due to methodological shortcomings or for political reasons?

As far as statistical data are concerned, it should be noted that the various year-

books published by UN-agencies are rather cautious in using data that they evaluate as unreliable, especially for statistical methodological reasons. Of course, it is more difficult to find out when data are distorted for political reasons; therefore it becomes more difficult to safeguard oneself against such deficiencies. Data on ethnic and linguistic fractionalization may, for instance, be subject to distortion for political reasons. A certain caution is demanded in Chapter 4 with reference to this variable. As for other types of data (e.g., data on types of family structures) collected from various books and other scientific sources, the reliability of data may be cross-checked by using several sources.

Lack of data is the third main problem which should be mentioned when discussing problems concerning cross-national comparative research. As the reader realizes, the present study embraces countries from three different continents and several dimensions by which these countries are studied. This means that a large amount of quantitative and qualitative data is required in order to carry out a systematic and complete study of the countries involved with respect to the chosen variables. Unfortunately, this is not always fully possible. Here and there, one is hindered by lack of data. Lack of data may due to several reasons: data may quite simply be missing, as is often the case. But it may also be missing due to problems of comparability and/or reliability. That is, data which are not comparable and/or not reliable cannot be used. In subsequent chapters, lack of data is always explicitly indicated while elaborating the chosen independent variables, but even at this point the reader should be aware of this problem.

CHAPTER 2
Aims and Claims Elaborated: A Theoretical Frame of Reference

2.1. Introduction

In this chapter we shall give a detailed presentation of the main problem of this inquiry. As mentioned above our objective is to generate and assess hypotheses based on data given in the AAM. The question is, how are we to achieve this? What should be the fundamental premises of an approach employed for this purpose? Various scientific strategies and premises can be utilized in approaching our main objective: this study will use a *macrosociological* approach in investigating the AAM.

2.2. The Problem

At the very outset of this study, we mentioned two elements as the starting points of this inquiry. The first is access to the *Atlas of Affective Meanings* (AAM), the second is *scientific curiosity* alone. As was described previously, the AAM indicates, for various language/culture communities, the degree of affective differentiation between various concepts, as defined within a concept category. This initially elementary starting point or what might be termed the givens of the inquiry, can be schematized as follows:

Diagram 2–1

Note: Arrows show relations or connections and *not* causal inferences. Arrows refer particularly to questions and curiosity about the AAM and its external determinants.

The first question actualized by this simple schema is, of course, what the AAM stands for. What do we measure with and indicate by the AAM? What does the AAM denote? What kind of objective reality does the AAM refer to? Secondly,

we become curious about cross-national *variations* of affective meanings, indicated by the AAM: What *factors* contribute to variations of affective meanings, as indicated by the AAM? What are the socializing agents which influence the AAM? These questions can be tentatively answered by saying that the AAM is influenced by two types of elements. The first is the *concrete experiences* that the individuals have when they are involved with objects covered by the AAM. What does the individual think and feel about objective reality? For instance, what does the individual think about family members, concrete and living objects such as "Father" or "Mother", or about artifacts such as "Table" or "Pencil", or about more abstract concepts such as "Democracy" or "Morality"?[1] The second type of element influencing the AAM embraces *socializing agents,* which form and shape the individual's picture of social reality. An individual's picture and experience of objective reality is formed, not only by the objective characteristics and nature of the object in question, but also by the education and socialization of the individual. Here, of course, we primarily find the family, the school and various other institutions that operate as agents of socialization.

The simple schema relating the AAM to boxes containing various question marks can be now completed as the second step of formulating the main problem of our inquiry.

Diagram 2–2


Proba-[2] bility of being exposed to certain socializing agents
influences
AAM
influences
Proba-[2] bility of being exposed to certain objects

The boxes which previously contained question marks are now filled in by two elements which are considered to influence the AAM. These are two natural aspects of any given society: in our daily life, we are exposed to various objects existing in our environment, but the range of objects to which we are exposed varies according to the social setting. For a certain group of people living within a certain cultural setting, the probability of being exposed to *certain objects* can be higher than it is for another group of individuals of the same or another society. For instance, a group of male teenagers can have contacts or activities with certain groups of objects, and not with others. Whether or not they have concrete experience of, or transactions with, certain objects, is likely to contribute to variations of affective meanings, indicated by the AAM. Where no such transaction takes place with a certain group of objects, socializing agents become more important in influencing variations of affective meanings. Based on these working hypotheses,

sociologically interesting and crucial questions emerge here. What is the relative importance of a concrete group of denoted objects? What kind of social factors determine probability of *being* or *not being* exposed to a certain object or group of objects? Are there any factors intrinsic in the *social structure* which influence and determine the probability of being exposed to a certain object or group of objects?

The other element or factor important in this context consists of the socializing agents, such as the school, the family, etc. The social survival, continuity and persistence of human society is conditioned and achieved by various socializing agents found in all societies, although their form and content diverge. It is important to notice that the type and structure of socializing agent alter, according to the kind of society within which they are active. Even at this point we encounter questions that are sociologically important and interesting: what is the relative importance of socializing agents in influencing variations of affective meanings within various concept categories? How can we explain why, in a given historical period of a society, certain socializing agents are more current and have greater impact than other socializing agents? Do socializing agents play a more important role when the probability of being exposed to certain objects is lower? At this point it is asserted that *structural factors determine* the probability of being exposed to, on the one hand, certain socializing agents and, on the other, certain objects within the environment. We can improve our schema with a further step, outlined below:

Diagram 2–3



Note: If not otherwise indicated, straight arrows indicate causal relations in the present and in the following schemata.

At this point, we *explicitly* move to a macrosociological level where the main concern of the inquiry is related to the social structure of society. The first task, then, is explicitly to describe types of structural factors that are related to the probability of being exposed to certain socializing agents and to certain objects. For this purpose, we require both a specific and a general discussion: specific, because it must take into consideration the particular characteristics of the groups that have contributed the *Atlas* data; general, because it must give an overall picture of

the social reality in which we are operating. As mentioned above, the subjective culture for each of the 23 language/culture communities involved in the AAM comes from a very special group of people in these respective countries. That is, subjective culture, here indicated by the affective meanings of a large number of concepts, is an output produced by *urbanite, male teenagers in high schools.* It is to the specific characteristics of this group, that we must pay attention when investigating the impact of economic and macrosociological factors which, through the socializing agents and objects that this group is exposed to, lead to affective differentiation of various concepts. Thus, we shall now advance the following diagram, introducing three factors which are independent and explanatory variables:

Diagram 2—4



The new boxes introduced in this diagram indicate three important elements or institutions of the social structure that are related to the AAM in two ways: firstly, by determining the probability of being exposed to certain group of objects and, secondly, by determining the probability of being exposed to specific socializing agents. These institutions are family, school and finally, the dominant cultural environment.

An issue which becomes of interest at this point is whether adolescent culture does or does not exist[3]. Our intention here is not to present a survey of youth sociology, nor to discuss arguments for and against the view that there exists adolescent culture.[4] A survey of literature by Andersson supports the conviction that

> the question whether a youth culture exists or not is largely a problem of definition, and the conclusions arrived at are dependent on what is meant by the term culture and what criteria are used.[5]
>
> (Andersson 1969:28)

Andersson concludes that

> the main question is not whether the conduct and values of young people are to be regarded as proof of a special subculture or not.[6]
>
> (Andersson 1969:29)

At this point, what is important is to emphasize that the *Atlas* data may adequately be approached by our theoretical frame of reference, which in the context of youth maintains the family, the school and the dominant cultural environment as main elements *connecting the social life of youth to the total social structure.*

The standpoint of our theoretical frame of reference in this context mirrors that found in the following words of Jahoda and Warren:

> The major culture of which they [the youth] are part is transmitted by family, school and community in which they mix with other age groups to varying extents. It follows that such a group in society can usefully be studied from the point of view of what they have in common as well as from the point of view of what they share with the major culture.
>
> (Jahoda & Warren 1965:143)

The type of family structure existing in a certain cultural setting influences directly the type of objects of exposure in this social setting. For instance, in a nuclear family, the objects of exposure are primarily (as far as the family members are concerned) parents, brothers and sisters, and occasionally grandparents, whereas in a so called joint or extended family there is another pattern.[7] On the other hand, we also know that the family operates as an important and vital socializing agent in many societies.[8] The family is the major transmitter of many attitudes, norms, values and even language[9] (Wolfe 1973:168). At this point, some sociologically interesting questions arise: why does the family transmit certain types of attitudes, norms and values, and not others? Which factors determine the type of socializing role played by the family? Is the family, as a social institution, an independent element within the social structure? If not, what is the nature and the place of the family within the social structure? In order to grasp questions of this type we must refer to a larger context, giving an overall picture of social reality and society. Before accomplishing this task, however, let us briefly comment upon the other two social elements chosen here, and for the purposes of this schema adapted to the exigencies of our specific group.

In this context, the school (which also plays a twofold role) has a particular place. The school is the main institution that makes possible the exposure to a certain group of objects which are not available to teenagers in their daily life outside the school. The impact of the school as a socializing agent is also essential. Various aspects are involved: one aspect is the selection of verbal material. Norms and value orientations accepted by the society are most effectively transmitted through verbal material used by formal educational institutions. Verbal material often embodies political and ideological aspects. Pedagogical forms of transmitting verbal material and other types of information comprise another aspect worth mentioning. Being representatives of the school, teachers play an important role, by forwarding specific attitudes, norms and value orientations. The role of schoolmates is also significant in this context. A final aspect of importance is the pattern of recruitment of children to school.[10]

Sociologically interesting questions with respect to schools: what is the nature of the school as a socializing agent? What kind of role does this institution play within the social structure? Can a school, as a socializing agent, be considered as an autonomous element within the social structure? If not, what kind of relation does a school have with other components of the social structure?

The last element chosen for the purpose of this schema is the dominant cultural environment. This conception is very crucial for at least two reasons: 1) it concretizes ideas and issues of the superstructure, i.e., it identifies those ideas which play active and effective roles in a given historical period, 2) it reveals the frame of these ideas. The dominant cultural environment is, then, a network of ideas, issues and "popular" ideologies[11] of a given society in a given historical period. As a matter of fact, the dominant cultural environment is a part of the overall superstructure. We can say, generally, that superstructure is a concept which emphasizes the *total* number of such ideas, issues, institutions and ideologies, whereas the conception of dominant cultural environment emphasizes the *dominant* ideas and issues, etc., of the superstructure in a given historical period of a certain society. We shall maintain that some ideas, issues, etc., become dominant and active, not because "it happens to be so", but because of the internal interaction of the various elements of social structure.[12]

The dominant cultural environment functions in such a way that it directly or indirectly influences thinking, views and feelings of people in favoring or in decrying certain things. In our general frame of reference, the dominant cultural environment primarily functions in two ways when influencing the AAM, namely, by influencing the probability of being exposed to certain objects and the probability of being exposed to certain socializing agents. At present, the term dominant cultural environment seems to cover a wide range of cultural forms, from Western pop- and mass-culture to disciplinary ideological training manifested in different countries. It seems obvious that youngsters are being exposed to both the objects displayed and the socializing agents (television, newspapers, magazines, ads, commercialized culture, training camps, etc.) which comprise the dominant cultural environment.[13]

At this point, we can legitimately raise questions about dominant cultural environment: what is the nature of the dominant cultural environment? How is it formed and shaped? Who are the markers of the dominant cultural environment? What kind of role is played by the dominant cultural environment within the social structure?

Up until now, we have considered the three elements or institutions of the social structure, i.e., family, school and dominant cultural environment, as independent and autonomous factors, influencing and deciding the probability of being exposed to certain objects and to certain socializing agents. Nevertheless, questions raised with respect to these institutions suggest that they operate within a larger context, a social structure. This means that these factors are, in their turn, influenced by other structural components. In order to illustrate this type of

relations, a new and ultimate schema will be presented:

Diagram 2–5



Note: Straight arrows indicate causal relations only whereas jagged, double-ended arrows represent dialectical, expressive, conditional and functional relations.

In this final schema, which is the theoretical frame of reference for this inquiry, two new boxes are added: Superstructure and Economic Structure. A minute analysis and description of these two terms will be given in Chapter 5. At the moment, the focus will be concentrated on the theoretical frame of reference, as schematized above. In the figure, school, family and dominant cultural environment, on the one hand, and superstructure on the other are shown as if they were different bodies or components of the social structure. To comprehend the figure in this way would be both erroneous and improper, for the simple reason that school, family and dominant cultural environment are components of social structure—more precisely, they are components of superstructure. In the figure they are (for pedagogical and analytical reasons) represented by different boxes which belong to the superstructure and are connected with the economic structure, not by straight arrows, however, but by jagged, double-ended arrows.[14]

In fact, family, school and dominant cultural environment all operate within social structure, the components of which we assume have *dialectical relations*

with each other—dialectical in the sense described in Chapter 5. The general idea of this theoretical frame of reference is that the AAM is a function of structural factors that are dialectically related to each other. In the figure dialectical relations of the components of social structure are indicated by jagged, double-ended arrows. As will be analysed in Chapter 5, the major dialectical relations occur between economic structure and superstructure, the two main components of social structure. Superstructure is the body of political, legal, ideological and cultural ideas, views and their corresponding institutions and organizations that justify the economic structure. In this sense, family, school and dominant cultural environment are the major institutions and channels which are advanced as socializing agents and displayers of objects. The key questions emerging at this point are, of course, how does social structure function? What is its nature? What kind of relations—causal, conditioning and/or dialectical—take place within the social structure? These questions will be elaborated in Chapter 5, when studying certain fundamental aspects and problems of the Marxist conception of society.

2.3. Concluding Remarks

Before concluding this chapter we should like to make clear for the reader both our motives for choosing a Marxist inspired general theoretical frame of reference[15] and the functions of this framework.

By now it should be clear that three elements (the family, the school, and the dominant cultural environment) are specifically emphasized in the frame of reference, since they are *considered* to be the most important social elements with regard to the relations of *Atlas* youngsters with the rest of the society. Social tensions generated by the interaction of structural factors are *assumed* within the frame of reference to be transmitted to the youngsters primarily through these three social elements. As was already mentioned these three elements function within a complex web of structural conditions which must in one way or another be classified in order to understand mechanisms of such structural factors. A general frame of reference put forward by the Marxist social theory was chosen as the classifier of such a complex of structural factors. We shall here advance some arguments as to why such a general frame of reference is relevant to, and indispensable for, a study of this type.

Total Picture of Society. In any study within the social sciences, and particularly in pioneering inquiries, one of the starting points of the social scientist is a given conception about how society and human actions function. Without such a ready-made collection of hypotheses, theoretical frameworks or theories, the investigator may be compared to a captain without a compass and in the middle of the ocean. The researcher must have an instrument that can handle a wide range of

problems out of which some can be sorted and identified, so that their relevance to the social scientific purposes at hand may be defined and, hopefully, demonstrated. In this *pioneering* and *explorative* stage of investigation of subjective culture as indicated by the AAM, we require such an instrument, one able to cover the *totality* of societal existence. There is no doubt today that the Marxist frame of reference is the major framework that has not only *explicitly* approached the interaction between economic, social, political, and ideological forces but also has produced a rather advanced instrument for macrosociological purposes.[16] It seems natural to use such an approach in our explorative cross-culturally comparative study of subjective culture.

Moreover, it must be pointed out that the Marxist frame of reference provides a total picture of the society not only because it focuses on various *sectors* (economic, social, political, ideological) of the social structure as a whole, but also because of its suggestions concerning the *class-character* of society. Now, this aspect of the frame of reference is very important for future sociological investigations of subjective culture, as need not only cross-cultural comparisons but also *cross-cultural-cross-class* investigations of subjective culture (as indicated by the AAM) in order to arrive at a better understanding of the relationship between subjective culture and objective social structure. As we shall see in Chapter 5, the *Atlas* data yields preliminary evidence that subjective culture may alter not only as a function of cross-cultural differences but also as a function of objective class-positions.

Delineating Boundaries. One of the functions of any theoretical frame of reference is to delineate a kind of boundary that limits a region or domain within which central factors that relate to the scientific problem are to be identified and selected. The general objective of this inquiry is to generate and assess hypotheses from a macrosociological viewpoint on the basis of data that indicate subjective culture. This is a rather wide-ranging objective. Concept categories available in the *Atlas* cover large sections of human life and society, the understanding of which demands an overall picture of a society with given contours. In this context we believe that the theoretical frame of reference adopted here provides valuable help not only for the present inquiry but also for future investigations of subjective culture.

Generative Purposes. The theoretical frame of reference will be used in order to *generate* relevant variables for use in the inquiry. This function proves to be important especially for the construction of a macrosociological typology, presented in Chapter 5. Furthermore, the theoretical frame of reference adopted here has the additional advantage of generating variables which are theoretically connected to each other.

Selective Purposes. A significant function of the frame of reference is to *select* those factors, and thus variables, that are relevant to and important for the study of a particular concept category. A typical example of this function is given in Chapter 4, where we investigate so called Labelling Concepts. It is evident that

the general theoretical frame of reference used in this study has been decisive in selecting specific variables for the purpose of studying labelling concepts.

CHAPTER 3
Kinship Concepts

3.1. Introduction

The objective of the present chapter is to explore and assess hypotheses, using affective meanings of kinship concepts as expressed in the *Atlas,* and a macrosociological approach. In accordance with the *Atlas* terminology we shall henceforth use the term *kincepts* in referring to kinship concepts.

Out of the total of 620 concepts[1], only 22 concepts are defined as belonging to the domain of kincepts. The 19 kincepts we consider are the following: AUNT, BRIDE, BRIDEGROOM, COUSIN, BROTHER, DAUGHTER, FATHER, FATHER–IN–LAW, GRANDFATHER, GRANDMOTHER, HUSBAND, EGO, MOTHER, MOTHER–IN–LAW, RELATIVES, SISTER, SON, UNCLE, WIFE. In addition to these, three nouns, PERSON, MOST PEOPLE and FRIEND, were included.

In the following pages we shall first introduce our independent variables: the family type and the level of development of the productive forces. After having assessed the position of the language/culture communities[2] with regard to the independent variables, two typologies will be exhibited. Thereafter, a discussion concerning the structural circumstances generated by the interaction of the independent variables is in order. Finally, we shall present a discussion on the relationship between objective structural conditions and subjective evaluation of kinship concepts.

3.2. Independent Variables

As stated in Chapter 1, our dependent variables are spheres of subjective culture as indicated by the AAM. The dependent variable being studied in the present chapter is the degree of clustering of "kincepts" and their pattern. As we know, kincepts refer to objects related to family structure. The independent variables that will be utilized for the purposes of this chapter are twofold: family type, that is, extended or nuclear,[3] and the level of development of the forces of production,[4] that is, economic and technological development (which also includes the development of human resources). Clearly, these two variables are not the only conceivable factors that can be used in analysing the societal bases of kincepts. Neverthe-

less, the interplay or the interaction of these two variables seems to the present author significant and appropriate for the generation of hypotheses regarding kincepts. Kincepts signify objects closely related to family structure. Family structure in turn depends to a great extent on the level of development of productive forces, while possible discrepancies between family structure and the economic base again may affect both the objects signified by kincepts and the socialization process contributing to their affective meaning. Before turning to more particular and detailed aspects of our two independent variables, we should like to make a few remarks with regard to the following question: do these independent variables correlate positively with each other? In other words and more explicitly: is the type of family structure prevailing in a certain society completely dependent[5] on the development of the productive forces in that society? For instance, growing industrialization may alter the extended type of family structure to a more nuclear type of family structure. Nevertheless, this does not hold in all cases. William J. Goode writes:

> Technological systems may be ranked as more or less advanced, and, with somewhat greater theoretical difficulty, so may economic systems; but no specific family forms seem to be correlated with the specific 'stages' of the economic and technological evolution. For example, the Eskimo types of kinship and that of the United States are very similar.
>
> (Goode 1963:4)

The single example given by Goode is rather unique and uncommon; we do not know where it stands in relation to other societies. The use of the term "correlation" is unjustified unless a great number of societies are involved in the analysis.

The development of the productive forces and the state of the relations of production certainly have an impact on the family structure by altering daily routines and the roles played by their members.

The reverse may also be true. William Ogburn and M.F. Nimkoff (1955) focused on the impact of technology on the family. But the latter does not establish a unilateral causal relation where a certain stage in the development of the forces of production determines a certain type of family structure. A given level of the development of the productive forces and the state of the relations of production both contribute to the shaping of the structure of a specific family type, but this is not sufficient to suggest a simple causal relation exclusively between these two variables. As Goode puts it:

> It is doubtful that the amount of change in family patterns is a simple function of industrialization; more likely, ideological and value changes, partially independent of industrialization, also have some effect on family action.
>
> (Goode 1963:2)

A living example of changing the type of family relations and hence the type of family structure may be seen in Albania. The old type of family structure, leading to the exploitation and suppression of women, is being altered by ideological and value changes.[6]

In the light of this discussion there would seem to be no difficulty in considering family structure and level of productive forces as related but separate variables when constructing a fourfold table for studying the interaction effects of these two variables on other variables, such as the affective meanings of kincepts. Before studying the fourfold table in detail, we shall present it here, merely to give the reader a chance of independently assessing its significance. Horizontally, we find the type of family structure, dichotomized as nuclear and extended, whereas vertically we find the level of development of the forces of production, also dichotomized, but as high and low. The fourfold table follows below:

Table 3–1: A Preliminary Cross-Tabulation of Two Independent Variables

		Type of Family Structure	
		Extended	Nuclear
Level of Development of the Forces of Production	High		
	Low		

In this table statistical interaction effects can be studied.

3.2.1. Family Type: The First Independent Variable

The first independent variable to be explored in this chapter is the family type. A family is a group and relates to "marriage", which in turn is an institution. "Marriage may be defined as the pattern of recognized usages governing establishment and continuance of the family group" (Wells 1970:168). It embodies a certain number of established roles: husband, wife, child, etc. Related to the family is the concept of "kinship" (Beattie 1967:93). Wells defines kinship as:

> a system in accordance with which people are regarded as holding certain statuses and having certain rights and obligations in consequence of their 'relationships' established through the circumstances of parentage and marriage.
>
> (Wells 1970:168)

It must, however, be noted that the social functions of such a system are "different from, and not necessarily wholly consistent with, those of the family" (Wells 1970:169). The structural form of the family may vary, depending upon the various cultural settings considered. In this study we prefer to distinguish between nuclear and extended types of family structures. This concept pair embraces primarily the number of members involved and the complexity of the structure from the point of view of interpersonal relations. In this sense the nuclear type is the most basic form of family structure, primarily embodying one married couple and their children. The number of members incorporated into the nuclear family may vary according to the number of children living in the family.

Dichotomously speaking, the opposite side of this variable is the extended type

of family structure. This also has a great number of varieties, depending on the kind of society we are observing. But normally, as Wells puts it, the pattern of an extended family:

> will be of a complex group consisting of several elementary families inhabiting the same house or the same compound... cooperating closely in the household tasks—including the rearing of the various elementary families' children—bound by kinship ties, and under the *authority of one family head*...
>
> (Wells 1970:172; emphasis added)

For instance, a variant of the extended type of family structure is the "joint family", in which older brothers live together, with their respective families (Wells 1970: 175; Goode 1963: 238–247).

This variable will be used dichotomously, that is, we shall only distinguish between extended and nuclear types of family structure. Although this dichotomy may, at first glance, appear quite natural and clear, it is, however, of a somewhat dubious and problematic character. In fact, it is difficult to demarcate these two types empirically, i.e., to see whether a particular family is nuclear or extended. For instance, although a nuclear family may have neolocality and consist exclusively of a married couple and their children, the father of the family may be in charge of many relatives, or some relatives may spend most of their time with this nuclear family in spite of the fact that they themselves live a few blocks from the nuclear family's house (Stenhouwer 1965).

This ambiguous character of our dichotomy demands the introduction of a complementary and simplifying concept: the ideal type. Thus, the dichotomy used here refers to ideal types with ideal family patterns. This term is also relevant to the kind of *Atlas* data available to us. Due to the various economic options of the cross-sections of the society, a large variety of family structures are present within the same society or cultural setting. In such a position, the term ideal includes potential extremes such as upper-class or slum residents but mainly refers to some kind of urban and rather better-off families. In fact, in some societies so-called "extremes" might be "normal", i.e., for example, the peasant class might constitute the majority of the society and thereby cannot be, in objective terms, classified as an "extreme". Nevertheless, this aspect is not relevant to the kind of data we are working with. As already indicated, the *Atlas* data derive from urban middle-classes. At this point, it might be added that what is important for distinguishing these two types of family structure is *not the frequency of contacts* among the members of a family or a kinship system. What is crucial is the *kind* of contacts. More precisely, dependencies of an economic and authoritarian nature are the contacts that play a vital role in this context. To give an example: those kinds of relations—e.g., authoritarian relations and economic obligations—that may under given structural circumstances lead to frustration or to interpersonal aggressions, are the ones which interest us most in this context. In the following analysis we shall maintain, for instance, that authoritarian relations may produce interpersonal tensions between the members of the family who are economically indepen-

dent of each other. Such tensions may in turn affect the affective meaning attributed to various kincepts by the individual.

3.2.2. Forces of Production: The Second Independent Variable

It was established that in Marxist terminology the conception of the forces of production is related to the basis—the economic structure—of society.[7] The forces of production, as a matter of definition, incorporate all kinds of instruments of labor, men who produce the material wealth, and finally the natural resources available in a certain society. Clearly, this is a *multidimensional* concept, covering several empirically observable components. It is a concept which relates to a given societal context and to a certain social structure. Marx asserted that one of the main and particular features of this concept is its reference to variations in and implications for the societal character of the production process. In fact, the components of the forces of production develop and expand constantly. The instruments of labor and production—that is, tools, technical equipment, machinery—and capital accumulation in all its aspects become more advanced and complex, and demand the involvement of larger units. In Western scientific terminology, this component of the forces of production is usually called industrialization. On the other hand, human resources alter, as well. The appropriate division of labour requires intricate specialization and training in human contributions. The demand for a higher yielding and qualitatively more effective technology becomes more and more important. All these developmental processes and alterations shape the societal nature of the forces of production. Thereby it becomes *more* fruitful to use various components of the forces of production, instead of a simple and unsophisticated concept of industrialization, in order to classify various societies—more precisely, our *Atlas* countries.

This variable—i.e., the level of development of the forces of production—will also be dichotomized: high and low. It may perhaps be suggested that it is somehow paradoxical to dichotomize a variable which was chosen for its advantageous complexity and multidimensionality. This is nevertheless not so paradoxical as it might seem. The variable is dichotomized for technical reasons which do not annul the multidimensional character of the variable when analysed theoretically. In this study, in order to operationalize the 'forces of production' variable, we shall use a technique introduced by Karl W. Deutsch (1960:34–57). A discussion of this problem will be presented below, when we classify the *Atlas* communities along the forces of production variable.

3.3. Independent Variables and Atlas Communities

3.3.1. Assessing the Position of Atlas Communities on the Family Type Variable

This is an arduous task. An adequate typology classifying family types with reference to the concept of language/culture community is not available. Social anthropologists have, by detailed studies, systematized a great number of kinship systems. A now classical example of this sort of arrangement, where social scientists have investigated several kinship systems within a society, is the typology developed by Murdock (1967) in his *Social Structure*. Such a typology is, however, less useful for our particular purposes.[8] For the purposes of the present chapter we have classified the *Atlas* countries using the relevant literature. It should at this point once again be stressed that this typology merely shows tendencies which are apparent in these societies. Consequently, this is not a real, but rather an ideal typology which, however, is adequate for the purposes of the present study.

Our typology uses two basic criteria which are analytically separated: a) the *basic* structure of the family, and b) the type of relations between the members of a kinship group. The first criterion for our purposes offers two alternatives, nuclear and extended, where the label *nuclear* indicates a family type with a married couple and their offspring, whereas the label *extended* indicates a family type with a much greater number of members related to each other either by marriage or blood. In this sense, this criterion sharply focuses very much on the size and the complexity of the family structure. The second criterion concerns the types of relations involved when interaction takes place between members of a kinship group. Here we distinguish two alternatives: relations between members of different nuclear families of the same kin may be voluntary and affective, requiring no economic and/or authoritarian obligations. This is what T. Parsons calls role diffuseness. This type of relation is characteristic of what we call the nuclear type of family structure. That is to say, in an ideal–typical sense, within the frame of a nuclear type of family structure, families are constituted by a minimum number of members, each family living separately, and the relations between the members of various nuclear families of the same kin are voluntary, affective and diffuse. Of course, this is not always the case. The second alternative indicates that relations between members of different nuclear families, or simply, between the members of the kin, are subject to various types of interpersonal and internuclear obligations: these obligations may require not only submission of female to male and of younger to older, for instance, but also mutual aid in an economic sense, in order to secure the existence of the members. This type of relation is, in turn, a characteristic of the extended type of family structure. That is (still in an ideal sense), in-

terpersonal and inter-nuclear relations within the extended family are obligatory and include various types of mutual obligations. As in the first case, this is not always so. In the typology (Table 3—2), cells (I) and (IV) are the types already described in an ideal-typical sense. Theoretically, however, cells (II) and (III) indicate two other possibilities.

Table 3—2: A Typology of Family Structures[9]

Types of relations when interaction takes place between the members of the family / Type of family structure (with reference to approximate size and complexity)	Nuclear	Extended
Relations between the members of different nuclear families of the same kin are voluntary, sentimental, diffuse, affective and do not require economic and/or authoritarian obligations.	(I) AE United States BF Belgium FF Finland FR France GG West Germany HC Hong Kong IT Italy ND Netherlands SW Sweden TH Thailand	(II) Non-Existent
Relations between the members of different nuclear families, or simply, between the members of the kin, are obligatory and require not only authoritarian relations but also economic obligations.	(III) GK Greece JP Japan TK Turkey YS Yugoslavia	(IV) AD Afghanistan CB Calcutta DH Dehli IF Iran LA Lebanon MS Mexico MK Mysore

Cell (II) suggests that the family type has the structure of an extended family but the relations within the kin are voluntary, sentimental and do not require any obligations. This is a non-existent case in the context of our *Atlas* communities. Cell (III), however, is much more interesting. Although the structure of the family is nuclear, the relations within the nuclear family itself and between the different nuclear families of the kin, are obligatory: they demand various types of mutual obligations. Practically, it seems that this is the case of transitional family structures: that is, when the family structure alters, whatever the reeasons for such an alteration from an extended to a nuclear type, some of the social habits and values of the individuals do not change at once. Table 3—2 also exhibits the distribution of the given *Atlas* communities in the suggested typology; the distribution is based on a variety of literature.[9]

In a theoretical sense, the first type of relations (i.e., affective, voluntary, etc.) are primarily characteristic of the nuclear family, whereas the second type (i.e., obligatory and authoritarian relations, etc.) primarily are characteristic of the extended family. In this sense *an implication of this theoretical assumption* is that cell (III) is very similar to cell (IV) in Table 3—2. Then, in order to simplify the typology we may group together cells (III) and (IV), while bearing in mind that cell (III) represents a transitional state for the *Atlas* communities in question. Thus, we obtain the following typology (Table 3—3) in which we have combined two analytically separated criteria or dimensions:

Table 3—3: A Typology of Family Structures: A Simplified Version

Nuclear		Extended	
		AD	(Afghanistan)
AE	(United States)	CB	(Calcutta)
BF	(Belgium)	DH	(Delhi)
FF	(Finland)	GK	(Greece)
FR	(France)	IF	(Iran)
GG	(West Germany)	JP	(Japan)
HC	(Hong Kong)	LA	(Lebanon)
IT	(Italy)	MK	(Mysore)
ND	(Netherlands)	MS	(Mexico)
SW	(Sweden)	TK	(Turkey)
TH	(Thailand)	YS	(Yugoslavia)

The nuclear type of family structure refers to a group consisting of a married couple and their offspring, and the relations between the nuclear family members and between the nuclear families of a kin are mainly affective, voluntary, etc.

The extended type of family structure refers to a group of several nuclear families, or simply a kinship system, the relations between the members of the kin being obligatory, authoritarian, etc.

3.3.2. Classifying Atlas Communities Along the Forces of Production Variable: A Productive Forces Profile

This classification is based on statistical data covering several dimensions or components of the forces of production. In principle, *Atlas* countries will be classified in such a way that the level of development of the forces of production will be identified primarily as high or low. For this purpose, the construction of an index is in order. Karl W. Deutsch (1960) introduced a so called "code number technique for simultaneous inspection of many variables", which is a rather simple technique for designing profiles. The following procedure is suggested by Deutsch:

> (1) List in a fixed sequence a number of variables—say, ten—of presumed interest. (2) Assign a ten-place number to each country, with one digit corresponding to each variable. (3) Obtain the distribution for each variable, and divide all countries

by rank for this particular variable into five classes, according to some suitably chosen intervals. (4) Assign a number to each class, beginning with 0 for the lowest, and ending with 4 for the highest class. (5) Write the class number for each variable into the appropriate digit of the "country profile" number. (6) Match the country profiles for two or more countries which you wish to compare for some purposes of political analysis. (7) Observe the distribution of all country profiles, or of all such profiles for a particular group of countries.

(Deutsch 1960:40)

The present procedure deviates on a few points from the method suggested by Deutsch: firstly, in assigning a number to each class, we have used a scale with six grades, and not with five grades, as Deutsch suggests; thus, we have begun with 0 for the lowest, and ended with 5 for the highest class. In the context of our variables, this range of scores would seem to provide more precision in constructing country profiles. Secondly, we shall not use the profiles in exactly the same way as Karl Deutsch suggests. The typology that we advance in this work will be based on an index calculated by using the country profiles. Thus, by adding the class codes for each country we obtain an index for each country. A ranking of these indices provides us with a ranking of the given *Atlas* communities along the forces of production variable.

The set of variables used embraces the following variables:

1. gross national product (GNP, given in billions of dollars)
2. per capita gross national product (gnp given in dollars)
3. industrial share of gross domestic product (given in %)
4. agricultural share of gross domestic product (given in %)
5. distribution of male labor force: percentage in mining and manufacturing
6. distribution of male labor force: percentage in agriculture
7. enrollment in higher education (per million inhabitants)
8. literacy (given in % of total population)
9. number of scientific journals
10. energy consumption (per capita in kilograms).[10]

In our opinion, this set of variables should quite satisfactorily cover the definition given to the concept forces of production.[11] The aim of the set is to operationalize primarily the following aspects of the forces of production: national production, industrialization, human resources, scientific and technological advance. It might be objected that this operationalization of the concept is inadequate, and that several other variables should have been added to the set. Nevertheless, we would argue that our set covers the most important aspects or components of the concept.[12] Further, we would agree that ideally it would have been preferable to have a larger range of variables then ours, in order to provide a better operationalization of the concept.[13] We are forced to limit our set of variables, however, since the statistical data available for cross-cultural comparisons are rather incomplete. A presentation of Productive Forces Profiles for our 20[14] *Atlas* communities is given in Table 3–4.

Deutsch suggests that profiles can be written more conveniently. Thus, in our

Table 3–4: Statistical Data Used for Productive Forces Profiles

Country		Gross National Product (in $ m)	Gross National Product Per Capita (in $)	Industrial Share of Gross Domestic Product (in %)	Agricultural Share of Gross Domestic Product (in %)	Male Labor Force in Mining and Manufacturing (in %)	Male Labor Force in Agriculture (in %)	Enrollment in Higher Education (Per Million Inhabitants)	Literacy (in %)	Scientific Journals	Energy Consumption (Per Capita in Kg.)
United States	Data	695,500	3,575	34	4	29.7	8	28,400	99	6,000	9,201
	Code	5	5	3	5	3	5	5	5	5	5
France	"	94,125	1,924	38	8	30.4	25	10,420	99	2,780	2,951
		4	4	4	4	3	3	4	5	4	3
Belgium	"	17,071	1,804	35	6	40.3	7	8,050	99	1,260	4,727
		3	4	3	5	4	5	3	5	4	4
Netherlands	"	19,106	1,554	41	8	34.0	13	12,090	99	660	3,271
		3	4	5	4	4	5	4	5	3	4
West Germany	"	112,232	1,901	45	5	43.7	8	6,320	99	2,560	4,234
		4	4	5	5	5	5	3	5	4	4
Sweden	"	19,714	2,549	37	7	38.8	18	9,230	100	710	4,506
		3	5	4	5	4	4	4	5	3	4
Finland	"	8,067	1,749	29	18	22.9	38	8,410	100	280	2,668
		2	4	2	3	3	3	3	5	2	3
Japan	"	84,347	861	29	12	27.4	21	11,400	98	2,820	1,783
		4	3	2	4	3	4	4	5	4	3
Italy	"	56,947	1,104	31	13	28.7	24	5,830	92	1,530	1,787
		4	3	3	4	3	3	3	5	4	3
Yugoslavia	"	8,800	451	38	28	14.7	57	9,480	77	400	1,192
		2	2	4	2	2	2	4	4	3	3
Greece	"	5,877	687	19	25	14.5	48	6,260	82	60	780
		2	2	1	2	2	2	3	4	1	2

Turkey	"	8,770	282	18	36	11.3	58	2,930	46	90	348
		2	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1
Mexico	"	19,432	455	32	18	15.5	59	3,120	65	225	977
		3	2	3	3	2	1	2	3	2	2
Hong Kong	"	1,600	421			32.6	5	2,870	71	0	603
		1	2			4	5	2	4	0	2
Costa Rica	"	592	413	15	31	10.8	58	5,040	84	15	306
		0	2	1	1	1	1	3	4	0	1
Lebanon	"	1,120	437	12	18	10.2	50	8,440	86	20	747
		1	2	1	3	1	2	3	4	0	2
Iran	"	5,889	251	30	31	10.2	58	1.050	23	10	391
		2	1	3	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
India	"	49,220	101	18	51	10.7	68	2,840	28	670	172
DH, CB, MK		4	1	1	0	0	1	2	1	3	0
Thailand	"	3,930	129	15	33	4.4	78	1,660	77	50	110
		1	1	1	1	0	0	1	3	1	0
Afghanistan	"	1,250	83	6	78	5.0	85	220	8	0	25
		1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

case, the productive forces profile (PF) for the United States looks like this: PF 55–3535–55–55. (The complete list of profiles is given in Table 3–5).

Table 3–5: Productive Forces Profile and Index for Given Atlas Communities

Rank	Country	Productive Forces Profile	Index
1	United States	PF 55–3535–55–55	46
2	West Germany	PF 44–5555–35–44	44
3.5	Netherlands	PF 44–4433–45–43	41
3.5	Sweden	PF 35–4544–45–34	41
5	Belgium	PF 34–3545–35–44	40
6	France	PF 44–4433–45–43	38
7	Japan	PF 43–2434–45–43	36
8	Italy	PF 43–3433–35–43	35
9	Finland	PF 24–2333–35–23	30
10	Yugoslavia	PF 22–4222–44–33	28
11	Mexico	PF 32–3321–23–22	23
12	Greece	PF 22–1222–34–12	21
13	Hong Kong	PF 12– 45–24–02	20*
14	Lebanon	PF 12–1312–34–02	19
15	Costa Rica	PF 02–1111–34–01	14
16.5	India (CB, DH, MK)	PF 41–1001–21–30	13
16.5	Turkey	PF 21–1111–22–11	13
18	Iran	PF 21–3111–11–01	12
19	Thailand	PF 11–1100–13–10	9
20	Afghanistan	PF 10–0000–00–00	1

*Incomplete profile and index for Hong Kong.

The Productive Forces Profiles are given in column 3 in Table 3–5. The first group of digits indicates levels of national production; the second group indicates levels of industrialization; the third group indicates levels of human resources; and finally, the fourth group of digits indicates levels of scientific and technological advance. Table 3–5 also exhibits the ranking of 20 *Atlas* communities, where the ranking is based on the indices calculated by adding the code ratings for each country. Since we have 10 variables and 6 grades on each variable, the index varies between 50 and 0, where 50 would indicate the highest level of the forces of production, and 0 the lowest. In our index the highest ranked country is the United State with 46, the lowest is Afghanistan with 1.

For our purposes, we shall dichotomize the index as high and low in accordance with the theoretical discussion presented earlier, and thus obtain a typology of the 20 given *Atlas* countries. For both methodological and logical reasons, the dichotomy would seem to divide the ranks between Yugoslavia and Mexico. The typology obtained is presented in Table 3–6.

Table 3–6: A Typology of Given Countries along the Forces of Production Variable

High		Low	
AE	(United States)	AD	(Afghanistan)
BF	(Belgium)	CB	(Calcutta)
FF	(Finland)	CS	(Costa Rica)
FR	(France)	DH	(Delhi)
GG	(West Germany)	GK	(Greece)
IT	(Italy)	HC	(Hong Kong)
JP	(Japan)	IF	(Iran)
ND	(Netherlands)	LA	(Lebanon)
SW	(Sweden)	MK	(Mysore)
YS	(Yugoslavia)	MS	(Mexico)
		TH	(Thailand)
		TK	(Turkey)

3.4. Conflict, Harmony and Indifference Disposing Structures

In this section, we should like to introduce a discussion concerning social tensions and contradictions, and more generally, the state of affairs generated by the interaction of our two independent variables, forces of production and type of family structure. For this purpose we may first reproduce the fourfold table already presented in Table 3–1. Table 3–7, below, not only reproduces this table but also incorporates the results of previously introduced typologies of the given *Atlas* communities with regard to the independent variables.

Horizontally, we find type of family structure dichotomized as extended and

Table 3–7: Cross-Tabulation of Two Independent Variables

The Level of Development of Forces of Production	The Type of Family Structure: Extended	The Type of Family Structure: Nuclear
High	(I) CONFLICT *expected* Japan, Yugoslavia	(II) HARMONY *expected* Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, United States
Low	(III) HARMONY *expected* Afghanistan, Calcutta, Delhi, Greece, Iran, Lebanon, Mexico, Mysore, Turkey	(IV) INDIFFERENCE *expected* Hong Kong, Thailand

nuclear; vertically we find level of development of the productive forces, also dichotomized, but as high and low. As the reader will remember, both types of family structure and forces of production imply, in accordance with the discussions of previous sections, a wider range of dimensions rather than a single unidimensionality. The cross-tabulation of the two dichotomized variables yields four types, here indicated as cells (I), (II), (III) and (IV).

Cell (I) is characterized by extended type of family structure and high degree of development of the forces of production. A main question one should ask in this connection is what *general* and *dominant* kind of social tensions and contradictions is generated by these structural circumstances? Another important question is, of course, in which direction tensions and contradictions generated by such structural circumstances influence the formation of subjective culture, and more precisely, our kincepts. We know that the extended family system imposes many types of mutual obligations and requirements upon its members. We shall point out only a few of such demands: economic responsibility may be expected to be the duty of only one member rather than several or nearly all members of the kin, or of male members rather than female. A better-off member of the extended family may be expected to take care of the entire kin rather than only his/her nuclear family. In addition to these and many other economic obligations operating on members of an extended family, we may observe an intricate and complex web of authoritarian relations which demand submission of some family members to other family members; submission of female to male, or of younger to older may be considered as most common. Such an authoritarian rule should require, for instance, a married woman to be obedient not only to her husband but also to other males and/or older persons of the extended family. Under suitable circumstances such a family structure may function harmoniously and without generating any frictions, tensions or contradictions among the individual members of, and/or between the nuclear families of, the kin.

Nevertheless, we now generate a hypothesis suggesting that *the extended type of family structure does not necessarily function harmoniously and without generating any social tensions and contradictions when the level of development of the productive forces is high.*[15] We know that certain objective facts are present whenever the level of development of the forces of production is high: division of labor is more differentiated; the number and range of sectors requiring the collaboration of many individuals from different social groups or classes is higher. This situation has several effects upon the life of individuals: a larger number of individuals start earning their own money, and thus they become economically independent of the rest of the extended family. In their working-life they are sometimes given the possibility of acting on a relatively equalitarian basis—at least with their workmates and colleagues—and thus they develop more autonomous personalities. In addition, the number of illiterate persons decreases, whereas the number of individuals with education, and most importantly, with higher education, increases. Thus, a number of individuals become conscious both of a variety of societal problems

and of themselves. We believe that the combination or interaction of structural circumstances as examplified above, by exposing individuals to cross-pressures, generates tensions and contradictions, both at the individual and at the societal level. An individual is exposed both to objects (abstract or concrete) and to socializing agents, not only in the family, but also in the school and in the dominant cultural environment in general. Thus, individuals experience and/or are indoctrinated to expectations, requirements and values linked to the extended family, on the one hand, and to the changing productive forces, on the other. These structural conditions are expected to generate a state of affairs that can be summarized by the term *conflict.*[16] Under such structural conditions we expect to find, in the particular domain of subjective culture composed by kincepts, a high degree of polarized clustering of the kincepts with regard to various dimensions, e.g., age, sex, rural-urban differentiation. As for the overall inter-kincept distances in the semantic space, the mean of these distances is expected to be relatively high. The identification of specific dimensions of importance for our findings in each *Atlas* community would require a particular investigation of such dimensions in each of these societies. This task, however, is beyond the scope of the present study. The *Atlas* communities fitting the structural conditions of this cell of conflict, according to our typology, are Yugoslavia and Japan. Two other communities, Greece and Mexico, although placed in cell (III), are probably relevant in this cell, as well. Mexico and Greece are two countries in which the level of development of the productive forces is relatively high, compared with other countries classified as low on this dimension. Bearing in mind that this variable is a continuum rather than a dichotomy, and that it was dichotomized for technical reasons, we can say that as far as the level of development of the productive forces is concerned, these two countries are very near to cell (I) in Table 3–7.[17] More precisely, we would suggest that although both Mexico and Greece are placed in cell (III), various types of societal tensions and contradictions generated by the structural conditions of cell (I) are also appropriate to these two *Atlas* communities. We know that several effects produced by high level of development of the productive forces are also present in Mexico and Greece. These two communities are so-called transitional societies, where structural changes (e.g. urbanization, industrialization, educational reforms, and agricultural changes) have taken place during the last few decades. (See for example Almond & Coleman 1970, Maddison 1970.)

On the other hand, structural changes occur with regard to the family structure, as well. The traditional extended family is now nuclear, at least as far as the size of the family is concerned. In our typology of family structures (Table 3–2) Greece is placed in cell (III), indicating that the predominant family type is nuclear with respect to the *size* of the family group. Nevertheless, the same cell also indicates that this specific nuclear family still has *survivals,* elements of the extended family that have not yet disappeared. This is, in fact, the main reason why this cell was classified as extended when we dichotomized the typology. It seems that the existence of such survivals is important for the macrosociology of the family: the in-

teraction between elements of family structure and the development of the forces of production produces tensions and contradictions, which in turn affect subjective culture. In the case of Mexico and Greece, two communities with extended family structures (extended in the sense explained above) and with a level of development of the productive forces which is *becoming* high, we *expect emergence* of macrosociological tensions which may produce a high degree of polarized clustering of the kincepts, as well as a relatively long average mean distance for all the kincept-pairs. In fact, as we shall see in the following section, the figures obtained for Mexico and Greece strengthen (we do not say verify, since our purpose is to generate and assess hypotheses) our hypothesis generated with respect to these two *Atlas* communities.

Cell (II) is characterized by a nuclear type of family structure and a high level of development of the forces of production. As for the first variable, intra- and inter-nuclear relations are rather different in a nuclear type of family structure than in an extended type. Especially, relations between the members of different nuclear families of the same kin are expected to be voluntary, sentimental, and affective without necessarily implying economic and/or authoritarian obligations. Nuclear families are assumed to be independent of each other, that is, both economically and otherwise. Thus, no member of any nuclear family possesses the right to decide over the members of other nuclear families of the kin. A similar situation should also occur with regard to intra-nuclear relations. Clearly, parents may have dominating economic and authoritarian attitudes toward their young children but these attitudes are expected to be subject to alteration as the children grow up and reach adulthood. Here, there is no need to repeat the previous discussion about the high level of development of the productive forces. The same circumstances apply for this cell, as well. We may then formulate the following hypothesis relating to cell (II): *the nuclear type of family structure normally functions harmoniously, and without generating serious social tensions and contradictions whenever the level of development of the forces of production is high.*

In order to indicate the state of affairs assumed to be generated by the structural conditions of this cell, I use the term *harmony*. Under such structural conditions we expect to find a low degree of polarized clustering in general, but occasionally some concepts may be polarized highly if they refer to partial tensions and contradictions with regard to kinship relations in the society. Owing to structural changes, partial tensions and contradictions may occur temporarily. For instance, structural changes taking place as a consequence of women's liberation movements, or alterations within the educational system, may lead to societal tensions and contradictions which in turn influence the subjective culture, and thus produce occasional polarization of certain kincepts. Furthermore, we expect to have relatively higher means of inter-kincept distances (less than in cell (I) but more than in cell (III)). The *Atlas* communities fitting the conditions of cell (II) are the following: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden and United States.

Cell (III) is characterized by extended type of family structure and low level of development of the productive forces. A discussion concerning the extended type of family structure has already been presented in connection with cell (I). As for the second variable, a low level of development of the forces of production is rather different than a high level. Here, the division of labor is less differentiated. The agricultural sector is usually dominant, and the job opportunities outside the extended family context, i.e., jobs in industrial and service sectors, are limited. Thus, the individual's life is centered within the extended family circles. Expectations and obligations imposed by the extended family do not contradict the structural conditions of low level of development of the productive forces. In other words, we have a situation which can be designated as consensus. We may then formulate the following hypothesis pertaining to cell (III): *the extended type of family structure normally functions harmoniously, and without generating serious social tensions and contradictions whenever the level of development of the productive forces is low.* It seems that the term *harmony* is also adequate to indicate the state of affairs generated by the structural conditions of this cell.

Here, we expect to find a low degree of polarized clustering in general, but occasionally various concepts may be polarized highly if there are partial tensions and contradictions with regard to kinship relations in the society. In addition, we expect to have a relatively lower average mean of inter-kincept distances for the given *Atlas* communities. The *Atlas* L/C communities that may be placed in this cell are the following: Afghanistan, Calcutta, Delhi, Greece, Iran, Lebanon, Mexico, Mysore and Turkey.

Cell (IV) is characterized by nuclear type of family structure and low level of development of the productive forces. This is a rather unusual structural situation. Nevertheless, one *Atlas* language/culture community, Thailand, well fits this cell. Thailand has a very low level of development of the productive forces, and furthermore the traditionally dominant type of family structure seems to be nuclear (Phillips 1965: Chapter 1; Smith 1971). The interaction of low level of development of the productive forces and nuclear family does not generate any *dominant* tensions or contradictions in this context. On the contrary, we may expect a kind of indifference in attributing affective meaning to kinship concepts. We may formulate the following hypothesis: *whenever we have a low level of development of the productive forces and a nuclear type of family structure in a society, it is expected that no particularly general tensions and contradictions in the context of interkinship relations are generated. On the contrary, we may expect indifference in attributing affective meaning to kincepts.*

Here, we expect to find a low degree of polarized clustering in general, and a relatively lower average mean of inter-kincept distances. Nevertheless, the best *Atlas* indicator for this cell should be Distance from Origin. (See the following section for a description of this measure.) In addition to Thailand, we have placed Hong Kong in this cell. We should like, however, to draw the reader's attention the fact that our knowledge of Hong Kong with regard to our two independent

variables is rather incomplete. Consequently, we do not advance any claims for the correctness of Hong Kong's placement in this cell.

3.5. Subjective Culture as a Mirror of Conflict, Harmony and Indifference

After having, in the previous section, elaborated four types of objective structures, each having certain given structural characteristics and generating a specific state of affairs, we shall, in the present section, use *Atlas* data to investigate to what extent conflict, harmony, and in addition, indifference with regard to kinship concepts are indicated in these four types of social structures.

A good and adequate indicator that may be used in working with *Atlas* data is degree of polarized clustering of given concepts in the semantic space.[18] In psychological terms the degree of polarized clustering indicates the differentiation of affective meanings given to various concepts. Thus, a high degree of polarized clustering of logically connected concepts indicates that the concepts are attributed different and/or opposite affective meanings. Similarly, a low degree of polarized clustering indicates that the concepts involved are attributed similar or nearly identical affective meanings. Nevertheless, this measure is difficult to apply *when studying kincepts* for the purpose of our study, that is, for the purpose of exploring hypotheses on a rather general analytic level. If we had prior knowledge indicating which specific intra- and inter-nuclear contradictions and dimensions, e.g., age, sex, or urban-rural differentiation, were crucial in the process of polarization within each given *Atlas* language/culture community, then we could successfully use degree of polarized clustering in the semantic space as an indicator. Access to such objective data would give the possibility of knowing exactly which dimensions of polarization within polarized clusters were *meaningful* and should be focused on.[19]

In the absence of such prior knowledge as is needed to use with insight the degree of polarized clustering in the semantic space, we find it adequate, for our purpose, to use mean distances as a rough overall indicator. For each language/culture community, the Average Mean Distance is calculated by adding together the inter-kincept distance of each kincept-pair, and then dividing this sum by the number of kincept-pairs. In psychological terms, this measure indicates a rough overall similarity or dissimilarity between affective meanings attributed to the concepts involved in a concept category. Thus a high degree of mean distance indicates dissimilarity between affective meanings attributed to the concepts involved, whereas a low degree of mean distance indicates similarity.

Although this measure does not yield *very detailed* information about the shape

Table 3–8: Average Mean Distance, Standard Deviation and Distance-From-Origin for Specified Atlas Communities

Group Classification on the Basis of Objective Data	I			II				III				IV		
	Country	Mean	St. De.[1]	D–O	Country	Mean	St. De.	D–O	Country	Mean	St. De.	D–O	Country	Mean	St. De.	D–O
	Yugoslavia	2.28	1.03	2.10	France	2.18	0.98	1.73	Greece	2.48	1.19	1.99	Hong Kong	1.86	0.95	1.00
	Japan	1.74	0.81	0.51	Italy	2.08	1.17	1.86	Mexico	2.01	1.12	1.81	Thailand	1.49	0.69	0.34
					Sweden	1.91	0.85	1.37	Delhi	1.65	0.90	1.56				
					Netherlands	1.89	0.76	1.59	Turkey	1.59	0.76	1.50				
					Finland	1.87	0.93	1.76	Calcutta	1.57	0.78	2.13				
					West Germany	1.83	0.80	1.90	Lebanon	1.57	0.83	1.73				
					United States	1.76	0.79	1.89	Afghanistan	1.38	0.68	1.91				
					Belgium	1.58	0.75	1.24	Mysore	1.34	0.58	1.11				
									Iran	1.33	0.67	2.63				
Mean		2.01	0.92	1.31		1.89	0.88	1.67		1.66 (1.49)[2]	0.83	1.82		1.68	0.82	0.67

[1] St. De. = Standard deviation.
[2] Average mean distance, excl. Greece and Mexico.

and specific configuration of a nebula, i.e., all the concepts of a concept category for a given community, it provides *at least a gross and general understanding* of the concept category for cross-national comparative occasions. Average mean distances give, for instance, the overall size of the nebula. Thus, the sizes of various nebula may be compared on a cross-cultural level. Furthermore, the picture given by average mean distances will be supplemented by another measure, namely Distance From Origin (D—O). This latter measure indicates the average distance of the concepts from the origin of the semantic space. Psychologically, this measure indicates the meaningfulness of the concepts. This is a rather interesting measure, especially for the subjective cultures of cells (I) and (IV).

We may now review the correspondence between the *Atlas* data, i.e., subjective culture, and the objective data used to classify our *Atlas* communities. For this purpose, in Table 3—8 we exhibit Mean Distances and D—Os for each community, classified in accordance with the cross-tabulation of objective data presented earlier.

We may start with cell (I), which supposedly indicates a conflict-generating structure with regard to kincepts. The typical community here is Yugoslavia. For this specific country the kincepts are distributed in the semantic space in such a way that they configurate a *large* nebula. As indicated in the preceding section, contradictions in various dimensions are to be expected. One type of contradiction, more precisely, an intergenerational contradiction in the case of Yugoslavia, may be illustrated by figure 3—1.

We see that as differences between generations become larger, the distance between EGO and the average mean distance of the rest of the kincepts becomes larger, and thus this indicates affective dissimilarity or affective polarization. By also having a large average D—O (2.10), the case of Yugoslavia becomes more meaningful. In the same cell, we find another country, Japan, whose average mean distance better fits cell (II). A more detailed study should in the future focus on Japan in order to understand special aspects of her subjective culture. The present study cannot offer any further insight with regard to this matter.

Cell (II) contains a larger number of language/culture communities and represents a state of affairs characterized, for our purposes, by the term harmony. As expected, the average sizes of the nebulae are smaller than for the nebulae of cell (I)-communities and larger than for the nebulae of cell (III)-communities. The mean of the averages of 8 countries in this cell is 1.89. This is quite sufficient to indicate dominance of relatively average-sized nebulae. There is nevertheless a difference between, for instance, France (2.18) and Belgium [Flemish] (1.58) that puzzles the investigator, and surely introduces new questions to answer. Nevertheless, such detailed investigations are beyond the scope of the present study.

Cell (III) embraces 9 language/culture communities, and represents a structural situation that may also be characterized by the term harmony. Since no general tensions and contradictions among the members of the kin are generated, the affective meanings attributed to various kincepts are expected to be similar. This ex-

Figure 3–1: Affective Dissimilarity in the Context of Kincepts Referring to Different Generations–The Case of Yugoslavia.



Note: The figure should be read from left to right. On the upper part we exhibit average mean distances whereas on the lower we schematize these distances. The concepts in the first column refer to EGO's own generation, the concepts in the second column refer to a generation older than EGO's, and finally the concepts in the third column refer to a generation much older than EGO's. As differences between generations become larger the distances between EGO and the average mean distance of the rest of the kincepts become larger, and thus this indicates affective dissimilarity or high affective differentiation.

pectation is verified by the tendency of the *relatively* small average mean distances, indicating the average closeness of the concepts in the semantic space. That is, the concepts are given similar affective meanings. The mean of the average mean distances for 9 countries is 1.66, a rather low figure, as compared with the figures obtained in connection with cells (I) and (II). The mean of the average distance drops to 1.49 (shown in parenthesis in the table) if we exclude Greece and Mexico from the calculation.

These latter two countries have relatively higher average mean distances. Nevertheless, this proves to be a very interesting case, if we remember what was pointed out in the previous section, namely that as far as the objective data are

concerned, both Greece and Mexico tend to move into cell (I) in the cross-tabulation (Table 3–7). Any further evidence supporting the assumption of such a transition would further strengthen our hypotheses.

Finally, cell (IV) embraces two language/culture communities. Strictly speaking, however, only one of them qualifies for this cell.

The case of Hong Kong, as pointed out earlier, is rather ambiguous because of lack of information. Thailand proves to be quite illustrative for this cell, in which we expect to have very low meaningfulness of the concepts. As a matter of fact the average D–O of kincepts in Thailand is 0.34, which is a very low figure. This indicates that the kincepts are concentrated near the point 0 (zero) on the 7-graded Evaluation, Potency and Activity dimensions of the semantic space. Thus, the *Atlas* informants in Thailand have shown their indifference toward concepts of kin by not attributing more pronounced affective meanings to kincepts.

In the present and previous sections we have generated and assessed several hypotheses in connection with macrosociology of the family. It is clear that the family structure always interacts in one way or another, with some part(s) of the rest of the social structure. In this specific study, we have examined the relations between family structure and a given variable, namely the forces of production. Owing to historical and societal factors these two variables are subject to alterations in all societies. The hypotheses generated here suggest that the relations between these two variables are sometimes functional and sometimes dysfunctional. During a given historical period of a society, the interaction of the two variables may be functional and thus may generate harmony with respect to the functioning of the family structure and especially with respect to intra-kinship relations. In other historical periods, however, the interaction may be dysfunctional and thus may generate conflict with regard to the functioning of the family as well as with respect to the intra-kinship relations. Thus, many intra-kinship relations can be understood in terms of macrosociological investigations (and perhaps only so). The *Atlas* of course, provides data on what people—more precisely, urbanite, male high school teen-agers—*think* and *feel* about various members of their kinship group. The cross-cultural data available indicate similarities and dissimilarities (see Table 3–8) between various language/culture communities in a cross-cultural perspective. It was our starting point that such cross-cultural similarities and dissimilarities can be understood best in terms of macrosociological analysis.

We found two main structural circumstances, i.e., harmony- and conflict-generating structures, produced by the interaction of the productive forces and the family structure. An analysis of the subjective data in terms of the objective data presented here advances the hypotheses that:

1. in societies where the predominant type of family structure is functional with the level of development of the productive forces, subjective culture reflects the harmonious structural conditions generated by these two variables;
2. in societies where the predominant type of family structure is not functional with the level of development of the productive forces, subjective culture reflects

the conflictual structural conditions generated by these two variables.

Within the frame of our cross-cultural investigation the first case is illustrated by cells (II) and (III) in Tables 3—7 and 3—8, whereas the second case is illustrated by cell (I) in Tables 3—7 and 3—8. Thus, the discussion presented in this section is an integral part of the discussion presented in the previous section.

As mentioned above, Average Mean Distance (the measure used here as an indicator of subjective culture) gives only a gross and general understanding of the kincepts. Nevertheless, the measure is an adequate indicator when a large number of societies are under cross-cultural comparative investigation.

In Table 3—8 we can see that the average mean distances obtained in the *Atlas* satisfy, for the majority of the language/culture communities, the expectations generated by the objective structural conditions that we have exhibited in Table 3—7. In this sense, these results prove the adequacy and the fruitfulness of our macrosociological approach for at least explorative purposes.

Subjective cultures of some few communities (France and in particular Greece and Mexico), however, did not follow the expectations generated by the macrosociological data. This should be considered as a natural outcome in a study of this type. Some viewpoints have already been presented for the case of Greece and Mexico. For a more detailed analysis of these two language/culture communities we would need to know specific inter-kinship conflicts with regard to various dimensions—e.g., age, sex, urban-rural differentiation—that would enable us to use polarized clusters as an indicator. Nevertheless, such an analysis remains beyond the scope of this study.

CHAPTER 4
The Labelling Concepts

4.1. Introduction

We have repeatedly pointed out that the theoretical frame of reference chosen for the present study is a rather general and vague model which must be specified while the research advances step by step. The first attempt to bring about such a specification was made in the previous chapter, where certain hypotheses were generated on the basis of data describing the subjective perception and assessment of various kinship concepts. In accomplishing this task we have elaborated various aspects of types of family structures which also are considered as a part (or a component) of the superstructure.

The objective of the present chapter is the same as for the foregoing one. That is to say, generally speaking, we want to specify aspects of relationships between subjective culture and the social structure. More strictly, the objective of the present chapter is to explore and to assess hypotheses by studying certain concepts which refer to superstructural phenomena, such as ideologies of race, of religion, of political convictions, of in- and outgroup conceptualizations. Originally, these concepts were defined so as to form two different concept categories in the AAM: the concept categories II-B and II-D (see Appendix 3). We have, however, selected 37 concepts out of the 48 concepts defined by these two concept categories. For the sake of simplicity, we shall drop the names of former categories (indicated by the AAM) and instead relabel them for the purpose of identifying the group of 37 concepts that will be studied in the present context. We call this concept category the *labelling category*. We shall return to a more detailed presentation of the category, but shall first list the 37 concepts under inquiry:
BLACK RACE, RED RACE, WHITE RACE, YELLOW RACE, ATHEISTS, BUDDHISTS, CHRISTIANS, HINDUS, MOSLEMS, AFRICA, ASIA, EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA, SOUTH AMERICA, EAST, NORTH, SOUTH, WEST, CAPITALISM, COMMUNISM, DEMOCRACY, NATIONALISM, SOCIALISM, I (MYSELF), MY NATION'S NAME, NEGRO, JEWS, NONBELIEVER, FRIEND, MOST PEOPLE, STRANGER, FOREIGNER, REFUGEE, IMMIGRANT, GYPSY, ENEMY, CHARITY.

The concepts studied in the previous chapter were *homogeneous* in the sense that they are linguistic representations of a particular superstructural component with rather well-defined frame and limiting lines, namely, the kinship structures. It is clear, for instance, that the concepts defined in the previous chapter can, without

any doubt, be conceived of as belonging to the sphere of kinship structures. The demarcation lines distinguishing the present concepts are, on the contrary, especially unclear and vague. This uncertainty is due to the heterogeneous selection of concepts. As revealed in the list indicated above, some of the concepts refer to clearly defined superstructural components—e.g., the concepts of COMMUNISM and DEMOCRACY—whereas others allude to much more vaguely defined superstructural components, e.g., CHARITY. Furthermore, some concepts, i.e., the concepts indicating "directions", e.g., NORTH and WEST, have nothing to do with the context of social structure, at least directly. Although the relative importance of this latter type of concepts is secondary in the present context, they were included for their potential assistance in approaching various clusters identifiable within the semantic space. Nevertheless, the first two types of concepts, i.e., the concepts of race and religion, are more significant and will be of primary interest. In particular, we shall scrutinize those concepts which connote phenomena, symbols, thoughts, ideologies and structures that are crystallized around the concepts of race, religion and political ideologies. More precisely, the type of concepts we shall basically concentrate our attention upon are threefold: firstly, we have the concepts of race. These are concepts that have a clear-cut superstructural aspect and distinctiveness. One can easily speak about *"racial" ideologies*. This aspect will be evaluated in section 4.2.1. Secondly, we differentiate *concepts of religion:* these concepts, as well, connote superstructural characteristics in such a way that we can study religion as an autonomous component of the superstructure. Thirdly, we have the concepts of *political ideologies* which are also distinctly of superstructural character. Moreover, we shall also, although only secondarily, look at those types of concepts which denote counterparts of the individuals in social interaction.

Now, as to the question of why these concepts are collected under the title labelling category: as a short glance at the evaluation, and in general, at the distribution of concepts in the semantic space, will show, there are certain tendencies, characteristic of the thinking of middle class urbanite school-youngsters, which assort and classify certain concepts (and thereby people to whom the concepts are attributed) in *pigeonholes*. The term pigeonhole relates to the concept of labelling. By pigeonhole we understand any given "territory" or "box" into which certain elements are collected or classified. Such a classification is based on *external* determinants such as social-psychological stereotypes or generative structures. (Generative structures are such structural conditions as generate certain ideas, ideologies, etc. Examples for such conditions are given in the final sections of the present chapter). The evaluation of, for instance, COMMUNISM alongside NONBELIEVER is a way of labelling people (or concepts) and placing them in pigeonholes. These kind of tendencies are *not simply* due to functioning of what social-psychologists call *stereotypes* but also to political and ideological denominations and contrivances, whether conscious or unconscious, generated by structural factors. This brings us to one of the central premises of this chapter: *the phe-*

nomenon of labelling has its origins in structural formations and therefore should be approached within the frame of the theoretical model of this inquiry. As we shall subsequently see, the phenomenon of racism in particular, and the evaluation of political-ideological concepts in general, are very much dependent on the dialectics of social structure.

As for the number of language/culture communities, the complete sets of data for these 37 concepts are not available for all the 23 language/culture communities in the AAM. Nevertheless, this shortcoming is not of such a kind as to impede an adequate analysis of the central concepts upon which we intend to focus in this chapter. The reader will be informed whenever this imperfection can be assumed to mislead the analysis of a specific concept for a certain language/culture community. Moreover, Yucatan (Mexico) will be excluded for two reasons: firstly, the difficulties of obtaining adequate economic, political and social indicators; and secondly, the *Atlas* data available are assumed to have certain shortcomings since no re-testings were made. Furthermore, the Indian communities (Delhi, Calcutta and Mysore) and Lebanon will not be considered because of the partial and inadequate nature of the objective data.

4.2. Independent Variables

The *dependent* variable which we shall consider in this chapter is the *degree of clustering of labelling concepts.* This specific concept category is a part of subjective culture as indicated by the AAM. We shall not only examine the degree of clustering of concepts, however, but also look at some interesting E–Z scores given to various concepts in the AAM. For the purpose of exploring and assessing hypotheses that particularly refer to the labelling category, three major types of independent variables will be used: (1) an historical dimension, the function of which is to remind us about certain crucial factors that must be kept in mind in an inquiry of this kind; (2) the presence of ethnic and linguistic fractionalizations and/or the presence of immigrant labor-power; (3) unemployment and its connotations. These three types of independent variables will be discussed in detail in the following sections. Nevertheless, certain clarifications must be made and some difficulties must be pointed out, even at this early stage.

Firstly, these three independent variables will not be used in the same way: the historical dimension will remain as a *general background variable* indicating the historical-structural aspects of the phenomenon of labelling whereas the other variables will be used explicitly in order to explore our hypotheses. The two latter are the *primary independent* variables of the present chapter. Another issue that should be mentioned is the question of how these independent variables fit into, and which interrelations they have with, the general theoretical frame of reference

that was schematized for the objectives of our inquiry. In general, historical phenomena leave their traces upon social formations or in other words, upon formations of social structure. Basis and superstructure are formed historically. In particular, the elements of a historical phenomenon, namely, the rise of racial ideology (and also the rise and development of other ideologies closely connected with it) that we shall study in this chapter, have lingered into the present as *survivals* in the *dominant cultural environment.*

The second and the third variables, on the other hand, have properties which belong to the economic basis. The ethnic and linguistic fractionalization is a given demographic and social factor in society. We can only establish that a certain ethnic group (or groups) exist(s) in a given community. For instance, we can observe that the majority of people living in Sweden belong to the so called "white race" and that there are various ethnic minority groups, such as the Lappish people (Petrén, 1971:30–31). The existence of immigrant workers is also intimately connected with the basis. Migration of labor force between countries is dependent on the economic structure, in general, and on the supply and demand of cheap labor-power, in particular. This variable is to be considered in the context of the need for cheap and healthy labor-power, and the necessity of an industrial "reserve-army of labor".[1]

At this point it should be said that here it is primarily the post Second World War migration that is meant by migration of labor force. The migration that has economic motivations will be of particular interest. Certainly, migration, whatever the reason behind it, is not a recent phenomenon. People have moved across the continents for centuries. Thus, when we speak of, for instance, the "white race" of Sweden or Swedes, we do not exclude those who immigrated centuries ago and who are assimilated and have the same culture as other members of the main group.

Unemployment itself is a concept signifying facts belonging to the basic level. Factors active within the economic structure determine the number of unemployed, the period of unemployment and various other aspects. Nevertheless, diverse superstructural elements are not wholly inactive. There are superstructural factors which affect the perception, the meaning and the social consequences of unemployment.

The type of family structure (or other supplementary or superseding societal organizations) is assumed to affect different social outcomes with regard to unemployment which in itself is a phenomenon that belongs to the economic structure. Thus, for instance, unemployment has different meanings depending on whether the dominant type of family structure constitutes a natural protection against the negative effects of unemployment. By using these two variables we shall explore and assess hypotheses in order to understand some of the findings of the AAM—more precisely, we shall search for relations between the degree of polarized clustering of labelling concepts and various structural factors.

A more detailed presentation of the fourfold table obtained by the cross-tabula-

tion of the two independent variables will be presented in the following sections. (For instance, the term strain-generating unemployment, instead of the general term unemployment, will be introduced in section 4.3.2). Nevertheless, we shall exhibit the fourfold table, making it possible for the reader independently to assess the significance of the table. Horizontally, we have the degree of unemployment, dichotomized as high and low, whereas vertically we have the degree of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization together with the existence of immigrant labor force, also dichotomized as high and low. The cross-tabulation of the variables gives the following fourfold table:

Table 4–1: Unemployment by Ethnic and Linguistic Fractionalization

		Unemployment	
		High	Low
Ethnic and Linguistic Fractionalization	High		
	Low		

4.2.1. An Historical Perspective

As far as the evaluation of various concepts of race is concerned, at least one trend is clear in the *Atlas* material: in most of the Western *Atlas* language/culture communities there is a general tendency to evaluate one's own race (which is "white") positively, while other races are evaluated negatively. This also accounts for Turkey and Greece, geographically and culturally (at least Turkey) non-Western societies, but they can be conceived of as Western-*oriented*, not only because of the ambitions and attitudes of their middle-classes but also because of their recent social and cultural history. Now, since the majority of people living in this part of the world are classified as "white people", one is inclined to ask whether there is a societal and/or cultural similarity between these language/culture communities that can be conceived of as an historically determined background factor, relating to, and most probably influencing, the evaluation of race concepts. This general trend is not actually dominant within all the *Atlas* Western language/culture communities. Exceptions are the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland and Yugoslavia. Common to all these communities is that they, alongside their own race, evaluate also "BLACK RACE" and "RED RACE" positively. Yet, they all evaluate "YELLOW RACE" negatively. The question now is whether this data pattern can be understood by using the frame of reference developed earlier in this study. Our answer to the question will be affirmative. The literature supports the supposition that we can explore hypotheses based on the *Atlas* data and on the general frame of reference of the inquiry. In order to be able to structuralize patterns of the data we must review some historical aspects of race relations between "white" and "colored" peoples.

In many of the Western colonizer (and colonized!) communities the *dominant cultural environment* has been generated and formed in such a way that people living in these societies admitted the superiority of the "white race". This phenomenon has been coupled, however, with the propagation of the belief that "colored" races, and especially the black race, were inferior to the white race.

Students interested in questions crystallized around the concept of racism encounter a great number of various other concepts which are more or less related to the concept of racism and are disturbed by the inconvenience they introduce. It is possible to differentiate a wide range of concepts: racism, ethnic differentiation, ethnocentrism, social intolerance, etc.[2] Any more detailed study of this variety of concepts is beyond the scope of the present chapter. It would nevertheless seem that some of these concepts should be briefly defined in order to prevent any possible misunderstanding in the present and subsequent sections (especially section 4.2.2.).

By *racism* we understand an ideology. Such an ideology refers to:

> . . . any set of beliefs that organic, genetically transmitted differences (whether real or imagined) between human groups are intrinsically associated with the presence or the absence of certain socially relevant abilities or characteristics, hence that such differences are a legitimate basis of invidious distinctions between groups socially defined as races.
>
> (van den Berghe 1967:11)

Racism as ideology fosters, rationalizes and justifies certain structural economico-political states in society. Historically, it is frequent that ethnic differences are manipulated so as to support racism.

We agree with Oliver C. Cox in his understanding of the term *ethnic:*

> The term "ethnic" may be employed generically to refer to social relations among distinct peoples. Accordingly, an ethnic may be defined as a people living competitively in relationship of superordination or subordination with respect to some other people or peoples within one state, country, or economic area. Two or more ethnics constitute an ethnic system or regime; and, naturally, one ethnic must always imply another. In other words, we may think of one ethnic as always forming part of a system.
>
> Ethnic systems may be classified:
> 1. According to the culture of the ethnics:
>   a. Degrees of cultural advancement (simple or complex).
>   b. Type variation, e.g., Occidental or Oriental.
>   c. Pattern, e.g., variation in language, religion, nationality, or other ways of living.
> 2. According to physical distinguishability:
>   a. Race, e.g., black, brown, red, white, etc.
>   b. Mixed bloods.
>
> (Cox 1948:317)

Ethnocentrism, then, is a social attitude emphasizing the sentiments of "we" and "others", mainly generated on the basis of elements listed in the above quote.

Social intolerance is "social displeasure or resentment against that group which refuses to conform to the established practices and beliefs of the society" (Cox 1948:321).

Neither ethnocentrism nor social intolerance are originally racial ideologies, but they may either be utilized as grounds for racial ideologies or emerge as a basis for racial ideologies under certain historical and structural circumstances.

The views of race, racial differences and racial prejudice can be recognized even in the early periods of human history.[3] Nevertheless, sources of such information are either not always dependable or are sometimes rather self-contradictory or not sufficiently enlightening. As a matter of fact, data connecting the evaluation of racial situations to societal phenomena, and especially to the rise of capitalist and imperialist type of social systems, are much better documented and therefore are also more dependable.

We should like to start here by stating the hypothesis that there is a direct relationship between the way of evaluating (or the evaluation of) the race concepts and the type of social and economic structure.[4] Theories of racism and the variety of dimensions implied by these theories are rather numerous.[5] One of the approaches used to explain the phenomenon of racial ideology has been heavily influenced by the Marxist tradition. The first scholar who applied a Marxist frame of reference in approaching race relations was Oliver C. Cox, 1948. He saw the problem of racial antagonism as only a specific case of more general social factors, and thus also adopted a holistic approach. As we understand Cox' study, or at least the sections where he examines the concept of racial antagonism and its social determinants in the rising capitalist societies, it is well documented and useful for the purpose of our study on race concepts. In addition to giving a holistic view of the phenomenon and being well documented, Cox' study includes historical and structural aspects of the conception of racial ideology. Consequently, it is our belief that Cox' contributions are adequate for the purpose of this section.

Oliver C. Cox' general and perhaps somewhat too far-reaching hypothesis is the following:

> . . . racial exploitation and race prejudice developed among Europeans with the rise of capitalism and nationalism, and that because of the world-wide ramifications of capitalism, all racial antagonisms can be traced to the policies and attitudes of the leading capitalist people, the white people of Europe and North America.
>
> (Cox 1948:322)[6]

When under a commercial and religious impulse Europeans began to travel to strange lands, there did not yet exist racial ideology in Europe. We continue to cite Cox:

> . . . (T)he geography of the world was still a mystery, and some of the most fantastic tales about its peoples were believed. Stories of the splendor, luxury and wisdom of the peoples of the East held all Europe in constant wonderment. No one would have been surprised if some traveler had returned from the heart of Africa to break the news that he had found a black monarch ruling over a kingdom surpassing in

> grandeur and power any that had then existed in Europe. In short, the white man had no conception of himself as a being capable of developing *the* superior culture of the world—the concept "white man" had not yet its significant social definition—the Anglo-Saxon, the modern master race, was then not even in the picture.
>
> But when the Portuguese began to inch their way down the African coast they knew that the Moors and heathens whom they encountered were inferior to them both as fighters and as culture builders. *This, however, led to no conclusions about racial superiority.*[7]
>
> (Cox 1948:327)

We have reason to believe that religion lay behind the first Portuguese encounters with the non-white people of the African coast. Another fact is that Eastern people were at that time positively evaluated by the Westerners not only because of the former's relative economic prosperity but also because of their high-standing cultural standard and "wisdom".

Portuguese and Spaniards were very much inclined to convert "heathens" to Christianity. They believed in the Christian definition of human equality which at that time prevented development of racial prejudice. The seeds of an economic and rationalistic basis for the development of racial antagonism were to be found later, in the discovery of America. Oliver Cox continues:

> The socioeconomic matrix of racial antagonism involved the *commercialization of human labor* in the West Indies, the East Indies, and in America, the intense competition among businessmen of *different western European cities* for the capitalist exploitation of the resources of this area, the development of nationalism and the consolidation of European nations, and the decline of the influence of the Roman Catholic Church with its mystical inhibitions to the free exploitation of economic resources. Racial antagonism attained full maturity during the latter half of the nineteenth century, when the sun no longer set on British soil and the great nationalistic powers of Europe began to *justify* their economic designs upon weaker European peoples with subtle theories of racial superiority and masterhood.
>
> (Cox 1948:330. Emph. added.)

This long quote emphasizes at least three issues: (1) the rise and the development of racial antagonism was intimately related to the commercialization of human labor, especially the need for surplus human labor in the recently discovered territories. (2) the bourgeois sections of various Western European cities became involved in the human labor business and thus developed economic interests closely related to this business. (3) Western Europe's rising class, the capitalists and their agents, began to justify their overseas undertakings by the myth of the white man's racial superiority over the colored peoples of strange lands. Overseas relations which at first had a more or less private character came to be legitimized by the official authorities of European bureaucratic structure. Cox reports an important incident in this context:

> If we had to put our finger upon the year which marked the beginning of modern race relations we should select 1493–94. This is the time when total disregard for the human rights and physical power of the non-Christian peoples of the world, the

colored peoples, was officially assumed by the first two great colonizing European nations. Pope Alexander VI's bull of demarcation issued under Spanish pressure on May 3, 1493, and its revision by the Treaty of Tordesillas (June 7, 1494), arrived at through diplomatic negotiations between Spain and Portugal, put all the heathen peoples and their resources—that is to say, especially the colored peoples of the world—at the disposal of Spain and Portugal.

(Cox 1948:331–332)

Cox continues, in order to show the character of race relations:

Sometimes, probably because of its very obviousness, it is not realized that the slave trade was simply a way of recruiting labor for the purpose of exploiting the great natural resources of America. This trade did not develop because Indians and Negroes were red and black, or because their cranial capacity averaged a certain number of cubic centimeters; but simply because they were the best workers to be found for the heavy labor in the mines and plantations across the Atlantic. If white workers were available in sufficient numbers they would have been substituted. As a matter of fact, part of the early demand for labor in the West Indies and on the mainland was filled by white servants, who were sometimes defined in exactly the same terms as those used to characterize the Africans.

. . . . . .

This, then, is the beginning of modern race relations. It was not an abstract, natural, immemorial feeling of mutual antipathy between groups, but rather a practical exploitative relationship with its socioattitudinal facilitation—at that time only nascent race prejudice.

(Cox 1948:332)

The exploitation of native peoples, imperialism, is not a sin, not essentially a problem of morals or of vice; it is a problem of production and of competition for markets. Here, then, are race relations; they are definitely not caste relations. They are labor-capital profits relationships . . .[8]

(Cox 1948:336)

To summarize: the discovery of new territories that made it possible for Europeans to appropriate new settlements, and thus necessitated access to cheap and good labor-power, established the early grounds for race prejudice. Commercial interests, centered in various European metropoles, began to stimulate the traffic intended to transport considerable number of colored peoples from Africa to America. *Race prejudice was created and developed as a rationalization and justification for the exploitation of colored people.*

This generally accepted thesis is also emphasized by George Beckford (1972):

The predominant social characteristic of all plantation areas of the world is the existence of a class-caste system based on differences in the racial origins of plantation workers on the one hand and owners on the other hand. This is an inherent feature of the plantation system. In every instance, the system was introduced by white Europeans who had to rely on non-white labor for working in the plantations. Race, therefore, was a convenient means of controlling the labor supply.

(p. 67)

. . . (W)e find that throughout the New World, race became the moral justification of slavery. At first, white people had justified slavery on the grounds that the black Africans were heathens. But when they had been converted to Christianity, that

> justification could no longer stand. And so the theory of the racial inferiority of black people was advanced.
>
> (p. 68)

An interesting question at this point is how anti-Semitism and race prejudice are logically related. Expressed in other terms: is anti-Semitism an instance of racism, in an ideological sense? The conceptual distinction introduced at the beginning of this section helps us to understand the nature of this question. The issue of anti-Semitism has been a controversial matter in the history of Semites. Especially after the publication of Count Gobineau's *Essay on the Inequalities of the Human Race,* in 1853–1855, where he sought to establish that "only the white races were possessed of true creative power", the idea emerged that the Semites were completely uncreative and inferior (Krausnick & Broszat 1970:20). Nevertheless, the history of the Jewish people and of their conflicts with other peoples does not indicate clear traces of racism. Rather than the concept of racism, the term *social intolerance* (as well as ethnocentrism) is appropriate in understanding attitudes of people towards the Jews during the periods *prior* to Gobineau's *Essay.*

Helmut Krausnick strengthens this idea:

> The deepest roots of hatred of the Jews has always lain in the *latent tendency* of many people to look askance at those of their fellows who do *not 'conform',* and both before and after the turn of the century an attitude of vulgar, unthinking hostility towards the Jews was the distinguishing mark of the anti-Semite.
>
> (Krausnick & Broszat 1970:19, emph. added.)

Oliver Cox emphasizes the same:

> Anti-Semitism . . . is clearly a form of social intolerance, which attitude may be defined as an unwillingness on the part of a dominant group to tolerate the beliefs or practices of a subordinate group because it considers these beliefs and practices to be either inimical to group solidarity or a threat to the continuity of the status quo. Race prejudice, on the other hand, is a social attitude propagated among the public by an exploiting class for the purpose of stigmatizing some group as inferior so that the exploitation of either the group itself or its resources or both may be justified.
>
> (Cox 1948:393)

The fact that anti-Semitism has remained as social intolerance during a very long period of time does not necessarily mean that anti-Semitism cannot become race prejudice.

As we have already asserted, race prejudice has an exploitative aspect, which is one of its cardinal traits. In the case of, for instance, Negroes, it had a *direct economic* objective: a group of people were declared as inferior and thus, their direct exploitation in the new territories was justified. Nevertheless, the exploitation of certain groups on the basis of a racial ideology need *not necessarily* take direct economic forms. Such an exploitation may also function *indirectly:* it can, for instance, be used to create and to justify *other* ideologies and policies which in turn may lead to more direct economic and social forms of exploitation. Thus, one of the consequences of Nazi anti-Semitism was the mobilization of the working-class

of Germany for the purposes of the *exploiting*-classes. Anti-Semitism contributed to the economic purposes of exploiters. Only in this sense, i.e., only in the context of exploitation of one class by another, may anti-Semitism (like many other phenomena) become racism, a racial ideology. Otherwise, anti-Semitism remains as social intolerance. By referring to Cox we wish to actualize the *general background,* which is important to remember for anyone who intends to study race relations and race prejudice. To suggest that the historical process described in this section is the sole factor which patterned the *Atlas* data would be too simplistic and fruitless from the point of view of further analysis. Yet even if it is not the only factor (in a simple, one-way directed causal sense), it has been, in our opinion, the *main* factor which contributed to the *formation of dominant cultural environments* with regard to this kind of topic in various Western societies.

As will be remembered, the conception of dominant cultural environment embraces views, beliefs, practices, etc., about a variety of matters. Thus, views, beliefs and practices evaluating "races", "religions" and other issues are parts of the dominant cultural environment.

A more specific question must be raised at this point: in what way does the above-mentioned background contribute to the formation of subjective culture (i.e., in this context that part of subjective culture which gives the profile of race and other concepts)? For this purpose we must first distinguish between two concepts indicating two crucial elements—survivals and emergents—that exist in any dominant cultural environment.

Survivals[9], as defined here, are ideas, views, beliefs, etc., which have been generated by the earlier social structure(s) of a society and which are transmitted to the present dominant cultural environment. A general property of survivals is that they are generated by *earlier structures* and would *not necessarily* have been generated by the present structure, but nevertheless are maintained by it. This implies that weaker interests, but interests nevertheless, are required to *maintain* a set of beliefs than to cause them to emerge. Emerging elements of dominant cultural environment are those ideas, views, beliefs, etc., which are being generated by the present structure. Thus, the substance of a dominant cultural environment is a combination of survivals and emerging elements.[10]

To return to the question raised above, it may be said that the general and historical background reviewed in this section contributes to the formation of subjective culture by being the producer of elements which are inherited into the present dominant cultural environment of the societies involved.

What does this mean in more concrete terms? It means that *there are survivals, i.e., beliefs, views, practices, etc.* (including stereotypes) *which have their origin in the historical processes and developments and which today under various structural circumstances affect people's subjective culture.* Such beliefs, the origins of which may be detected in the history of a country, are part of its dominant cultural environment and influence people in evaluating "races" and other concepts. The purpose of Diagram 4—1 should be understood as threefold: firstly, it sche-

Diagram 4–1: An Historical-Structural Context


Socializing Agents
Exposure to objects, (members of other ethnic groups, etc.) denoted by symbols
AAM
Exposure to relevant symbols and symbolic socialization
Present ethnic heterogeneity, immigration of foreign workers, unemployment, etc.
Historic formation of dominant cultural environments
History

Note: Arrows indicate causal, conditional relations. The diagram should be read from the bottom up!

matizes the discussion of this section; secondly, it relates the discussion to the general theoretical frame of reference of this inquiry, and finally, it links the present section to subsequent sections. *History,* indicated as the ultimately generative factor in the diagram, should at this point be compared with the basis-superstructure of our general theoretical frame of reference, as presented in Chapter 2. According to our approach, history is to be understood as events taking place *within* the social structure, that is, withint the context of interaction of basis and superstructure. History, or historical factors, generate(s) not only dominant cultural environments but also condition(s) in relation to ethnic differentiation, immigration of foreign workers, etc.—the independent variables which will be elaborated in subsequent sections. Without repeating matters already discussed in Chapter 2, we should recall that such historical-structural factors determine and condition the AAM through two main channels, namely, exposure to objects and symbols and exposure to socializing agents.

4.2.2. Ethnic and Linguistic Fractionalization and Flow of Immigrant Labor

Another independent variable which will be directly used in generating hypotheses is the degree of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization and the inflow of immigrant workers in each country involved. In fact, this is *not* merely *one but two* variables. Nevertheless, these two distinct variables will be transformed into one single variable for reasons that we shall elaborate in section 4.3.1. In the present section we intend to describe and to emphasize the significance of these two independent variables. Clearly, individuals or groups of individuals may have judgements about phenomena or things which are remote and far-off for them and for which the probability of being exposed may be very low or equal to zero. In such cases socializing agents are the institutions which to a large extent determine judgements made by individuals or groups of individuals. An illustrative example may be borrowed from the beginning of the twentieth century (Burgman 1965:47–54): the Yellow Danger was a conception which in the West gained universal notoriety as being something terrible and menacing, not to say directly threatening. It connoted a political, economic and cultural danger directed from the Yellow Race toward the White Race. Any testing of the concept by the semantic differential during these days in the Western societies involved would quite probably have given strongly negative scores on the E-scale and strongly positive scores on the P- and A-scores. In the meantime no one can claim that there were many Europeans or other foreigners who had access to adequate information on the subject, or who even saw a single Chinese. Nevertheless, socializing agents were active in exposing individuals to the *concept,* of course, and in the way they wanted to do it (Burgman 1965:43–54).

Exposure to objects, rather than to the concept alone, is decisive in forming judgements made under certain other structural conditions. Thus, exposure to minority groups is vital in the context of labelling concepts. The existence of minority groups increases the probability that the individual will be exposed to and have transactions with other ethnic groups, races, religions and world views in general, directly or indirectly. Exposure to these objects gives a concrete basis when a judgement is to be made.

The quotation from Cox (see p. 59) indicated that ethnicity can be classified in terms of various dimensions: variation in language, religion, nationality, race, etc. Although this is not always true, language is often an indicant of ethnicity. The following statement seems to hold in many cases:

> The language of a people is closely tied to their ethnic background. Giving up one's native language—the basic means of communication among people belonging to the same nation, the basic means of preserving and developing their cultures—although not equivalent to complete ethnic assimilation, does testify to a very significant development of assimilating processes.[11]
>
> (Taylor & Hudson 1972:215)

Indices of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization refer primarily to the minorities which have been settled in a certain country on a more *permanent* basis (sometimes for many generations) and which are a natural part of the nation. Reasons for the inflow or existence of such ethnic minority groups may be natural (ecological or geographical), economic, social or political.

Nevertheless, there is another type of minority group that for some time has been emerging in most West European countries and which we wish to include under this independent variable: this is the existence and inflow of so called *immigrant labor*. The term immigrant labor is ambiguous. A variety of terms are applied here depending very much on the legal status that the receiving country attributes to its immigrant workers.[12] In this study we shall adopt the following definition: immigrant labor[13] is constituted by individuals immigrating on a more or less *temporary* basis to highly industrialized countries. Immigrants do not comprise a homogeneous group of individuals but there are certain properties common to all immigrant workers. This phenomenon of import-export of labor power is a rather recent occurrence. It has been going on for something like 15—20 years and reached its peak in the '60s. Labor-exporting communities are usually less-developed countries[14] with stagnating or unsatisfactorily expanding economies which are not capable of absorbing their supply of labor internally. Labor-importing countries are, on the other hand, highly industrialized; their economies have been quickly expanding since the Second World War. These countries, with capitalist or monopoly-capitalist economic systems, have been dependent on the external supply of labor power for being able to continue, and to increase, the expansion of their economies. Although the number of studies made in order to understand specific aspects of immigrant workers in their new environment is not high, we know that these people constitute marginal groups in the receiving nations, where the attitudes and judgements of the indigenous population towards them may very easily alter, depending on economic fluctuations and economico-political alterations.[15] We do not know *much* about the motivations, the attitudes and the plans of immigrant workers.[16] No doubt, these groups, like any other minority group, may help generate social tensions under specific structural conditions. Therefore it would seem legitimate and even necessary to take these groups, as well, into account when analysing the labelling concepts and in comparing subjective cultures of exporting and importing communities.

Nevertheless, in a given society the relationship between various ethnic groups and immigrant workers on the one hand, and the rest of the population, on the other, is not so simple and unproblematic as it might seem. In fact, two factors must be kept in mind: (1) some minority groups and certainly a large majority of immigrant workers are employed in low-paying and low-status occupations;[17] (2) the indigenous population is in turn not a homogeneous mass, especially with respect to its position in the division of labor and with regard to the means of production. This is particularly important when the relations of the indigenous population to immigrant workers are concerned. The Norwegian sociologist Ottar

Brox, in his short article "Strukturfascismen", brought about a very crucial insight in this context. Brox writes:

> The term "structural fascism" denotes, as I understand it, certain traits in the modern, technologically managed, industrial society, traits that create more or less acute contradictions between different sections of the working class and which under certain conditions can express themselves in the form of ethnic conflicts and racial contradictions. We thus are concerned with a *fascism-generating* structure which forces the underdogs in the society to fight each other in order to preserve their conditions of living and which also protects those groups that make the ultimate decisions (primarily with regard to the policies of economic issues and of labor market) against sanctions from above.[18]
>
> (Brox 1972:15—16)

It is apparent from Brox' statement that some sections of the working-class, particularly when severely underprivileged, under certain structural circumstances may easily become a cradle of racist attitudes against ethnic minorities and immigrant workers. Nevertheless, those classes or sections of classes whose jobs and prosperity are not directly threatened under the same structural circumstances tend to maintain a more tolerant attitude towards ethnic groups and immigrant workers, according to Brox.[19] How tolerant is an open question. This argument has implications for the present study: we must keep in mind that the *Atlas* data comes from urbanite and middle class schoolboys who usually belong to the better-off cross-sections of their society. This means that we must be careful in assessing the hypotheses generated in this context. Clearly, the social differentiation that we have just pointed out should serve as a reason for future Atlas-testings to include data for comparing variations between the subjective cultures of various social classes.

Another significant structural condition is that of unemployment. Its interaction with, for example, certain conditions engendered by the presence of ethnic minority groups and of immigrant workers should occupy a central place in understanding the degree of clustering of labelling concepts. Unemployment will be presented in the following section.

4.2.3. Unemployment

The term unemployment is not primarily a sociological concept. It is an economic concept with several technical aspects. The UN-organ ILO, the International Labour Office, uses the following definition, adopted by the Eighth International Conference of Labor Statisticians in Geneva, 1954:

> Persons in unemployment consist of all persons above a specified age who, on the specified day or for a specified week, were in the following categories:
>
> a) workers available for employment whose contract of employment had been terminated or temporarily suspended and who were without a job and seeking work for pay or profit;

b) persons who were available for work (except for minor illness) during the specified period and were seeking work for pay or profit, who were never previously employed or whose most recent status was other than that of employee (i.e. former employers, etc.), or who had been in retirement;

c) persons without a job and currently available for work who had made arrangements to start a new job at a date subsequent to the specific period;

d) persons on temporary or indefinite lay-off without pay.

(*Yearbook of Labor Statistics* 1973:419)

Nevertheless, an economic and technical definition of the term unemployment is not sufficient for the purpose of our study.[20] We must somehow attempt to give the term a sociological and social-psychological meaning. As we understand it, unemployment refers to a *structural state* which has a specific impact on individuals and on society. Unemployment is certainly generated by a larger whole, i.e., the overall structure of the society. Here, it is not our task to investigate the structural causes of unemployment in various types of social formations. Nevertheless, unemployment, once engendered by a given social and economic structure, becomes an element *per se* and thus enters into interaction with other elements of the society. On the individual level, unemployment generates personal contradictions: the individual becomes involved in conflictual situations in his relations to himself, to his family, to his friends, etc. On the societal level, unemployment generates contradictions between various groups and/or classes: workers and employers, employers and the state, etc., are in antagonistic relations. Now, such tensions and contradictions do not emerge and develop in a social vacuum; on the contrary, they operate within a larger structural context. Thus, whether or not a potential and given contradiction will be generated in a state of unemployment also depends on *other* structural givens of the society. Such givens are often introduced by institutionalized formal organizations (conflict-solving, care-taking, structure-modifying, etc.) and by institutionalized informal groups or individuals (e.g., family, charismatic leaders, dictators, etc.). It seems that, depending very much on the level of development of the forces of production, on the type of dominant relations of production and also on the dominant superstructural formations, some institutions interact more *actively* in the context of unemployment. Such an institution which, we believe, is crucial when speaking of unemployment, is the type of dominant family structure in a given society. In the context of unemployment, the type of family structure is interesting particularly on the psychological (and social-psychological) level: it affects the individual's immediate situation. On a macro level, an environmental-structural factor, namely ethnic differentiation, will be scrutinized in connection with unemployment. (This is a task that will be accomplished in a subsequent section.) Thus we obtain a more complete perspective of the conception of unemployment, since we introduce both a psychological (and social-psychological) and a macro sociological dimension.

At this point we should like to advance the following hypothesis in order to obtain a better understanding of unemployment: the extended type of family struc-

ture implies a better protection against the negative effects of unemployment than the nuclear type of family structure, especially for those members of the kin who are outside the nuclear family.

From this follows our next hypothesis: in societies with extended type of family structure it is less likely that unemployment generates social-psychological and psychological contradictions. In societies with nuclear type of family structure it is more likely that unemployment generates psychological and social-psychological contradictions.

The reader may perhaps object that in some societies where the nuclear family is the dominant type of family structure there usually are other institutionalized organizations, e.g., unemployment security offices, which cope with various negative outcomes or dysfunctions engendered by the state of unemployment. Although this objection seems reasonable, it is an open question to what extent these societal institutions are able to alleviate the sociological and social-psychological impacts of unemployment. It seems that the role played by such organizations remains on a personal economic level and does not prevent development of certain psychological mechanisms, e.g., accusation of self, aggressions, etc., on the individual level, and of certain sociological contradictions on the societal level. Although such institutions may be able to alleviate the economic needs of individuals in the short run, this does not, however, invalidate our aforementioned hypotheses.

It should be emphasized that one of the primary functions of the extended family is to secure economic, social and psychological well-being of the family member, especially when the external environment is difficult or threatening. Based on the proposition that unemployment is due to factors external to the extended family's sphere of control, a function of the extended family's functions is to adjust itself to, or eliminate negative results of, a state of unemployment. Thus, the sociological and social-psychological significance of unemployment can be understood only in relation to the structure of the society. In this study the term unemployment is to be understood in such a more sociological sense. In this sense we should like to use the term *strain-generating unemployment,* rather than unemployment. Thus, this new term emphasizes sociological and social-psychological aspects of the phenomenon and thereby goes beyond its technical meaning.

4.3. Independent Variables and Atlas Communities

4.3.1. Classifying the Atlas Communities along the Ethnic and Linguistic Fractionalization and the Immigrant Labor Variables

The purpose of the present section is twofold: firstly, it is to present certain data

available from *Atlas* language/culture communities and to discuss the adequacy of these data in this context, and secondly it is to cross-tabulate two variables, that is, ethnic and linguistic fractionalization on the one hand, and presence of immigrant workers on the other, in order to obtain a typology of societies for the purpose of explorations along the lines suggested by our hypotheses. In section 4.2.2., we cited certain aspects of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization that interest us in this context. Among other things, it was asserted that a typology of ethnicity could be defined in terms of a variety of dimensions, e.g., variation in language, religion, nationality, etc. In the present section we shall use indices of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization that were calculated in *The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators,*[21] abbreviated WHPS. In WHPS, ethnic fractionalization is indicated by linguistic fractionalization (Taylor & Hudson 1972:215). As already pointed out, language "is frequently an indicant of ethnicity (e.g. Spanish-speaking Americans) but this is not always true (e.g. black Americans)" (Taylor & Hudson 1972:215). For the purpose of the present section, however, WHPS-data are reasonably adequate, especially when a supplementary variable, immigrant labor, is added.

At this point the reader may perhaps feel inquisitive about our preference for WHPS-data which actually emphasize only one dimension of ethnicity, namely language. There are two primary and legitimate reasons for this choice: firstly, it is very hard, not to say impossible, to find *systematic* cross-national data covering other dimensions of ethnic fractionalization. And secondly, to use linguistic fractionalization is adequate, in particular in societies with relatively old traditions of national integration and cultural homogeneity.

WHPS uses three major sources, namely Roberts 1962, Muller 1964, and *Atlas Norodov Mira,* in constructing indices of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization.[22] As for the correlation of these three sources, Taylor & Hudson write:

> An index of fractionalization calculated upon data from the *Atlas* does correlate highly with a similar index calculated upon linguistic data from other sources, but not quite highly enough to be considered the same variable.[23]
>
> (Taylor & Hudson 1972:215)

The index of fractionalization "varies from 0 to 1 and measures the probability that two randomly selected persons from one country will not speak the same language"[24] (Taylor & Hudson 1972:216). At this point, we shall present the list of 19 *Atlas* language/culture communities which are ranked from the most fractionalized down to the least fractionalized.

As we can visually assess in Table 4—2, indices given by the three different sources are quite close to each other for a given country. In ranking the L/C communities we used the ranking of *Atlas Norodov Mira,* whereas the ranking of Muller and Roberts were adjusted accordingly.

The next step is to dichotomize the language/culture communities as ranked in Table 4—2. To use the mean as an indicator of dichotomization seems to be reasonable, since we obtain a more or less equal number of elements on both sides of

Table 4–2: Ethnic and Linguistic Fractionalization Given by Three Sources

Language/culture community		Ethnic and Linguistic Fractionalization		
		Atlas Norodov Mira	Muller	Roberts
IF	(Iran)	.76	.60	.50
YS	(Yugoslavia)	.75	.43	–
AD	(Afghanistan)	.66	.71	.67
TH	(Thailand)	.66	.46	.30
BF	(Belgium)	.55	.51	–
AE	(United States)	.50	.25	–
MS	(Mexico)	.30	.19	–
FR	(France)	.26	.17	–
TK	(Turkey)	.25	.24	.16
FF	(Finland)	.16	.35	–
LA	(Lebanon)	.13	.18	.12
GK	(Greece)	.10	.21	–
ND	(Netherlands)	.10	.04	–
SW	(Sweden)	.08	.12	–
CS	(Costa Rica)	.07	.26	–
IT	(Italy)	.04	.09	–
GG	(Germany)	.03	–	–
HC	(Hong Kong)	.02	.23	.04
JP	(Japan)	.01	.02	.01
Mean		.28	.28	.26

the dichotomy. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that indices of fractionalization form a continuum and that they are dichotomized as high and low only for reasons of simplification and convenience. As we may see in Table 4–2, the mean for Roberts is =.26, for Muller =.28 and for *Atlas Norodov Mira* =.28. If we dichotomize the indices of fractionalization with figures obtained through means, we obtain the distribution indicated in Table 4–3.

The index of fractionalization for the complete number of language/culture communities is indicated only by *Atlas Norodov Mira.* In Muller only one language/culture community, namely GG, is missing. Roberts, on the other hand, is rather incomplete and gives data only for seven language/culture communities.

A final dichotomization based upon all the three sources is obtained with small adjustments, as seen in Table 4–4.

The mean of this scale is chosen as =.28, which is also the mean of Muller and of *Atlas Norodov Mira.* The addition of Roberts' mean in order to calculate a new mean based on three means would given .27, but would nevertheless change the final dichotomization. A few adjustments, however, were made: firstly, the United States[25] and Mexico[26] keep their positions as high on the dichotomy although they should be placed as low according to Muller, and secondly, Finland is placed as high (according to Muller) although it should be placed as low according to *Atlas Norodov Mira.*

Table 4–3: Ethnic and Linguistic Fractionalization Dichotomized

Source of index \ Index	High	Low
ATLAS NORODOV MIRA	AD (Afghanistan) AE (United States) BF (Belgium) IF (Iran) MS (Mexico) TH (Thailand) YS (Yugoslavia)	CS (Costa Rica) FF (Finland) FR (France) GG (West Germany) GK (Greece) HC (Hong Kong) IT (Italy) JP (Japan) LA (Lebanon) ND (Netherlands) SW (Sweden) TK (Turkey)
MULLER	AD (Afghanistan) BF (Belgium) FF (Finland) IF (Iran) TH (Thailand) YS (Yugoslavia)	AE (United States) CS (Costa Rica) FR (France) GK (Greece) HC (Hong Kong) IT (Italy) JP (Japan) LA (Lebanon) ND (Netherlands) MS (Mexico) SW (Sweden) TK (Turkey)
ROBERTS	AD (Afghanistan) IF (Iran) TH (Thailand)	HC (Hong Kong) JP (Japan) LA (Lebanon) TK (Turkey)

Table 4–4: Ethnic and Linguistic Fractionalization: A Final Dichotomy

High		Low	
AD	(Afghanistan)	CS	(Costa Rica)
AE	(United States)	FR	(France)
BF	(Belgium)	GG	(West Germany)
FF	(Finland)	GK	(Greece)
IF	(Iran)	HC	(Hong Kong)
MS	(Mexico)	IT	(Italy)
TH	(Thailand)	JP	(Japan)
YS	(Yugoslavia)	LA	(Lebanon)
		ND	(Netherlands)
		SW	(Sweden)
		TK	(Turkey)

This variable and the proper data available for 19 language/culture communities will be supplemented through juxtaposition with another chosen variable, namely the flow of immigrant workers and the appropriate data for this dimension. For simplicity' sake we shall henceforth call this variable "Immigrant Labor". Data that will be used should be in accordance with the definition of immigrant labor given in section 4.2.2. We repeat the definition:

> Immigrant Labor is a number of individuals immigrating, on a more or less temporary basis, to highly industrialized countries.

The definition repeated above excludes certain data: firstly, it is implicit in the definition that data from less developed countries where inflow of external labor is not needed will not be accessible (since such flows are rare or non-existent); secondly, the definition implies that (within the frame of our *Atlas* language/culture communities) this is mainly a European phenomenon, with Japan as an additional case.[27] Table 4–5, below, shows a number of language/culture communities for which it was possible to collect appropriate data.

Statistical data fitting the requirements of the definition adopted for the term immigrant labor is presented for seven language/culture communities. In Table 4–5 we have two kinds of information which should be related: firstly, we have figures showing the means for the number of newly entering foreign laborers through 1958–1970 and secondly, we have the figures giving the population in 1965. It is apparent from these figures that Germany and France in particular have been receiving a large amount of foreign labor, not only absolutely but also relatively, during the last decade. But the Netherlands and Belgium also distinguish themselves in this context. The case of Italy is somewhat ambiguous. From tables presented by Böhning, 1972, it can be shown that Italy has been a labor

Table 4–5: Inflow of Immigrant Labor and Total Population

Language/culture community	Means of number of newly entering foreign laborers 1958–1970	Population 1965
JP (Japan)	482,275[2]	97,960,000
GG (West Germany)	363,446[1]	59,041,000
FR (France)	220,515[1]	48,922,000
SW (Sweden)	37,820[3]	7,734,000
BF (Belgium)	20,015[1]	9,464,000
ND (Netherlands)	19,930[1]	12,292,000
IT (Italy)	4,375[1]	51,576,000

[1] Source: Böhning 1972:28,30,34,40,43.
[2] Source: *Japan Statistical Yearbook* 1970:44–45 and *Japan Statistical Yearbook* 1971:47. Figure shows the mean number of newly entering foreign laborers 1960–1970.
[3] Source: *Statistisk Årsbok för Sverige* 1966: Table 48 and *Statistisk Årsbok för Sverige* 1973: Table 52.

Table 4–6: Immigrant Labor Variable Dichotomized

High		Low (None)	
BF	(Belgium)	AD	(Afghanistan)
FR	(France)	AE	(United States)
GG	(West Germany)	CS	(Costa Rica)
JP	(Japan)	FF	(Finland)
ND	(Netherlands)	GK	(Greece)
SW	(Sweden)	HC	(Hong Kong)
		IF	(Iran)
		IT	(Italy)
		LA	(Lebanon)
		MS	(Mexico)
		TH	(Thailand)
		TK	(Turkey)
		YS	(Yugoslavia)

power-exporter rather than an importer. The rest of these countries can be qualified as labor-importers in order to be able to feed the external labor need of their expanding industrial sector. Tables presented by Böhning, 1972, not only give the number of newly entering foreign workers but also the number of employed workers at a given time of a given year.[28] It is interesting to note that Germany is one of the *Atlas* language/culture communities to which the inflow of immigrant labor has been intense in terms of newly entering and total number of employed workers in a given year. Those data become rather intriguing when juxtaposed with data on ethnic and linguistic fractionalization, where Germany noted very low fractionalization (.03 in *Atlas Norodov Mira*; unfortunately no data were available either from Roberts or Muller).

The immigrant labor variable will be dichotomized as *high* and *low* degrees of inflow or presence of immigrant labor. The reader may perhaps ask at this point how we within this dichotomy are to place those language/culture communities for which there are no data available? This must occur not only on the basis of the definition given the variable but also on the basis of these communities' various levels of forces of production (see the typology in Chapter 3). We feel it is legitimate to assume that the countries for which data are missing can be estimated (evaluated) as low or NONE on the dichotomy.[29] The immigrant labor variable and the data relating to it is schematized in Table 4–6.

Table 4–7: Immigrant Workers By Ethnic and Linguistic Fractionalization

		Immigrant Workers	
		High	Low (none)
Ethnic and Linguistic Fractionalization	High	I	II
	Low	III	IV

Our next step is to combine the data exhibited in Tables 4–4 and 4–6. For this purpose we shall construct a fourfold table by cross-tabulating these two variables in dichotomized form. The fourfold table is presented in Table 4–7.

Cross-tabulation of our given variables in dichotomized form generates four boxes with varying properties. Box (I) is characterized by *high internal ethnic differentiation* and *high imported ethnic*[30] *differentiation.* This is a cell[31] in the property space where ethnic differentiation is present in both dimensions. In language/culture communities fitting this cell we find not only a considerable number of foreign immigrant workers but also either several (each one having *a relatively small* number of members) or *two or very few* internal ethnic groups (each one having *a relatively large* number of members). In box (II) we have *high internal* but *low (or no) imported ethnic* differentiation. Due to internal differentiation, this cell also qualifies as highly differentiated in terms of ethnicity. The imported ethnic differentiation remains low (or none), however, and thus does not affect the cell in terms of ethnicity. Box (III) shows *low internal* but *high imported ethnic differentiation* and also qualifies as a case which is differentiated in terms of ethnicity. This is due, however, to imported and not to internal ethnic differentiation, as was the case in box (II). Box (IV) is characterized by *low internal and low (or no) imported ethnic differentiation.* This cell, like the first one, represents a pure form: it is the space of language/culture communities where no ethnic differentiation (at least in terms of our chosen variables) is observable.

For the purpose of the present chapter we can reduce the number of types in the property spaces by combining boxes (I), (II) and (III), since all of them represent some kind of differentiation which is relevant in the context of labelling concepts. The new type obtained in this way is then contrasted with box (IV), which represents no ethnic differentiation *in terms of our given dimensions.* This reduction of the property space and the placement of language/culture communities is exhibited in Table 4–8.

Thus, the final distribution of the *Atlas* language/culture communities along the ethnic differentiation variable is summarized and displayed in Table 4–9.

Table 4–8: Immigrant Workers by Ethnic and Linguistic Fractionalization with Appropriate Countries

		Immigrant Workers: High	Immigrant Workers: Low (none)
Ethnic and Linguistic Fractionalization	High	I Belgium	II Afghanistan, Finland, Iran, Mexico, Thailand, United States, Yugoslavia
	Low	III France, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, West Germany	IV Costa Rica, Greece, Hong Kong, Italy, Lebanon, Turkey

Note: Reduction of property space is indicated by double lines.

Table 4–9: Ethnic Differentiation: A Final Typology

High		Low	
AD	(Afghanistan)	CS	(Costa Rica)
AE	(United States)	GK	(Greece)
BF	(Belgium)	HC	(Hong Kong)
FF	(Finland)	IT	(Italy)
FR	(France)	LA	(Lebanon)
GG	(West Germany)	TK	(Turkey)
IF	(Iran)		
JP	(Japan)		
ND	(Netherlands)		
MS	(Mexico)		
SW	(Sweden)		
TH	(Thailand)		
YS	(Yugoslavia)		

In Table 4–9, the ethnic differentiation variable is dichotomized as high and low. Those language/culture communities which were placed in boxes (I), (II) and (III) in Table 4–8 are now classified as high in Table 4–9, since they have qualified as highly differentiated, either in terms of internal or external ethnic differentiation or in terms of both. Those language/culture communities which are placed as low in the dichotomy belong to cell (IV) in Table 4–8 and are very little or not at all differentiated in terms of ethnicity.

Here, however, we face a loss of information due to the dichotomization of a fourfold property space. We are quite aware of this matter and consider it worthwhile to use the entire property space later, in the context of hypothesis generation. After having assessed the position of the language/culture communities on the unemployment variable, an attempt to use the entire property space will be made.

4.3.2. Assessing the Position of Language/Culture Communities on the Strain-Generating Unemployment Variable

In this section, we shall first cite unemployment figures which are necessary for the purpose of the present chapter. Secondly, we shall operate once again with property spaces, defined by the number of unemployed and the type of family structure, in order to obtain a more realistic distribution of language/culture communities on the strain-generating unemployment variable.

Students who wish on a cross-cultural basis to collect figures showing the number of unemployed under a given period are confronted with several problems which make their task difficult, if not nearly impossible. A major difficulty is the *comparability* of statistics reported in national sources. In principal, there are five approaches which the International Labor Office accepts as norms for registration of unemployed. Thus, data can be obtained from (1) labor force sample sur-

veys, (2) compulsory unemployment insurance statistics, (3) statistics of trade unions and union benefit fund statistics, (4) registered applicants for work, and finally, (5) registered unemployed.[32] Data available from various nations are frequently collected with only one, but not necessarily the same, approach and are therefore not always *fully* comparable.

As indicated in Table 4—10, statistical data on the general level of unemployment, used in this context, refer primarily to the number of registered unemployed (code IV in the table) given by Employment Office statistics. Only data from the United States, Finland and Italy refer to labor force sample surveys (code I in the table). Moreover, the comparability of national statistics is also often jeopardized by the definitions of "unemployed" adopted.

> The national definitions used vary from one country to another as regards in particular age limits, reference periods, criteria for seeking work, minimum limits of time worked, treatment of persons temporarily laid-off, and treatment of first-time job seekers.
>
> (*Yearbook of Labor Statistics* 1973:419)

It should be noted at this point that we are not claiming that the comparability of statistics reported here is satisfactory. On the contrary, we recognize that there is a considerable amount of uncertainty as regards this matter. It is important to remember, however, that the aim of the statistical data presented here is to reflect general *trends* of unemployment and not to show *real* differences between given countries for given years. As also asserted by Myers and Chandler (1962:864), this starting assumption seems to be reasonable.

Another and more serious difficulty is to know whether or not the available data are *reliable.* As far as the figures of unemployment from various language/-culture communities are concerned, we have in this study relied on data given by *Yearbook of Labor Statistics,* published annually by ILO. As may be seen from Table 4—10, data are not available for *all* countries. The absence of reliable data from certain countries is responsible for this. In order to obtain a rough idea about the type of data not available in *Yearbook of Labor Statistics,* we have also investigated the national statistical sources of these countries[33] but unfortunately the data reported in these sources are not only notoriously unreliable but also unsystematic, so that the data cannot be used on a cross-cultural level.[34] With regard to the problem of reliability, the *Yearbook of Labor Statistics* (1973:419) maintains that:

> (w)hen based on adequate sampling methods, labour force sample surveys have proved in practice to be a satisfactory and reliable method of estimating unemployment.

The *Yearbook* also asserts that the volume of unemployment office statistics "varies widely" (Ibid.: 420). It seems that our Western *Atlas* communities have a clear advantage in this respect, since their employment offices function more effectively. The statistical data that we use in this study are shown in Table 4—10, pp. 80—81.

The table gives the general level of unemployment from 1958 to 1973. The data from 1958 to the mid-sixties should be particularly relevant in the case of our young informants. Data are available only for 12 language/culture communities.[35] Percentages of the general level of unemployment are also given.[36] These percentages are also exhibited in Diagram 4—2, where we can visually follow the trends of unemployment in these countries. In the last column of Table 4—10 are found the means of the percentages. (Diagram 4—2, see p. 82.)

For the purpose of the present chapter the general level of unemployment will be dichotomized as high and low. Two problems emerge in the context of dichotomization and of assessing the position of the language/culture communities with respect to the dichotomy. The first question is where to draw the demarcation line between high and low, since it is more a continuous than a dichotomous variable. The second problem is what to do with the language/culture communities for which the data are missing.

The demarcation line dichotomizing the general level of unemployment will be set at 2.9, which is the mean of means of unemployment percentages for 9 language/culture communities. The index indicating the point of dichotomization would be much higher if we had figures for other language/culture communities, since it is very likely that those communities have much higher percentages of unemployment figures. But also a more qualitative review of unemployment figures shows that especially those countries (Belgium, Italy) which are placed on the *high*-side and which could change place if the index were set higher than 2.9 would have higher percentages of unemployment. France, for which we do not have the percentages, should be located as low in the dichotomy. France has the same characteristics as the other European societies which were also placed as low in the dichotomy. In addition, her need for a very considerable amount of foreign labor lends further support to this contention.[37] The question of index becomes relatively less problematic, however, when the variable is adjusted through a more complex fourfold table. Consequently, the probability that the potential problems of comparability and reliability would effect our dichotomy is assumed to be small. Two factors help us to keep this probability on a low level: (1) we are seeking *trends* of the general level of unemployment, (2) the conception of unemployment is not understood merely in a technical sense or at face value, but rather in a sociological and social-psychological sense. That is to say, we are interested in strain-generating unemployment.

As for our second question, it is rather difficult to solve: how do we know whether the general level of unemployment is high or low in those communities for which the data are missing? It is *impossible* to know the exact figures. But it is easier to guess and to approximate on the basis of a great amount of literature focusing on the problems of underdeveloped countries.[38] At the very least, it can be said that the general level of unemployment in these communities is *not* low. In terms of quantitative figures we may place these countries on the "left" side of the dichotomy, i.e., as high. This hypothesis, however, which is very difficult

Table 4–10: General Level of Unemployment (In Thousands and in %)

Code[a]	Key/Country	1958[1]	1959	1960	1961	1962[2]	1963	1964
I	AE United States	4,602.0	3,740.0	3,852.0	4,714.0	3,911.0	4,070.0	3,786.0
		(6.8)	(5.5)	(6.7)	(5.5)	(5.7)	(5.2)	(4.5)
IV B	FR France	93.1	139.7	131.1	111.1	122.6	140.3	114.1
IV B	BF Belgium	116.4	132.3	114.3	89.1	70.9	59.1	50.4
		(5.5)	(6.3)	(5.4)	(4.2)	(3.3)	(2.3)	(2.2)
IV B	ND Netherlands	81.5	63.0	41.3	22.4	22.7	25.0	22.1
		(2.3)	(1.8)	(1.2)	(0.9)	(0.7)	(0.5)	(0.6)
IV B	GG Germany	683.1	479.9	237.4	161.1	142.4	174.2	157.4
		(3.5)	(2.4)	(1.2)	(0.8)	(0.7)	(0.8)	(0.7)
IV B	SW Sweden	31.7	26.5	18.9	19.6	56.0	65.0	58.0
		(2.5)	(2.0)	(1.4)	(1,2)	(1.5)	(1.7)	(1.6)
I	FF Finland	b	46.0	31.0	27.0	27.0	32.0	33.0
			(2.2)	(1.5)	(1.2)	(1.2)	(1.5)	(1.5)
	CS Costa Rica							
	MS Mexico							
I	IT Italy	1,322.0	1,117.0	836.0	710.0	611.0	504.0	549.0
		(6.6)	(5.6)	(4.2)	(3.5)	(3.0)	(2.5)	(2.7)
IV B	YS Yugoslavia	132.0	161.6	159.2	191.3	236.6	230.3	212.5
		(4.9)	(5.6)	(5.1)	(5.6)	(6.7)	(6.4)	(5.6)
IV B	GK Greece	79.1[3]	89.1	86.7	76.0	74.5	69.6	64.8
		(8.3)[4]	(10.4)	(5.9)	(3.9)	(4.7)	(6.0)	(6.0)
IV B	TK Turkey							
	LA Lebanon							
	IF Iran							
	AD Afghanistan							
	DH Delhi							
IV A	CB Calcutta	1,049.2	1,314.2	1,502.1	1,753.9	2,081.2	2,605.3	2,541.9
	MK Mysore							
	HC Hong Kong							
I	JP Japan	630.0	650.0	500.0	440.0	400.0	400.0	370.0
		(1.4)	(1.5)	(1.1)	(1.0)	(0.9)	(0.9)	(0.8)

a) Codes showing the type of data:
I: Labor force sample surveys
II: Compulsory unemployment insurance statistics
III: Statistics of trade unions and union benefit fund statistics
IV A: Registered applicants for work (Employment Office statistics)
IV B: Registered unemployed (Employment Office statistics)

to verify or to falsify within the frame of our present statistical knowledge, becomes more tenable and more justifiable when the general level of unemployment is cross-tabulated with type of family structure for the purpose of obtaining a more relevant distribution of language/culture communities in this respect. On the basis of data presented in Table 4–10 and of our discussion above, we obtain the dichotomy shown in Table 4–11, p. 83.

This dichotomy will be cross-tabulated with type of family structure, dichotomized as extended and nuclear (see Chapter 3). Neither the type of family struc-

ey	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	Mean 1958–1973
E	3,366.0	2,895.0	2,975.0	2,817.0	2,831.0	4,088.0	4,993.0	5,426.0	4,847.0	
	(4.5)	(3.8)	(3.8)	(3.6)	(3.5)	(4.9)	(5.9)	(6.2)	(5.4)	(5.6)
R	142.1	147.7	196.0	253.8	223.0	263.1	338.2	333.8	329.5	
F	55.4	61.5	85.3	102.7	85.3	71.3	70.9	78.5	82.4	
	(2.4)	(2.7)	(3.7)	(4.5)	(3.6)	(2.9)	(2.9)	(3.2)	(3.3)	(3.6)
D	26.7	37.3	78.5	71.9	52.9	46.4	62.0	91.2	92.8	
	(0.7)	(1.0)	(2.0)	(1.9)	(1.4)	(1.1)	(1.6)	(2.3)	(2.3)	(1.4)
G	139.2	154.3	444.6	313.6	173.2	143.8	177.7	181.9	201.0	
	(0.6)	(0.7)	(2.1)	(1.5)	(0.8)	(0.7)	(0.8)	(0.9)	(0.9)	(1.2)
W	44.0	59.0	79.0	85.0	72.0	59.0	101.0	87.2	73.6	
	(1.2)	(1.6)	(2.1)	(2.2)	(1.9)	(1.5)	(2.5)	(2.2)	(1.9)	(1.7)
F	31.0	35.0	63.0	89.0	62.0	41.0	49.0	52.0	50.0	
	(1.4)	(1.6)	(2.8)	(4.0)	(2.8)	(1.9)	(2.2)	(2.2)	(2.1)	(2.0)
S										
S										
	721.0	769.0	689.0	694.0	663.0	615,0	613.0	623.0	735.0	
	(3.6)	(3.9)	(3.5)	(3.5)	(3.4)	(3.1)	(3.1)	(3.3)	(3.9)	(3.7)
S	237.0	257.6	269.1	311.0	330.6	319.6	291.3	288.8	353.9	
	(6.1)	(6.7)	(7.0)	(8.0)	(8.2)	(7.7)	(6.7)	(6.4)	(7.5)	(5.6)
K	64.3	64.8	83.5	73.7	66.5	48.7	30.3	38.2	12.8	
	(5.2)	(5.0)	(6.0)	(4.4)	(4.2)	(3.4)	(4.5)			
K		23.5	26.8	33.0	39.0	43.8	44.9	43.9		
A										
D										
H										
B	2,527.0	2,609.8	2,706.3	2,902.8	3,203.9	3,725.7	4,602.3	5,688.0	7,596.0	
K										
C										
	390.0	440.0	630.0	590.0	570.0	590.0	640.0	640.0	670.0	
	(0.8)	(0.9)	(1.3)	(1.2)	(1.1)	(1.2)	(1.2)	(1.2)	(1.2)	(1.1)
							Mean of means			(2.9)

Empty spaces indicate either data are missing or data available are not dependable.
Source: Data for 1958–1961: *Yearbook of Labor Statistics,* 1968:377–389.
Source: Data for 1962–1973: *Yearbook of Labor Statistics,* 1971:417–429 and 1973:419–431.
Excl. unemployed seamen.
Unemployed seamen.

ture nor the distribution of *Atlas* communities on this dichotomized variable will be evaluated here since this task has already been accomplished in Chapter 3. In order to allow for the reader more simply to assess the value of the typology we shall reproduce the dichotomy of family structures already exhibited in Chapter 3, see Table 4–12, p. 83.

The next step is to combine the data represented in Tables 4–11 and 4–12. A fourfold table will be constructed for this purpose by cross-tabulating the general level of unemployment and the type of family structure, both dichotomized. We obtain the typology given in Table 4–13, p. 83.

Diagram 4–2: General Level of Unemployment in 9 Selected Language/ Culture Communities (Shown in %)



Table 4–11: The General Level of Unemployment

High		Low	
AD	(Afghanistan)	FF	(Finland)
AE	(United States)	FR	(France)
BF	(Belgium)	GG	(West Germany)
CS	(Costa Rica)	JP	(Japan)
GK	(Greece)	ND	(Netherlands)
HC	(Hong Kong)	SW	(Sweden)
IF	(Iran)		
IT	(Italy)		
LA	(Lebanon)		
MS	(Mexico)		
TH	(Thailand)		
TK	(Turkey)		
YS	(Yugoslavia)		

Table 4–12: Typology of Family Structures Repeated

Extended family		Nuclear family	
AD	(Afghanistan)	AE	(United States)
CB	(Calcutta)	BF	(Belgium)
DH	(Delhi)	FF	(Finland)
GK	(Greece)	FR	(France)
IF	(Iran)	GG	(West Germany)
JP	(Japan)	HC	(Hong Kong)
LA	(Lebanon)	IT	(Italy)
MK	(Mysore)	ND	(Netherlands)
MS	(Mexico)	SW	(Sweden)
TK	(Turkey)	TH	(Thailand)
YS	(Yugoslavia)		

Table 4–13: Family Structure by General Level of Unemployment

		Family Structure	
		Extended	Nuclear
General Level of Unemployment	High	I	II
	Low	III	IV

Thus, we have generated four boxes with different properties. Box (I) is characterized by *high* general level of unemployment and *extended* type of family structure. In such societies, sociologically and social-psychologically relevant negative outcomes of unemployment are known to be reduced or alleviated by the dominant family structure.[39] Box (II) is also characterized by *high* general level of unemployment, but the dominant type of family structure is *nuclear*. In those societies which have the properties defined by box (II), there is a higher probability of generation and development of certain societal conflicts, especially when no other supplementary social welfare institutions operate effectively. Box (III) is defined by *low* general level of unemployment and *extended* type of family structure. Little or no societal contradictions which may be channelled into ethnic or political polarization are expected. Finally, box (IV) is also defined by *low* general level of unemployment, but this time the dominant type of family structure is *nuclear*. Because of the low general level of unemployment no societal contradictions are expected in relation to ethnic differentiation. The purposes of this chapter lead us to reduce the number of property spaces from four to two by combining boxes (I), (III), and (IV), as opposed to box (II). This means that communities which fit the definitions of boxes (I), (III), and (IV) are distinguished as societies where we expect either low general level of unemployment or where conflict-generating effects of unemployment are reduced or alleviated. In contrast, communities which fulfil the definition of box (II) are expected to be able to generate conflicts on the social-psychological and sociological level. Such structural conditions will be discussed more thoroughly in the coming sections. At this point, we can display the cross-tabulation of the two dichotomized variables with *Atlas* language/culture communities placed in the appropriate spaces.

Table 4–14: Family Structure by General Level of Unemployment with Atlas Communities

		Family Structure	
		Extended	Nuclear
General Level of Unemployment	High	I Afghanistan, Calcutta, Delhi, Greece, Iran, Lebanon, Mexico, Mysore, Turkey, Yugoslavia	II Belgium, Hong Kong, Italy, Thailand, United States
	Low	III Japan	IV Finland, France, Netherlands, Sweden, West Germany

Note: The reduction of the property space is indicated by double lines.

Having assessed the value of the above-displayed property space and the placement of *Atlas* language/culture communities in this space, we can now give the final distribution of communities along the unemployment variable:

Table 4—15: Strain-Generating Unemployment: A Final Typology

High		Low	
AE	(United States)	AD	(Afghanistan)
BF	(Belgium)	CB	(Calcutta)
HC	(Hong Kong)	DH	(Delhi)
IT	(Italy)	FF	(Finland)
TH	(Thailand)	FR	(France)
		GG	(West Germany)
		GK	(Greece)
		IF	(Iran)
		JP	(Japan)
		LA	(Lebanon)
		MK	(Mysore)
		MS	(Mexico)
		ND	(Netherlands)
		SW	(Sweden)
		TK	(Turkey)
		YS	(Yugoslavia)

The remark made at the end of section 4.3.1. concerning the loss of information is also valid in the present context. Dichotomization of the fourfold property space generated by two variables (the general level of unemployment and the type of family structure), turns out to be an operation leading to loss of information. Therefore, before going into the findings on the interaction of our two independent variables (i.e., ethnic differentiation and strain-generating unemployment), both dichotomized, we suggest the possibility of cross-tabulating Tables 4—8 and 4—14, in order to prevent loss of information.

At this point, it is sufficient to exhibit only the cross-tabulation, and not the distribution of the communities in the table, simply for the purpose of making it possible for the reader independently to assess the significance of the table. In a subsequent section, however, this property space with sixteen cells will be elaborated and compared with our final fourfold property space. The cross-tabulation of the two fourfold tables gives the following property space:

Table 4—16: Four Variables Cross-Tabulated

Ethnic and Linguistic Fractionalization			High		Low	
Immigrant Workers			High	Low (None)	High	Low (None)
Unemployment	High	Type of Family Structure: Nuclear	I	II	III	IV
		Type of Family Structure: Extended	V	VI	VII	VIII
	Low	Type of Family Structure: Nuclear	IX	X	XI	XII
		Type of Family Structure: Extended	XIII	XIV	XV	XVI

4.4. Findings on the Interaction of the Two Independent Variables and the Findings in the Labelling Category

In this section we shall present an analysis of the clustering of the labelling concepts. This analysis will also be related to a cross-tabulation of two variables, ethnic differentiation and strain-generating unemployment, chosen for the purpose of generating and assessing hypotheses.

Before presenting the clustering of labelling concepts in the context of these two selected independent variables, however, it is necessary to render some background findings from the AAM. Briefly, the sequence of presentation in this section is the following: (1) a presentation of our findings concerning the labelling category, (2) a presentation of the fourfold table that will be used in exploring our hypotheses, (3) relations between polarized clustering of labelling concepts and our two selected independent variables.

4.4.1. Findings on Subjective Culture (the AAM) with Respect to the Labelling Concepts

Here we shall primarily follow two ways of exploring subjective culture as revealed by the labelling concepts: first, we shall simply look at E-scores as standardized within each community, in order to see whether some trends, similarities and dissimilarities can be found in the *Atlas* data. Such trends help us better to identify those polarized clusters which are of interest in the present context. As in the previous chapter, however, hierarchical cluster analysis remains our main technique. Since overall results of hierarchical cluster analysis of the labelling concepts are rather difficult to observe systematically, due to the heterogeneous and irregular character of the category—i.e., the category embraces a wide range of concepts referring to *various* aspects of subjective culture—these results will be *selectively* systematized by a presentation of the degree of clustering of given labelling concepts. At this point, we can begin to review standardized E-scores for given concepts and language/culture communities. Table 4—17 embraces 23 selected labelling concepts for 22 language/culture communities.

To begin with the concepts of race (BLACK RACE, RED RACE, WHITE RACE, YELLOW RACE), no *clear* similarity between the subjective cultures can be identified. Nevertheless, one tendency is that in most of the language/culture communities, our young informants are inclined to evaluate their own race positively, whereas they evaluate other races negatively. This accounts for both white Americans and Europeans, with the exception of the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland and Yugoslavia.

More manifest and accentuated trends can be seen in the case of the concepts of

religion (BUDDHISTS, CHRISTIANS, HINDUS and MOSLEMS). It is apparent that the informants are inclined to evaluate their own religion positively and others' religions negatively; e.g., in communities where the majority of people are Christians, the concept CHRISTIANS is evaluated positively and the other religions negatively. There are, however, exceptions even here. The Netherlands, for instance, is such an exception.[40] In this context, the concept ATHEISTS is a universal. That is to say, it is evaluated *negatively* in *all* the *Atlas* language/culture communities. Such a concept, a universal, can be used as what we call a *marker* in cluster analysis. A marker is some kind of standard point around which certain concepts may be seen to crystallize, whereas other concepts are non-crystallized. Another concept which is very near to ATHEISTS is NON-BELIEVER, also negatively evaluated everywhere (missing scores are indicated by 000).

Similar kind of trends are also manifested with regard to the concept of political ideologies. Here we can note concepts such as CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, COMMUNISM, DEMOCRACY and NATIONALISM. DEMOCRACY is evaluated positively in all communities with the exception of Finland, where a negative score is noted; this evaluation of DEMOCRACY is unique to Finland. In this context, one should, following the previous trend, expect that CAPITALISM would be evaluated positively in communities where capitalism is the major dominant ideology. This, however, is not the case. Another marker is the concept FRIEND. It is evaluated positively in all these societies. In the context of clusters, FRIEND can be used as a "crystallizer" of other concepts, particularly in contrast to ATHEISTS or ENEMY (the latter is also a marker—evaluated negatively in all communities except Greece). Moreover, in Table 4—17 we have included a few other concepts such as STRANGER, REFUGEE, IMMIGRANT and FOREIGNER, in order to give a general idea of this category. All these concepts, with the exception of FOREIGNER, are evaluated negatively in most of the communities.

This short glance at some *general trends* in subjective culture as revealed by the labelling concepts indicates a major principle: many labelling concepts are evaluated in a context of *ethnocentrism.* By ethnocentrism we understand a social attitude expressing "a community of feeling in any group" (Cox 1948:321). Ethnocentrism refers primarily to *group solidarity,* emphasizing divergent interests and feelings between "we" and "others". This attitude is not necessarily a question of racial antagonism, and it may have a *survival* character. That is to say, such ethnocentric attitudes may derive from previous superstructures and have historical explanations—which sometimes are difficult to discover. It is necessary at this point to differentiate between two issues: (1) "we" feelings are generated in interaction with others and such feelings in turn generate solidarity, group security, etc., in various social and historical situations. Such feelings may be generated on different levels, e.g., "we" in the sociology department, "we" Scandinavians, or "we" white people, (2) the *labelling* of such group feelings, however, is a social and historical phenomenon. Thus, we can search for, and find, structural and his-

Table 4–17: Standardized Composite E-Scores of 23 Concepts in 22 Communities

Key/Location	Black Race	Red Race	White Race	Yellow Race	Atheists	Buddhists	Christians	Hindus	Moslems	Capitalism	Communism
AE United States	−0.9	−0.8	0.5	−0.7	−1.7	−1.2	-1.2	−0.9	−0.9	−1.0	−2.9
FR France	0.3	−0.1	−0.3	−0.6	−0.7	−0.2	0.2	−0.3	−0.6	−0.4	−1.6
BF Belgium	−0.3	−0.2	0.4	−0.7	−0.7	−0.7	−0.4	−0.7	−0.9	−0.2	−0.6
ND Netherlands	0.2	.0.5	−0.4	−0.9	−0.2	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	−0.4	−1.1
GG Germany	−0.1	−0.1	0.1	−0.9	−1.0	−0.6	0.7	−0.6	−0.6	−0.2	−1.1
SW Sweden	1.4	0.3	0.3	−0.5	−1.2	−0.2	0.7	−0.2	−0.4	−1.3	−1.2
FF Finland	0.0	0.3	0.8	−0.6	−1.9	−0.8	−0.4	−0.7	−0.5	−1.0	−1.6
CS Costa Rica	0.0	−0.4	0.6	−0.6	−2.1	−0.8	0.6	−0.2	−1.0	−0.1	−1.9
MS Mexico	0.5	−0.5	−0.2	−0.1	−0.8	−0.5	0.5	−0.3	−0.9	−1.2	−1.2
IT Italy	−0.2	−0.6	0.4	−1.0	−1.7	−1.1	0.0	−0.9	−1.3	−0.8	−0.7
YS Yugoslavia	0.3	0.8	0.2	−0.4	−0.5	−0.5	0.2	−0.2	−0.5	−2.2	1.3
GK Greece	−0.1	−0.8	0.8	−0.6	−1.7	−0.7	1.1	−1.2	−1.3	−1.4	0.0
TK Turkey	−0.5	−0.7	0.1	−0.8	−2.3	−0.1	−0.4	0.0	0.9	0.4	−1.4
LA Lebanon	0.0	−0.5	000	000	−2.2	−1.3	000	000	000	−0.4	000
IF Iran	0.7	−0.3	0.4	−0.3	−2.2	−0.8	−0.6	−0.3	0.7	0.4	000
AD Afghanistan	000	−0.1	0.1	0.0	−1.9	−1.1	−0.5	−0.1	1.0	−0.7	000
DH Delhi (India)	−1.2	−0.7	0.1	−0.5	−0.9	0.2	−0.4	0.2	−0.3	0.2	−0.7
CB Calcutta (India)	000	000	−0.7	000	−0.3	0.7	−0.3	1.0	−1.6	−1.4	0.5
MK Mysore (India)	−0.8	−0.4	−0.2	−0.5	−0.8	1.1	−0.2	1.9	−1.9	0.5	−1.4
TH Thailand	−0.3	−1.1	0.6	0.1	−0.8	1.2	−0.1	−0.7	−0.5	−1.3	−1.8
HC Hong Kong	−0.4	−0.4	−0.9	1.5	−0.5	0.8	0.9	−1.4	−1.6	−0.7	−1.3
JP Japan	−0.6	0.1	−0.2	0.1	−0.8	−0.5	0.0	−1.3	−1.0	0.1	−1.2

torical explanations why, for example, "we" in a given historical situation is labelled as "whites" or "Christians" as opposed to "others" who are labelled as "blacks" or "atheists", and why the former are evaluated positively and the latter negatively.

At this point the reader is reminded of the previous section, where we discussed the historical situation described by Oliver Cox (see s. 4.2.1). Keeping this specific situation in mind, we can now review the results obtained by the hierarchical cluster analysis of the labelling concepts.

A total of 37 concepts were included in the cluster analysis. Homogeneity of clusters diminishes possibilities for a more systematic investigation. It is nevertheless possible to systematize the data through a *selection* of certain given concepts to see whether they form clusters. The main guidelines of this selection are shown to us by the findings which are reported as general trends. We should mention at this point that the selection was made on analytic rather than purely statistical grounds. Briefly, this means that we have chosen certain concepts which not only according to our understanding and experience, but also according to patterns revealed in Table 4–17, are expected to configurate, in one way or another, and become polarized in opposed clusters.

In Table 4–18 we exhibit seven selection patterns which have here served as

Key/Location	Democracy	Nationalism	Socialism	Negro	Jews	Friend	Non-Believer	Stranger	Foreigner	Refugee	Immigrant	Enemy
AE United States	0.7	−0.3	−0.8	−0.6	−0.8	0.7	−1.8	−1.1	0.0	−0.4	−0.7	−2.7
FR France	0.3	−0.9	−0.5	0.6	−1.0	1.7	−0.5	0.0	0.2	−0.2	−0.3	−0.3
BF Belgium	0.3	−0.9	0.5	−0.4	−0.3	1.5	0.0	−0.6	−0.4	−1.1	−1.0	−2.0
ND Netherlands	0.9	−1.2	−0.6	0.2	0.7	1.3	−0.1	−0.3	0.3	−0.9	0.1	−2.2
GG Germany	0.8	−0.6	−0.4	0.3	−0.3	1.2	−0.9	−0.6	0.2	−0.6	−0.1	−2.4
SW Sweden	1.0	0.3	−0.8	0.6	0.6	1.7	−1.2	−0.5	0.1	−0.2	0.0	−3.3
FF Finland	−0.1	0.2	−1.5	0.0	−0.4	1.0	0.0	−0.6	0.4	−1.3	0.0	−1.9
CS Costa Rica	1.0	0.8	−0.6	−0.6	−0.9	0.7	−1.7	−0.8	−0.2	−0.8	−0.2	−2.1
MS Mexico	0.4	1.4	0.0	1.0	−0.5	1.2	−0.7	−0.7	−0.2	−1.2	−0.6	−2.1
IT Italy	1.0	−0.4	−0.8	−0.6	−0.7	1.1	−0.5	−0.4	−0.1	−0.6	−0.6	−2.4
YS Yugoslavia	1.0	0.2	0.6	0.9	0.1	1.1	−0.6	0.3	0.3	−1.3	−0.1	−2.3
GK Greece	0.7	0.9	−1.1	0.3	−0.3	1.2	−1.2	−0.4	−0.3	0.1	−1.1	0.3
TK Turkey	0.9	0.9	−1.1	0.2	−1.5	0.8	0.0	0.2	0.1	−1.1	−0.7	−2.1
LA Lebanon	0.9	0.9	0.2	−0.1	000	1.1	0.0	−0.9	−0.6	−0.7	0.0	−2.1
IF Iran	0.2	−0.4	0.0	0.3	−0.8	0.7	−2.4	−0.5	−0.8	−0.6	0.3	−2.6
AD Afghanistan	0.8	0.9	−0.9	−1.2	−1.7	0.9	−1.4	−0.8	−0.8	0.0	−0.3	−2.6
DH Delhi	0.6	0.0	0.5	−0.5	−0.3	1.1	−1.5	−0.2	0.2	0.2	−0.2	−2.7
CB Calcutta	0.0	0.4	0.3	−0.9	−0.3	1.0	0.0	−0.6	−0.3	−0.7	0.0	−2.3
MK Mysore	0.3	1.1	0.2	−1.1	0.3	1.5	0.0	−0.7	0.0	−0.7	0.0	−2.2
TH Thailand	0.9	−0.4	−0.6	−0.8	−1.6	0.7	0.0	−0.8	0.6	−1.5	−0.2	−2.3
HC Hong Kong	1.5	0.0	−1.2	0.4	−0.7	1.1	0.0	−0.7	−0.9	−0.9	−0.2	−2.2
JP Japan	0.8	−0.5	−0.6	−0.3	−0.3	1.5	−0.7	−0.9	0.2	−0.2	0.2	−1.8

Table 4–18: Guidelines in Selecting Concepts to Build Clusters

Type	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Concepts and type of concepts	FRIEND MY NA. NAME	ENEMY	MY NA. NAME				
	Own religion	Other religions	Own religion	Other religions	Own religion		Other religions
	Own race	Other races	Own race	Other races	Own race	Other races	
	Own geographical location		Own geographical location		Own geographical location		
	Own economical-political ideology	Opposite economical-political ideology					
No. of concepts	6	8	4	6	3	3	3

guidelines in studying the degrees of clustering for 18 language/culture communities.

In this table we have not given the complete names for the concepts involved, except for FRIEND, MY NATION'S NAME, and ENEMY, since this would demand too much space. We have indicated only the kind of concept (or concepts) which were selected. Thus, for example, "own religion" means CHRISTIANS for Sweden and MOSLEMS for Turkey and so on. "Other religions" indicates MOSLEMS, HINDUS and BUDDHISTS for Sweden and CHRISTIANS, HINDUS and BUDDHISTS for Turkey. The interested reader may multiply the number of examples by contrasting the key words given in Table 4—18 with the total list of labelling concepts. By juxtaposing I against II, III against IV, V against VI and finally, V against VII, we obtained four different groups of labelling concepts within which the degree of clustering for given concepts can be assessed (as mentioned in previous chapters, this also shows the degree of polarized clustering of the given concepts). Thus, we wished to investigate whether, for example, concepts chosen in group I and II constitute separate, polarized clusters *in relation* to each other and, in that case, on which hierarchical cluster level. In order to scrutinize the degree of clustering of concepts, i.e., our dependent variable, an index was calculated.

Our index of clustering, giving the degree of polarized clustering of given concepts, was calculated by:

$$I_{pc} = \frac{L}{d_1 + d_2}$$

where d_1 and d_2 are the diameters (the largest distance in a given cluster) of two given clusters, respectively, and L is the level on which these two clusters form *only one* cluster (or, what amounts to the same thing, the level on which two clusters conjoin). Thus, greater L indicates that two given clusters are highly polarized, or the affective differentiation of the concepts configurating in the same given cluster differs much from the other cluster's. When, on the other hand, L is *relatively* low, the reverse is true.[41] It should be noted here that the question as to whether the index of clustering is low or high is a *relative* matter. For instance, in Table 4—19 the lowest index =0.49, whereas the highest =3.73. Thus, keeping this relativity in mind, we shall use the means and the medians of the given indices when assessing these indices in the following discussion. The results are presented in Table 4—19. Indices for each group of concepts are ranked in such a way that the higher the index for a given language/culture community, the more distinct (more polarized from each other) are the two clusters. Thus, in the first column to the left, the degree of clustering for Iran is higher than it is for Costa Rica.

The first group of concepts may be named as *Labelling in General,* since both the number of concepts observed is higher and the contents of the group is more heterogeneous. The second group of concepts is obtained by a combination of III and IV in Table 4—18 and is characterized as embracing a reduced number of

Table 4–19: Indices of Polarized Clustering

Labelling in General			Labelling more Selectively		Labelling of Race		Labelling of Religion		
IF	(Iran)	0.74	AE	1.01	AE	3.11	AE	3.73	PROVINCIALISM (Intolerance)
CS	(Costa Rica)	0.62	IF	0.74	GK	1.04	IF	2.89	
TK	(Turkey)	0.60	SW	0.65	AD	0.93	SW	1.79	
AE	(United States)	0.59	CS	0.62	IF	0.83	MS	1.26	
GK	(Greece)	0.59	TK	0.60	FR	0.79	CS	1.15	
GG	(Germany)	0.56	GK	0.59	YS	0.78	GK	0.89	
FR	(France)	0.50	FR	0.50	MS	0.76	AD	0.81	
BF	(Belgium)	0.50	ND	0.50	SW	0.73	ND	0.80	
ND	(Netherlands)	0.50	GG	0.50	ND	0.68	YS	0.78	
SW	(Sweden)	0.50	FF	0.50	HC	0.67	FR	0.75	
FF	(Finland)	0.50	MS	0.50	BF	0.63	IT	0.70	
MS	(Mexico)	0.50	IT	0.50	CS	0.62	BF	0.68	
IT	(Italy)	0.50	YS	0.50	FF	0.61	HC	0.67	
YS	(Yugoslavia)	0.50	AD	0.50	TK	0.60	FF	0.61	
AD	(Afghanistan)	0.50	TH	0.50	JP	0.57	TK	0.59	
TH	(Thailand)	0.50	HC	0.50	GG	0.53	TH	0.52	
HC	(Hong Kong)	0.50	JP	0.50	IT	0.50	GG	0.50	
JP	(Japan)	0.50	BF	0.49	TH	0.50	JP	0.50	COSMOPOLITANISM (Tolerance)

concepts and as being less heterogeneous than Labelling in General. This group will be named *Labelling More Selectively*. The third and the fourth groups are more homogeneous and include only few concepts. The third group primarily gives clustering of the *concepts of race* and will be henceforth indicated as *Labelling of Race*. As for the fourth group, it includes the *concepts of religion* and will be indicated as *Labelling of Religion*. As may be seen in Table 4–19, for both Labelling in General and Labelling More Selectively the degrees of clustering are *low*. For only 6 language/culture communities do the given concepts shape clusters which are principally distinct from each other. These clusters are unclear and look like nebula rather than independent clusters. Nevertheless, this is not exactly the case for all the language/culture communities. There furthermore also exist various differences between Labelling in General and Labelling More Selectively. Thus, Labelling More Selectively is somehow more differentiated than Labelling in General. In Labelling More Selectively, the index for the United States is = 1.01, for Iran =0.74 and for Sweden =0.65, whereas in Labelling in General, the index for United States is =0.59, for Iran =0.74 and for Sweden =0.50. There is also a resemblance between the six most differentiated communities in Labelling in General and Labelling More Selectively, since five of the six tops are the same language/culture communities.

For the other language/culture communities no clusters *at all* are polarized with regard to Labelling in General and to Labelling More Selectively. This fact is indicated by the index =0.50 for 12 commmunities. (Index =0.50 in fact shows two juxtaposed clusters which look like two tangential configurations, but they are clearly not polarized from each other.) On the other hand, the clustering both

in Labelling of Race and in Labelling of Religion is rather polarized. For example, the United States has obtained the highest index both in Labelling of Race and in Labelling of Religion. (Index =3.11 and =3.73, respectively.) This means that concepts referring to "own" properties of the United States are very much differentiated from concepts referring to other races or other religions. The range of variation in both scales is large. Labelling of Race and Labelling of Religion are positively related, so that for a given community high degree of clustering with respect to concepts of race tends to mean high degree of clustering with respect to concepts of religion. (Tau for Labelling of Race and Labelling of Religion is =0.61.) If scrutinized within the frame of our independent variables, then the degrees of polarized clustering of (or what amounts to the same thing) or resemblances with regard to the affective differentiation of given concepts, suggest certain hypotheses. In the following sections we shall first present the main fourfold table of the present chapter and subsequently shall explore and assess hypotheses.

4.4.2. Provincialism–Disposing vs. Cosmopolitanism–Disposing Structures

The fourfold table, the two variables of which were already discussed in detail, can now be displayed. Horizontally, we have strain-generating unemployment dichotomized as high and low, and vertically we have ethnic differentiation, also dichotomized as high and low. As the reader will remember, both strain-generating unemployment and ethnic differentiation connote, in accordance with the discussion of the foregoing sections, a wider range of dimensions, rather than a simple uni-dimensionality. The cross-tabulation of the two dichotomized variables gives four types, here indicated as Boxes (I), (II), (III) and (IV).

Table 4–20: Strain-Generating Unemployment by Ethnic Differentiation with Appropriate Countries

Ethnic Differentiation	Strain-Generating Unemployment: High	Strain-Generating Unemployment: Low
High	(I) AGITATED PROVINCIALISM *– expected –* Belgium, Thailand, United States	(II) GENUINE COSMOPOLITANISM *– expected –* Afghanistan, Finland, France, Iran, Japan, Netherlands, Mexico, Sweden, West Germany, Yugoslavia
Low	(III) HISTORICALLY CONDITIONED PROVINCIALISM AND/OR COSMOPOLITANISM *– expected –* Hong Kong, Italy	(IV) IRRELEVANT *– expected –* Costa Rica, Greece, Turkey

Box (I) is characterized by a high degree of strain-generating unemployment and a high degree of ethnic differentiation. These structural conditions are expected to generate a state of affairs that can be summarized by the term *Agitated Provincialism.* This term is also interchangeable with another term, namely, chauvinism. Here we have a provincialism-disposing structure. Provincialism is a strain-generated and agitated state of affairs and is assumed to be due to the interaction of a high degree of strain-generating unemployment and a high degree of ethnic differentiation.

Agitated provincialism is a structural—more precisely, superstructural—situation which is generated by the social structure itself and which becomes an important element of the social structure for a given period. In this sense, agitated provincialism is an *ideology* which is assumed to be generated by given structural conditions. At this point it is reasonable to digress somewhat, in order to recall the historical background reviewed at the beginning of the present chapter. We maintained that racism has been an important superstructural element of certain societies in given historical situations and has played a justifying role with reference to the economic structure of these societies. In such cases racism becomes an ideology. The parallel and the connection between racism as ideology and provincialism become apparent. Clearly, there exists a similarity between the two concepts, since both of them refer to structural—more precisely, superstructural—situations which are generated by the social structure itself and which independently become an important element of the social structure for given historical periods. Moreover, we also expect a historical continuity in the sense that survivals from different periods—and in this case, from the periods during which racism played an important role—remain latent in societies and re-emerge in times of agitated provincialism. Thus, people are expected, depending on psychological and social contradictions generated by the structural state of affairs, to classify certain concepts together by attributing similar affective meanings to them. Under these structural conditions we expect high degree of polarization of the clusters. We shall, however, specify this matter in subsequent sections. As may be seen from Table 4—20, *Atlas* language/culture communities which fit in the structural conditions of box (I) are Belgium, Thailand and the United States.

Box (II), on the other hand, is characterized by a low degree of strain-generating unemployment and a high degree of ethnic differentiation. In order to indicate the state of affairs supposedly generated by these structural conditions we shall use the term *Genuine Cosmopolitanism,* which is the diametrical opposite of agitated provincialism. *Genuine Cosmopolitanism,* a general attitude generated by a low degree of strain-generating unemployment and a high degree of ethnic differentiation, means that individuals are *open* or less prejudiced in evaluating labelling concepts. Put more simply, people do not label each other in a stereotyped way; they refrain from labelling. Furthermore, they allow a racially and culturally more differentiated set of people into their own community, rather than relegating them into the camp of the ENEMY. This idea may also be connected with our dis-

cussion of ethnocentrism. Under these conditions ethnocentric attitudes, if any, remain latent and do not develop into what we here call agitated provincialism. Concerning subjective culture we expect under these structural conditions low degree of polarized differentiation with respect to labelling concepts. *Atlas* language/culture communities that can be placed in box (II) are the following: Afghanistan, Finland, France, Iran, Japan, Netherlands, Mexico, Sweden, West Germany and Yugoslavia.

Box (III) is an interesting type, as it is characterized by a high degree of strain-generating unemployment but a low degree of ethnic differentiation. Psychological and social tensions and contradictions generated by a high degree of strain-generating unemployment must be channeled in some way. While the above is true, the alternatives of channeling such tensions and contradictions are different than those of boxes (I) and (II). Clearly, there are no ethnic minority groups which may become the target of aggressions. Thus, depending on various (and particularly historical) dimensions the outcome of these structural conditions may be *either* provincialism *and/or* cosmopolitanism. Under these structural conditions, the degree of polarization of clusters with respect to concepts referring to dimensions of *ethnic* differentiation is expected to be low. Consequently, the cosmopolitanist side of these structural conditions should become relevant with respect to the concepts of ethnic differentiation. On the other hand, the provincialist side of these structural conditions should be revealed, again depending on historical factors, in connection with the concepts of political ideology. Thus, under the conditions of box (III), we may have both provincialism and cosmopolitanism simultaneously during a given period. Hong Kong and Italy are placed here.

Finally, box (IV) has a *low* degree of strain-generating unemployment and a low degree of ethnic differentiation. The state of affairs generated by these structural factors is rather *irrelevant,* at least logically, with regard to the agitated-provincialism-cosmopolitanism axis. No tensions and contradictions are assumed to be generated by the interaction of low level of strain-generating unemployment and low level of ethnic differentiation. The *Atlas* language/culture communities that fit this box are Costa Rica, Greece and Turkey. Nevertheless, as we shall soon see, the degree of polarization of the clusters with reference to the labelling concepts suggests a slight tendency toward cosmopolitanism in the subjective culture of these communities. Yet, this "cosmopolitanism" cannot be understood in terms of the structural conditions present in box (II). In this context, we prefer to use the term *Irrelevant* in order to express the hypothesis generated by the AAM. More precisely, it should indicate that *the given* structural conditions cannot qualify the type in terms of the agitated-provincialism-cosmopolitanism axis, but that other historical factors and/or special exposure to socializing agents and to certain objects and symbols should be assumed to influence the degree of polarization of the clusters.

In this section we have described some crucial aspects of our independent variables when interacting with each other and distributed the appropriate lan-

guage/culture communities into their respective types within our property-space. The next step of this analysis is to relate the independent variables to the dependent variable.

4.4.3. Subjective Culture as Cosmopolitan or Provincial

In the preceding section we have elaborated four types of objective structures, each disposing to certain given characteristics. Thus, for instance, the first type is assumed to be a provincialism-disposing structure. Here we shall use the AAM to indicate provincialism and cosmopolitanism. Thus, a high degree of polarized clustering indicates a *provincialist attribute* in the subjective culture, whereas a low degree of polarized clustering is a sign of a *cosmopolitan attribute* in the subjective culture. In this sense, for example, the United States is one of the most provincialist language/culture communities, in contrast to Japan, which is one of the most cosmopolitan communities. This may also be followed by means of the provincialism-cosmopolitanism axis, displayed on the right side of Table 4—19, although this table does not directly relate the dependent variable to the independent ones. In order to relate variations in the degrees of polarized clustering to the communities located in our fourfold property space, the means of the degrees of polarized clustering were calculated for each of the four cells. The results are presented in Table 4—21 and in Diagram 4—3. Diagram 4—3 shows the mean of the degrees of clustering for Labelling of Race and Labelling of Religion for the total number of language/culture communities placed in the respective boxes (Table 4—20 indicates the distribution of language/culture communities within the property space).

In box (I), where most provincialist subjective culture is expected, we have obtained the highest degree of polarized clustering for the given communities. Degrees of clustering, in particular, are very high with respect to Labelling of Race and Labelling of Religion. Under the pressure of high strain-generating unemployment and the presence of ethnic groups that may become the target of hostile attitudes, certain—sometimes ethnocentric—attitudes become active: one way of seeing such manifestations of provincialism is to assess the highest degree of polarized clustering of the labelling concepts. Concepts referring to one's own "in-group" are crystallized together and polarized from other concepts connoting the properties of "others". A typical example of this phenomenon is represented by the high degree of polarized clustering in Labelling of Race and Labelling of Religion.

In box (II), which is the property space of genuine cosmopolitan subjective culture, we have obtained a low degree of polarized clustering of concepts for given language/culture communities. The degrees of polarized clustering are rather low in comparison to those of box (I), as may also be seen in Diagram 4—3. The degrees of polarized clustering in box (II) are *not* the lowest degrees in *absolute*

Table 4–21: Mean and Standard Deviation of Degrees of Polarized Clustering for Each Group of Language/Culture Communities by Labelling of Race and by Labelling of Religion

Independent Structural Conditions	Labelling of Race		Labelling of Religion	
	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation
(I) Agitated Provincialism Expected High Strain-Generating Unemployment and High Ethnic Differentiation	1.41	1.20	1.64	1.47
(II) Genuine Cosmopolitanism Expected Low Strain-Generating Unemployment and High Ethnic Differentiation	0.72	0.11	1.07	0.84
(III) Historically Conditioned Provincialism and/or Cosmopolitanism Expected High Strain-Generating Unemployment and Low Ethnic Differentiation	0.58	0.08	0.69	0.20
(IV) Irrelevant with Respect to the Provincialism-Cosmopolitanism Axis Low Strain-Generating Unemployment and Low Ethnic Differentiation	0.75	0.20	0.88	0.23

terms with regard to the figures obtained for boxes (III) and (IV). Nevertheless, as the reader will realize, the importance of variation in this context is *not* given by the *absolute* figures but *rather* by the *relative* ones. In this sense, the contrast between provincialist and cosmopolitan subjective culture is quite obvious. As may be seen from Diagram 4–3, the degree of polarized clustering, particularly in Labelling of Race (which represents the clustering of race concepts), indicates low level of clustering. This type of outcome is typical for, and expected in, a cosmopolitan subjective culture.

Box (III) may turn out either as provincialist or cosmopolitan and includes only two language/culture communities, namely, Italy and Hong Kong. The degree of polarized clustering in Labelling of Race is equal to 0.58. Some differentiation is notable in Labelling of Religion (0.69). Estimating on the basis of low polarized clustering of the labelling concepts, the subjective culture of Italy has a cosmopolitan aspect which, however, cannot be understood in terms of high degree of strain-generating unemployment and low degree of ethnic differentiation. Furthermore, we find that the degree of polarized clustering with reference to certain given political-ideological concepts is *high*. For instance, COMMUNISM and SOCIALISM configurate a cluster (d=0.33), whereas CAPITALISM and NATIONALISM configurate another cluster (d=0.45). These two clusters, furthermore, are highly polarized. (Index of polarized clustering = 5.01.) Consequently, as long as Italy is classified in box (III) one must search for other bases of differentiation. A reasonable such basis of differentiation in this context may, of course, be a histori-

Diagram 4–3: Mean of Degrees of Polarized Clustering for Each Group of Language/Culture Communities by Labelling of Race and by Labelling of Religion



cal dimension: what are the factors influencing the post-war generation of a society which had been a principal arena of manifest fascism? Is openness and absence of prejudice (that is, the low clustering level) a reaction against the sins of a preceding generation? Since low level of ethnic differentiation and high level of strain-generating unemployment cannot explain the low degree of polarized clustering, which other structural factors may be interfering? In the present context we cannot suggest a more detailed analysis with respect to the Italian situation, but any particular *Atlas* testings should involve the questions that were raised here. Finally, it may be noted that although Germany is placed in box (II), it can be interesting to compare it with Italy in this context, since these two countries have a similar historical background. On the other hand, as was pointed out earlier, there is a possibility of removing Italy from box (III) to box (I) by differentiating the conception of ethnicity with additional dimensions. But in that case, the degree of polarized clustering of the labelling concepts would not satisfy the requirements of provincialism.

Box (IV), finally, is irrelevant with respect to the provincialism-cosmopolitanism axis. We have three communities placed in this box. As expected, the three language/culture communities placed in this cell do have low degrees of polarized clustering. The highest differentiation is obtained in Labelling of Religion. Thus, the concept of religion might be the starting point for a search for other common structural and historical aspects of these communities. We shall return, however, to these communities at the end of the present section.

The analysis hitherto presented in both the preceding and present section stresses the fact that we have been able both to generate hypotheses based on the findings in the AAM and *tentatively* to test the generated hypotheses with a larger portion of the AAM material. Nevertheless, this was done in such a manner as to perhaps leave the attentive reader in doubt about the loss of information resulting from our typology and about the final implications of this loss for our analysis. Therefore, before closing the present chapter we should like to reanalyse the data, using the more information carrying sixteen-celled property space, introduced earlier as Table 4–16. Here, the table will be introduced together with the language/culture communities and the degrees of polarized clustering in appropriate cells (see Table 4–22).

The degrees of polarized clustering are given only for Labelling of Race (the upper figures) and Labelling of Religion for each community. For those cells embracing more than one community, the *mean* of the degrees of polarized clustering for the communities in question is indicated. This property space involves sixteen cells, of which only seven seem to have relevance for us. To begin with: cell (I) in Table 4–20 is divided into cells (I) and (II) in Table 4–22. The difference between cells (I) and (II) in Table 4–22 is that the former has a high degree of immigrant workers, whereas the latter has low. The United States is placed in cell (II) and has very high degrees of polarized clustering and thus qualifies as a proper community in cell (I) of Table 4–20. This, however, is not the case for Belgium. It seems that a

Table 4–22: Four Variables Cross-Tabulated and Appropriate Countries Inserted

Ethnic and Linguistic Fractionalization			High															
Immigrant Workers			High				Low (None)				High				Low (None)			
Unemployment	Type of Family Structure																	
High	Nuclear		(I)				(II)				(III)				(IV)			
			BF				AE	TH	*MEAN*						IT	HC	*MEAN*	
			.63				3.11	.50	1.85						.50	.67	.58	
			.68				3.73	.52	2.12						.70	.67	.68	
	Extended		(V)				(VI)				(VII)				(VIII)			
							IF	YS	AD						TK	GK	CS	
							.83	.78	.93						.60	1.04	.62	
							2.89	.78	.81						.59	.89	1.15	
							MS		*MEAN*							*MEAN*		
							.76		.82							.75		
							1.26		1.43							.84		
Low	Nuclear		(IX)				(X)				(XI)				(XII)			
							FF				FR	GG	ND					
											.79	.53	.68					
							.61				.75	.50	.80					
							.61				SW	JP	*MEAN*					
											.73	.57	.66					
											1.79	.50	.86					
	Extended		(XIII)				(XIV)				(XV)				(XVI)			

large number of immigrant workers does not give Belgium an agitated provincialist character. One should, instead, return to other historical aspects of these two countries in order to understand their types of subjective cultures. A reasonable starting point may be the fact that the ethnic and linguistic fractionalization of Belgium is primarily due to *two* major groups, i.e., the Flemish and the Wallons (Demyttenaere 1959), who for many centuries have had a *common history*. On the other hand, the ethnic and linguistic fractionalization of the USA is due to a *large* number of groups, each having its own history and own culture. Moreover, many of them have been brought together in the "melting pot" only during this century. These groups may be supposed to have a more rigid attitude in terms of ethnicity than the two large groups of Belgium. Thailand, however, resembles Belgium rather than the United States. Cell (II) of Table 4—20 is divided into cells (VI) and (XI) in Table 4—22. Cell (VI) is the diametrical opposite of cell (XI) in terms of *all* the dimensions.

In addition, interestingly enough the communities placed in cell (VI), with the exception of Yugoslavia, were classified completely different in terms of all variables used in the macro-typology of language/culture communities (See Chapter 5).

Nevertheless, the difference between degrees of polarized clusterings of the communities in cells (VI) and (XI) is rather *marginal*. (The only considerable difference is found, in fact, in two societies, i.e., Iran and Mexico, where religion is an important and dominant element of the superstructure.) Consequently, no significant difference exists. This fact *supports* the hypothesis generated by Table 4—20: in societies where we find low degree of strain-generating unemployment and high degree of ethnic differentiation, there is a genuine cosmopolite position with regard to the labelling concepts.

Finland should be mentioned at this point. Finland was placed in cell (II) in Table 4—20, but moved to cell (X) in Table 4—22. This gives Finland quite different structural characteristics than those of the countries placed in cells (VI) and (XI), respectively. Finland, too, keeps a low degree of polarized clustering and thus supports the hypothesis generated by cell (II) in Table 4—20.

Cell (III) in Table 4—20, i.e., the cell of high unemployment and low ethnic differentiation, embraces Italy and Hong Kong. These communities are moved to cell (IV) in Table 4—22. This operation does not, however, change the hypotheses generated in the context of high unemployment and low ethnic differentiation. The reader may also wish to return to the first part of the present section where views on the subjective culture of Italy were discussed.

Finally, we have cell (IV), which is characterized by low level of strain-generating unemployment and low level of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization. This cell of Table 4—20 was designated as Irrelevant, since under such structural conditions we expect to have a low degree of polarized clustering which in principle cannot be understood with regard to the cosmopolitanism-provincialism axis. The three language/culture communities of this cell (Turkey, Greece, and Costa Rica) are moved to cell (VIII), where we find other structural conditions in Table

4–22. Namely, cell (IV) in Table 4–20 is characterized by *low* level of unemployment, whereas cell (VIII) in Table 4–22 is characterized by *high* level of unemployment: this is a change from low to high level of unemployment. Moreover, as we have seen earlier, a high level of unemployment is a feature which is more fitting in the context of these communities.

A *high* level of unemployment is, in one way or another, expected to generate tensions; but these tensions, as in the case of box (III) in Table 4–20, cannot be channeled in terms of ethnicity, since the degree of ethnic differentiation and of immigrant workers is low in cell (VIII). Are these tensions channeled in the context of political concepts? The answer, as far as Turkey, Greece, and Costa Rica are concerned, is NO. We found the degrees of polarized clustering with reference to political concepts, such as COMMUNISM, SOCIALISM, CAPITALISM, NATIONALISM and DEMOCRACY, very low. The low degree of polarized clustering found in the subjective culture of these communities under *various* structural conditions suggests that box (IV) in Table 4–20 should retain its designation as Irrelevant and that other *historical* factors should be sought in order to understand the features of the subjective cultures in question.

CHAPTER 5
Basis–Superstructure Concepts

5.1. Introduction

The primary objective of the present chapter is to specify relationships between subjective culture and the social structure. This objective is identical with that of the preceding two chapters. In Chapter 3 we established specific relations between subjective culture and social structure by exploring hypotheses regarding the subjective perception and assessment of certain *kinship* concepts on the basis of *Atlas* data. Similarly, in Chapter 4, we explored relationships between subjective culture and the social structure by focusing on *Atlas* data regarding so-called *labelling* concepts.

More precisely, the primary objective of the present chapter is to explore the same kind of relationship with regard to concepts which are linguistic representations of phenomena, structures, ideas and things which are implied by the historical materialist frame of reference, particularly the basis-superstructure conception. Thus, we wish to study relations between objective dimensions of the social structure and the affective meaning of concepts such as CAPITALISM, COMMUNISM, WORKERS, BANKER, MACHINE, EDUCATION. For this purpose, we shall construct a typology of language/culture communities by using certain objective variables, which although rather general and embracing a wide range of dimensions, nevertheless are pertinent to various important dimensions of the basis-superstructure conception. The objective variables that will be used as independent variables in the present chapter are the following: development of the productive forces, labor marketization, sectoral income distribution, land distribution (the latter two being expressed by Gini indices), political system style, ideological orientation and finally, interest articulation by associational groups.

The typology developed in the present chapter should be seen as a tentative contribution to cross-national studies in general, in the sense that it introduces an original approach, the basis and essence of which is significantly different from most typologies used in empirical cross-national research.[1] Now, this means that the typology is not a final one. On the contrary, it should be subject to further improvements with the introduction of new dimensions, depending on the purposes of the research involved.

The variables used in the typology presented in this chapter nevertheless seem adequate for our purposes. Thus, in the beginning of the present chapter we shall

introduce the historical materialist conception which is the frame of reference behind our typology.

In addition, a brief presentation of historical materialism is appropriate, for reasons already cited in Chapter 2, in connection with our general frame of reference. We may here repeat that the historical materialist conception of society was adopted because it (1) gives a total picture of society, which seems to us indispensable in this type of study—and in that sense the basis-superstructure conception is unique in the social sciences;[2] (2) provides a kind of boundary that limits a conceptual domain within which central factors that relate to our scientific problem can be identified and selected (this aspect, of course, is common to most frames of reference); (3) provides a point of departure used in cross-national research for selecting relevant variables of study. To our mind this last point is of vital importance. In every research process one must try to select relevant variables and to use them in a correct way. It is known that whether a given variable is relevant or not is very much conditioned by the frame of reference (or the theoretical framework) chosen. For instance, in the chapter on Labelling Concepts the relevance of the variables selected was explicitly revealed by our general frame of reference. This process, however, may not necessarily be explicit in all contexts. Furthermore, variables chosen within a given frame of reference can at least partly be the same as those chosen within another frame of reference.

Before we present the basis-superstructure conception, a few more remarks are in order. Originally, 27 concepts were run in the computer for the purposes of this chapter. We have, however, concentrated our attention primarily upon 15 concepts, each representing either a basis-related or superstructural aspect, structure, idea or thing. The 15 concepts of the basis-superstructure category are the following: CAPITALISM, COMMUNISM, SOCIALISM, DEMOCRACY, LABOUR UNIONS, WORKER, FACTORY WORKER, POOR PEOPLE, RICH PEOPLE, MIDDLE CLASS, BANKER, MACHINE, LABORATORY, AUTOMATION and EDUCATION.

It should be emphasized at this point that our selection of concepts was limited by the number and range of concepts available in the *Atlas*. We are thus aware of the fact that a more suitable and appropriate list of basis-superstructure concepts could have been selected. As the reader will realize, the concepts under study here are rather general as far as their connotations are concerned. Altogether they connote a wide range of societal aspects and artifacts, however.

At this point, we wish to suggest that there is a dialectical relationship between objective structures and the Evaluation-, Potency-, and Activity-scores of these concepts (that is, a given section of subjective culture) in given language/culture communities. In other words, this relationship should reveal itself in correspondence or discrepancy between (or adjustment and disadjustment between) objective structures and subjective culture, and thus its dialectical character should become clearer. More precisely, we expect that for given historical periods in certain language/culture communities there is correspondence between the objective

social structure and subjective culture, whereas in other communities discrepancy is predominant. (For a detailed discussion of this matter see section 5.4.) It is, in fact, our starting point that specific dialectical relations between social structure and subjective culture for given social classes and groups (in our case, urbanite middle-class school boys) may be identified and investigated. The elaboration of this task, however, will be presented in the final sections of the present chapter.

Limitations in data available for constructing our typology of communities will be indicated in connection with the elaboration of each particular variable, but a general remark may be in order here, so as to prevent confusion about the number of language/culture communities exhibited in each given subsection of the typology. Unfortunately, statistical and/or qualitative-structural data are not available for every language/culture community with respect to each variable used in the construction of the typology. Certain language/culture communities are therefore missing in both the various subsections and the final plot of the typology. Furthermore, these missing language/culture communities are not identical for all subsections or variables.

The sequence of the present chapter will be as follows. First, we shall present the historical materialist conception of society, after which we shall use this conception to generate variables to be utilized in constructing a macrotypology of language/culture communities. Finally, this typology will be used in order empirically to explore general hypotheses with respect to subjective culture and social structure.

5.2. Frame of Reference

5.2.1. A Presentation of the Historical Materialist Conception of Society: A Frame of Reference Used for Generative Purposes

As already indicated, the purpose of this section is at least twofold: the first purpose is to provide background material for our general theoretical frame of reference. The importance and relevance of the historical materialist conception of society with regard to our general theoretical frame of reference has already been discussed in Chapter 2. (At this point, the reader may wish to refer to section 2.3.) The second purpose is *generative*: the historical materialist conception of society will be used in the present chapter to generate relevant variables which may help us to construct a typology of language/culture communities. In other words, in a first step toward such a typology construction we shall select a number of variable generated by the historical materialist frame of reference. But first let us see what historical materialism is all about.[3]

We should like to begin by quoting from Karl Marx' "Preface" to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859).

> In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into *definite* relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production *appropriate to a given stage* in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond *definite forms* of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or—this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms—with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. *From forms of development* of the productive forces these relations turn into their *fetters*. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure. In studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic—in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production. No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society. Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve, since closer examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation. In broad outline, the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois modes of production may be designated as epochs marking progress in the economic development of society. The bourgeois mode of production is the last antagonistic form of the social process of production—antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism but of an antagonism that emanates from the individuals' social conditions of existence—but the productive forces developing within bourgeois society create also the material conditions for a solution of this antagonism. The prehistory of human society accordingly closes with this social formation.
>
> (Marx 1970:20—22. Emph. added.)

This often-quoted passage suggests, among other things, an important distinction which is vital in social sciences. The distinction mentioned here is what in Marxist terminology is called basis and superstructure.[4]

One of the crucial starting points inviting a further analysis of Marx' text concerns the question of the *relations* between various parts of the social structure. These relations are often interpreted as *dialectical* but too often without specifying the underlying mechanisms of such dialectics. As we shall see in the following

pages, the passage quoted from Marx provides a key to a further analysis of such relations. In order to reach a complete understanding of this distinction of basis-superstructure, we must investigate the Marxist conception of the nature of human society. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels in *The German Ideology,* 1845 (Marx & Engels 1968), put forward the materialist conception of *history*, i.e., the historical materialist conception of human existence and human action.

Human society begins with human beings. Men "begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to *produce* their means of subsistence . . . By producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material life" (Marx & Engels 1968:31). The existence of human beings is primarily connected with access to food, shelter, clothing, etc. By their own labor men satisfy their need for material items—items which are necessary for their survival. At the same time, the production of material necessities becomes the fundamental conditioning factor of social development, since, as we shall see, it requires collaboration among people. Economic activities, occurring first on a rather primitive level (focused on items necessary for human survival) and later on a much higher level of complexity, constitute the *basis* of society. Economic activities are analysed by two crucial concepts, namely, forces of production and relations of production. Forces of production or productive forces

> are the forces with which society acts on nature to obtain the means of subsistence and control elemental forces.
>
> (Fidlon 1968:61—62)

> The productive forces consist of the *means of production,* primarily the instruments of labor created by society, and also the *men* who produce the material wealth.
>
> (Fidlon 1968:62)

In addition to tools and instruments, used in production—i.e., machinery or technical tools—and labor power, a third primary source, namely natural resources, is included among the forces of production. The development of the productive forces is a dynamic and progressing phenomenon and plays an important role for the economic structure of society. New technical and scientific discoveries and other developments, and the increased skill of labor power constitute the development of the productive forces.

> *The structure of the productive forces is constantly developing.* This is above all expressed in the differentiation and the growing intricacy of such elements of the productive forces as the means of labour, the objects of labour and labour power.
>
> (Fidlon 1968:65; see also Richta 1972)

Another fundamental concept in the study of economic structure is *relations of production.*

> For a long time already men have been producing material wealth in society on the basis of social division of labour. Division of labour, i.e., specialisation and cooperation of producers in the process of production precludes isolated labour activity unconnected with other men. In order to organise production in conditions of

> specialization and co-operation of labour even in their most primitive forms men have to work together and establish the necessary production ties and relations of production whose character is determined by the *forms of ownership* of the means of production.
>
> (Fidlon 1968:67–68)

> Relations of production are based on the *form of ownership*, i.e. the relation of people to the means of production—the land, its mineral resources, forests, waters, raw materials, factory buildings, instruments of labour and so on.
>
> (Afanasyev:200)

Relations of production are men's relations in the process of production. One basic aspect of these relations is property relations. It must be stressed that the way the control of means of production, in a given historical society, is regulated and formed plays an important role in deciding the type of society that emerges. Another basic aspect of the relations of production is the growing complexity of the division of labor and more importantly, the way of using labor-power in general, and its marketization in particular.

The next question is that of the dialectics of the *forces* of production and the *relations* of production.

> The starting point for the development of the social material production is the development of the productive forces. . . . Diverse sources or causes, primarily the sources inherent in material production itself, are responsible for the progressive development of the productive forces.
>
> (Fidlon 1968:70)

The development of the forces of production is a precondition for all types of relations of production. As the process of material production continues, man acquires habits, skill and technical knowledge. This process operates on a *two-way basis,* so that better habits and skills, and more technical knowledge produce better results in the production of material wealth, which in turn enables man to secure new skills and knowledge. This process continues progressively. The development of the forces of production—in, e.g., the form of technology—constructs the basis for man's liberation from direct participation in material production. In order to satisfy his requirements, however, man must appropriate at least some part of the social product which is the result of the process of production. In this context, the role of the relations of production becomes significant, since the distribution of the social product depends on who controls the means of production.

> Since the relations of production and, above all, relations of ownership of the means of production and the social product make people strive for a tangible benefit from production, it is natural that relations of production have an active effect on the productive forces.
>
> (Fidlon 1968:72)

The development of the *forces* of production depends both on the internal dynamics of their constituent elements and their historical dialectics with the *relations* of production. Marx points out that

> (i)n the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production.
> (Marx 1970:20)

Correspondence between the forces of production and the relations of production is always a relative matter. The term contradiction is often used to signify one historical phase of this relation. The forces of production and the relations of production then correspond in a dialectical way: that is, in certain historical situations, where the contradiction between them is not intense, the *relations* of production are the adequate form appropriate to the *forces* of production and the content of social production. During other historical situations, where the contradiction between them is intense, the current form of the relations of production does not fit the level of development of the forces of production. This process alters *dialectically* and within it the development of society takes place. As Marx put it

> At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into *conflict* with the existing relations of production . . . From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their *fetters*.
> (Marx 1970:21. Emph. added.)

We have now discussed, although rather briefly, some basic concepts of the Marxist theoretical framework. These are: the basis, comprised of the forces of production and relations of production, and finally, the dialectically changing relationship between these two components. Our next task will be to consider the distinction between basis and superstructure, *and* the dialectical process between these two components.

The distinction of basis and superstructure serves to indicate how the basis, i.e., the forces of production and the relations of production, in a given social structure conditions and dialectically interacts with the superstructure, which embraces legal, political, moral and cultural ideas and their corresponding social institutions. The literature exploring the relationship between basis and superstructure is rather extensive as far as the number of interpretations of this relationship is concerned. The discussion about the nature of this relationship is a controversial one, however, and often lacks conceptual clarity. We shall quote a few passages that may exemplify this. To begin with, we refer to the quotation from Marx' "Preface" (see p. 105).

Another example can be taken from Maurice Cornforth:

> In entering into relations of production and carrying on the economic activities of production and distribution people acquire definite interests and requirements of life, and become involved in conflicts arising from contradictory interests and requirements. All these are objective, material facts, which exist independently of what people may think about them. But people act consciously, have ideas about themselves and their aims in life, and in their conscious activity are organised within all kinds of institutions to serve all kinds of consciously conceived purposes.

> In considering, therefore, the totality of social life we have to distinguish, on the one hand, the economic structure and economic development of society, which exists quite independently of what people think and may be determined with the precision of natural science; and, on the other hand, the ideas and conscious aims which arise in people's minds, and the institutions which are developed in accordance with those ideas and aims.
>
> (Cornforth 1969:83)

The last quotation, an example of Marxist dogmatism, will be taken from Afanasyev.

> The superstructure *is brought into being* by the basis and is inseparably bound up with it. The superstructure depends on the basis.
>
> (p. 234)

> The determining role of the basis in relation to the superstructure is manifested not only in the basis giving rise to superstructure, but also in the essential changes in the economic system necessarily leading to changes in the superstructure.
>
> (p. 236)

These quotations make one point clear: the basis is the platform where the totality of production relations and productive forces constitute the economic structure of society, and on this basis of society arises a superstructure which is the skeleton of political, legal, moral and cultural ideas, views and their corresponding institutions and organizations. One question nevertheless remains: what is the type of relations between basis and superstructure? Is it causal or dialectical, or both? Afanasyev's statement is a typical example from those who assert that the basis is *the cause* of the superstructure; or, what amounts to the same thing, the superstructure is the effect of the basis. Such a view, however, is rather problematic (Liedman 1973). For instance, although the passage from Marx' "Preface" is not very clear as far as this ambiguous point is concerned, it does not say that there is a causal relation between the basis and the superstructure. Sven-Eric Liedman (1973:77) points out that Marx in the text uses the verb "to cause". Furthermore, Marx writes in the same passage that the economic structure of society is "the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure". This statement, as well, is far from being equivalent to the verb "to cause". Engels was very well aware of this ambiguity when in 1890 he wrote:

> . . . According to the materialist conception of history, the *ultimately* determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life. More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. Hence if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the *only* determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase. The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure. . . also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their *form*.
>
> (Engels 1970:487)

And again in a letter to Starkenburg in 1894:

> Political, judicial, philosophical, literary, artistic, etc., development is based on economic development. But all these react upon one another and also upon the economic basis. It is not that the economic situation is *cause, solely active,* while everything else is only passive effect. There is, rather interaction on the basis of economic necessity, which *ultimately* always asserts itself.
>
> (Marx & Engels 1965:467)

Before elaborating upon these ideas on the role of superstructure, we shall quote Gunnar Aspelin (1970:175).

> It is meaningless to say: the medieval mode of production is a *cause* of feudal society, and this has *caused* scholastic thinking. But it makes sense when we propose: in agrarian societies, at a certain level of technical development there is regularly a certain type of social structure and a typical thinking.
>
> (Quoted by Liedman 1973:77)

Clearly, it is problematic and dubious to state that the relationship between basis and superstructure is a simple *causal* relation. But it is appropriate to assert that there is a correspondence between basis and superstructure. The nature of this correspondence becomes more obvious when we touch on the content of this relationship. The content of this relationship is characterized by the fact that the superstructure not only reflects but also *justifies* the state of the basis. The superstructure, with its political, judical, ideological and cultural institutions, is the justifier and protector of the economic structure. The relationship between superstructure and basis must, then, be seen in this context. The function of the superstructure is, at this point, related to its class character. The state of the relations of production implies which social class owns and controls the means of production in a given historical period of a certain society. This view was perhaps expressed best in *The German Ideology,* by Marx and Engels. We read:

> The ideas of the ruling classes are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is the ruling *material* force of society, is at the same time its ruling *intellectual* force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch.
>
> (Marx & Engels 1968:61)

Returning to the theoretical framework schematized for studying the AAM, the role played by factors deciding the probability of being exposed to certain objects and socializing agents must be seen within the context of social structure, the product of the combination of basis and superstructure. The role of the superstructu-

re varies with the historical situation. In certain situations, the superstructure plays a more active role, in order to protect the status quo which is threatened by the increasing contradiction between the relations of production and the forces of production, whereas, in certain other historical situations, the role of the superstructure may be more passive and secondary. To the best of our knowledge, we cannot simply state that the relations between the major components of the social structure are exclusively dialectical or exclusively causal. We should prefer instead to express the matter in terms of a variety of relations: to our mind, the interaction or relations between the forces of production, the relations of production, the basis and the superstructure are sometimes *dialectical* and sometimes *expressive, conditional* and *functional.*

If the relations between the given components of the social structure are not uniform in all historical situations, i.e., the relation between, e.g., the basis and the superstructure is *not* functional in *all* historical situations, but on the contrary successively alters, this provides a good reason for interpreting it in the context of dialectics. Dialectical interpretations provide a broader conceptual framework; by implying shifts from functional relationships to relationships of contradiction, a dialectical interpretation implies functional interpretations.[5] Another illustration of such dialectics may be taken from Karl Marx' *Grundrisse* (1857—58), where he points out the historical dialectics by which the productive forces became *more* societal and human beings become more *dependent* on the greater entity whereas in the meantime the same human beings emerge as free individuals, as free sellers of their labor power.[6] On the other hand, the expressive, conditional and functional aspects of the relations become apparent when we observe that there is sometimes a certain *harmony* between the basis and the superstructure, or that a given phenomenon is prior to and connected with another phenomenon in the social structure or, finally, that the superstructure justifies the state of the basis.[7]

5.2.2. Variables Generated by the Frame of Reference

In the context of our study we may find at least two reasons why we need a typology which is based on central and general structural characteristics of language/-culture communities.

Firstly, the present concept category, "basis-superstructure", of the *Atlas of Affective Meanings,* owing to its very definition, embraces concepts that together constitute an *unspecified* assembly of concepts which can be investigated merely by variables with larger dimensions. One interesting property of this concept category is that most of the concepts included are theoretically both heterogeneous and homogeneous. The category is heterogeneous in the sense that it embraces concepts belonging to different parts of subjective culture, since they denote and connote a broad range of phenomena from technology to ideology. At the same time it is homogeneous in the sense that many concepts included are analytically and histori-

cally related. Compare, for instance, the three concepts, MACHINE, WORKER and CAPITALISM. These three concepts form a triad, both heterogeneous and homogeneous. They are heterogeneous, because the first concept denotes an artifact, a productive force, the second concept denotes a person belonging to a given profession, a given social class, a person with a specific relation to the first and the third concepts, and, finally, the third concept denotes a political ideology. They are also homogeneous, because the three concepts have a specific relationship within the historical development of societies.

Secondly, the *Atlas* includes a relatively large number of language/culture communities, so that not only for the present cross-national investigation of the *Atlas of Affective Meanings,* but also for future investigations a typology based on central and general structural characteristics of language/culture communities becomes indispensable.

The frame of reference presented in the previous section has already generated three central and fundamental types of variables, namely, productive forces, relations of production and superstructure. Using these three fundamental bundles of variables, we have through decomposition obtained a certain number of operational variables that will be used in constructing our typology of communities. The first set of variables, productive forces, is simple to operationalize. This has already been done in Chapter 3. Relations of production, the second fundamental type of variable, will be represented by three dimensions, labor marketization, land distribution and sectoral income distribution (the two latter dimensions being indicated by Gini-indices). The third one, superstructure, certainly a multidimensional complex of variables, will be indicated in this study by three variables, namely, political system style, ideological orientation and interest articulation by associational groups.

A discussion and elaboration of all these variables and a presentation of our typology is the task of our next section.

5.3. An Alternative Approach toward Constructing a General Typology of Social Structure for Comparative Cross-National Research

5.3.1. General Considerations

Before elaborating the various variables and their specific problems, and before presenting our typology, a discussion is in order. This discussion will take up *general* problems concerning the data available, restrictions placed on our selection

of variables, and other methodological aspects. As already indicated at the beginning of this study, one of the main problems in cross-national research today is the lack of cross-national data, both quantitative (statistical) and qualitative (structural). Another is the problem of comparability. The scope of these problems becomes particularly obvious when the researcher must deal with countries on several continents (in our case three), since this increases the probability of encountering deficient data collection procedures and, consequently, inadequate data. We have already encountered these problems in previous chapters. In our main sources[8] the cross-cultural data presented far from satisfy the requirements of our typology. This sets unavoidable limits for the generation and selection of variables useful in our typology-construction.

Although one may suggest that *more* suitable variables should have been selected and operationalized for our purposes, we must accept, in spite of possible criticisms, the limitations of the cross-national data available. A related question is, of course, whether the specific indicators actually chosen can adequately represent the *fundamental variables* of our theoretical frame of reference. What is their validity? In spite of the reservations we must make on this point we should like to suggest at least four arguments strengthening our case and placing the whole issue of validity in its proper context.

Firstly, we must keep in mind that even if we apply a most sophisticated theoretical frame of reference, its usefulness is limited unless we have some reasonably adequate objective data to assess the fruitfulness of the theoretical framework in question. Now, considering the present state of cross-national comparative studies and the restricted access to cross-national objective data, we cannot do anything but use the available data—with due regard, however, for their limitations, and the sources of error involved.

Secondly, the presence of errors in the data may be less of a problem in our case because of the vast range of very different countries and cultures involved in our comparisons. The effect of *random* errors may to some extent be reduced in the usual way by not pursuing breakdowns of the data too far but rather combining several language/culture communities into a category or type. In fact, this is the procedure we shall adopt in most cases, and it will be done so as to assure clear distinctions between the types. *Systematic* errors cannot be reduced in this way, but on the other hand it seems rather unlikely, given the vast range of highly different communities in the AAM, that systematic errors will be great enough to produce an essential change in the *rank order* of the communities. Here, we are interested only in ranking these communities, and in relating such rank orders, usually after dichotomization or trichotomization, to the subjective data in the AAM. With less range in the objective variables involved, the unknown systematic errors undoubtedly present in these kinds of objective data would have been much more serious.

Thirdly, as the reader realizes, the variables derived from our theoretical frame of reference, taken together, involve a broad scope of economic, social and politi-

cal dimensions of social structure, so that the disappearance of a smaller segment of this range in the process of operationalization shall not endanger the adequacy of the typology obtained. Keeping in mind the *explorative* and *generative* character of the typology, this argument would seem particularly justified.

Fourthly, our purpose, being mainly *explorative,* does not necessarily require meticulous precision in operational transformation of the fundamental variables. This is also related to the main purpose of our study. As indicated at the beginning of this work, our primary aim is not to verify or to falsify hypotheses in any strict sense, but to generate and assess hypotheses for explorative purposes in the context of a pioneering contribution to cross-national studies. After having established some general problems related to the present section, we shall first discuss our generated variables, and then present our typology.

It should be noted at this point that our typology construction will follow a multistep procedure: first, a *sub*typology will be introduced by using variables concerning the basis; second, another *sub*typology will be created by using variables regarding the superstructure; third, the two subtypologies will be cross-tabulated in order to obtain a final typology embracing all the variables involved in the construction.

5.3.2. Forces of Production

We have already discussed this variable in our chapter on kinship concepts (see section 3.3.2). For this reason we shall not here repeat what has already been said. It may, however, be useful to reproduce the table showing the productive forces index for given *Atlas* language/culture communities (see Table 5—1).

5.3.3.1. Relations of Production

Together with the forces of production, the relations of production constitute the *basis* in any social structure. This fundamental variable is assumed to stand in a dialectical relation with the forces of production. A discussion on these matters has been presented in section 5.2.1. The aim of the present section is to operationalize relations of production and to classify our *Atlas* language/culture communities with respect to this variable. In our opinion, two factors, namely the ownership of forces of production and the growing specialization and complexity of labor power, are criteria relevant to an empirical assessment of relations of production. The question of ownership is, however, rather complicated and it is our belief that the cross-national comparative data available to us today are not sufficient to operationalize a variable that could be labelled as "ownership of the productive forces."[9]

As pointed out above, our selection of variables is also conditioned by external factors, such as access to available data. Limited by this condition, we found two variables (in addition to labor marketization, to which we shall return) to be useful for our purposes. These variables are Sectoral Income Distribution and Land

Table 5–1: Productive Forces Index for Given Atlas Communities: A Reproduction[1]

Rank	Country	Index
1	United States	46
2	West Germany	44
3.5	Netherlands	41
3.5	Sweden	41
5	Belgium	40
6	France	38
7	Japan	36
8	Italy	35
9	Finland	30
10	Yugoslavia	28
11	Mexico	23
12	Greece	21
13	Hong Kong	20[2]
14	Lebanon	19
15	Costa Rica	14
16.5	India (DH,CB,MK)	13
16.5	Turkey	13
18	Iran	12
19	Thailand	9
20	Afghanistan	1

[1] See Table 3–5 in Chapter 3 for the productive forces profiles.
[2] Incomplete profile and index for Hong Kong.

Distribution, both indicated by Gini indices of inequality. We assume that there is a *theoretical* relationship between these two variables and the relations of production.

The connection between land distribution and the relations of production is obvious. Land is understood as a productive force and thus the question "how equally the land is distributed in a given society" concerns the relations of production. As for the relevance of distribution of income, it is perhaps less clear at first glance. Our theoretical frame of reference suggests, however, that distribution of income is dependent on ownership, and control of the productive forces (control can be effective through various means such as economic rewards, trade union support and other means of interest articulation). We may then assume that more equality in distribution of income will be obtained in societies where the means of control and the ownership of the productive forces are attributed to several and large cross-sections of the population. We must remember, however, that this assumption has been falsified by history. That is to say, equality of income distribution is not reached in some societies where the means of control and the ownership of the productive forces are attributed to several and large cross-sections of the population. This historical experience has shown that this assumption must be

further specified. It is important to stress that this assumption must not be understood in a formalistic way, or as a slogan. As historical experience indicates, it is not sufficient to say that the people own and control the productive forces, while *in fact* only a group of politicians and bureaucrats control not only the productive forces but also other crucial elements of the society. It is thus clear that additional political and structural arrangements are *necessary* if the assumption suggested by the theoretical frame of reference is to be considered as realistic. Here, however, is not the appropriate place to discuss such arrangements.

The Gini index of inequality is defined as "the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of equality. It ranges from a value of zero representing perfect equality to unity representing maximum inequality (i.e. the richest single unit has all the income)"[10] (Taylor & Hudson 1972:212). It seems that the Gini index is an appropriate index for our purpose, i.e., for comparing inequality between *larger units* such as language/culture communities. Alker and Russett (1966), who discuss various aspects and implications of the Gini index, write:

> . . . *the Gini index . . . provide(s) attractive ways of summarizing important aspects on accurate cumulative distribution.* Besides allowing easy visual interpretation, they are sensitive to inequalities present in all parts of a value distribution.
> (Alker & Russett 1966:370—371. Emph. in orig.)

Again, in an accompanying footnote, they assert that the Gini index provides an excellent measure "for comparing inequality *between* larger political units (e.g. states), and the cumulated percentages on which they are based provide the data for comparison *within* the units (e.g. counties)" (Alker & Russett 1966:371. Emph. in orig.). The Gini index of sectoral income distribution compares *kinds of distribution* and not levels of wealth. That is to say, the index gives us the degree of inequality in the distribution of income in given sectors of the economy.

The use of the Gini index of sectoral income distribution is not unproblematic. As Taylor and Hudson put it:

> The most salient difficulty facing the scholar who wants to compare inequality of income over several national units, however, is the absence of sufficient data[11]
> (Taylor & Hudson 1972:212)

As far as the Gini index of land distribution is concerned, the inequality is calculated "by assuming a relationship between number of farms and number of owners" (Taylor & Hudson 1972:214). Unfortunately there are various problems also with regard to this index, as well.[12] We realize that for both theoretical and methodological reasons, sectoral income distribution and distribution of land ownership alone are not sufficient to represent the relations of production. Nevertheless, together with another variable—labor marketization—they serve our purpose better. Before we discuss labor marketization, a presentation of Gini indices of inequality in land distribution and of sectoral income distribution is in order. Indices for our specific communities are exhibited in Table 5—2.

Table 5–2: Inequality Index: Land Distribution and Sectoral Income Distribution

Country[1]	Gini Index	Date	Country[2]	Gini Index	Date
CS – Costa Rica	78.2	1963	MS – Mexico	45.7	1960
IT – Italy	73.2	1960	TH – Thailand	43.0	1960
AE – United States	71.0	1959	CS – Costa Rica	29.3	1963
MS – Mexico	69.4	1960	FF – Finland	25.6	1960
GG – Germany	66.8	1960	TK – Turkey	24.7	1960
IF – Iran	62.5	1960	India – Calcutta, Delhi, Mysore	22.5	1961
TK – Turkey	59.2	1963	IT – Italy	22.2	1965
ND – Netherlands	57.9	1959	FR – France	21.3	1962
India – Calcutta, Delhi, Mysore	52.2	1955	GK – Greece	19.5	1961
SW – Sweden	50.6	1961	JP – Japan	14.9	1965
JP – Japan	47.0	1960	AE – United States	12.2	1965
TH – Thailand	46.0	1963	GG – Germany	12.2	1965
YS – Yugoslavia	43.7	1950	BF – Belgium	11.9	1961
FF – Finland	35.1	1959	ND – Netherlands	10.2	1960
			SW – Sweden	5.6	1964

[1] Data are missing for Afghanistan, Hong Kong, Belgium, France, Greece and Lebanon.

[2] Data are missing for Afghanistan, Hong Kong, Iran, Lebanon and Yugoslavia.

Source: Taylor & Hudson 1972:263–265, and 267–269.

When presenting our theoretical frame of reference we touched upon the question of the growing complexity of labor power. This phenomenon follows the development of the productive forces, and is also related to changes in the relations of production. As human societies developed in given historical settings, i.e., as the productive forces developed, new forms of relations of production became necessary. On the other hand, new forms of relations of production necessitate further alterations in the development of the forces of production. The labor power, a productive force, is no exception to this dialectical process. Especially in the capitalist mode of production the labor power becomes a market commodity in the sense that it is sold and bought in a market. Its seller is the worker or the salaried employee, and its buyer is the capitalist or the employer. As this process continued individuals became more free but they also became more dependent upon each other, upon "a greater whole".[13]

Labor marketization indicates, then, relations between labor power and capital, or in other words, between wage earners and salaried employees on the one hand, and employers of different kinds on the other. The usage of this variable would require a much more complex discussion if we had language/culture communities with various Communist patterns of ownership of the productive forces. But such a discussion is not necessary since all of our language/culture communities except one are capitalist (some with feudal sectors, others with monopoly capitalist sectors) countries in which the relationship outlined above is an important part of the

economic structure. Yugoslavia, is, of course, somehow different than our other *Atlas* countries. As a socialist country, Yugoslavia is also quite different than the USSR, China or Albania. Here, however, is not the appropriate place to discuss Yugoslavia's specific properties which are different from other socialist nations' characteristics. Nevertheless, it may be mentioned that the institution of self-management is the most salient and indeed extremely important step taken in order to realize socialism. Moreover, in many respects Yugoslavia has the characteristics of the highly industrialized countries. Therefore, Yugoslavia is similar to countries like Italy, Belgium, France, etc. (see Table 5—6) as far as the subtypology of basis is concerned. Yet we may agree that the institutional frame regulating labor relations in Yugoslavia is different, as compared with those of the highly industrialized countries involved in this study.[14]

Labor marketization would most properly be indicated as the rate between: salaried employees + wage earners[15]/(salaried employees + wage earners) + (capitalists). We have, however, again been limited by the cross-national comparative data available. The main and most comprehensive source in this context, the *Yearbook of Labor Statistics,* includes the two following categories: 1) salaried employees together with wage earners; 2) employers together with workers on their own account. This means that we must calculate our index of labor marketization as the rate between: salaried employees + wage earners/(salaried employees + wage earners) + (employers + workers on their own account).
The category salaried employees and wage earners is rather unproblematic.

The next category, however—employers and workers on their own account—generates difficulties, since the proportion between employers and workers on their own account is not known. It would have been more useful to know either the proportion, or the absolute size, of each subcategory so that shifts between salaried employees and wage earner on the one hand, and employers or workers on their own account, respectively, could have been checked. A comparison between indices of labor marketization (Table 5—3) for our *Atlas* communities indicates that the category of salaried employees and wage earners becomes larger, whereas the category of employers and workers on their own account becomes smaller as the level of development of the productive forces becomes higher. A similar phenomenon can be seen in given *Atlas* communities for which we have data from different years.[16]

This observation may show at least two things as the productive forces develop and require alterations in relations of production:

1. the category of salaried employees and wage earners becomes larger. This may be caused by two structural factors: a) owing to structural changes, workers on their own account cannot any longer earn their own living and thus must become wage earners or salaried employees. This is a rather well-known phenomenon in several underdeveloped countries. b) The category salaried employees and wage earners may become larger through an introduction of foreign labor power. This may particularly be the case in countries with high level of development of the

Table 5–3: Index of Labor Marketization[1]

	Index[2]	Date	Index[2]	Date
Thailand	0.30	1970		
Turkey	0.47	1970		
Greece	0.51	1971		
Iran	0.54	1966		
India (CB,DH,MK)	0.62	1971		
Lebanon	0.65	1970		
Mexico	0.66	1970		
Yugoslavia	0.67	1971		
Costa Rica	0.76	1963		
France	0.76	1968	0.79	1972
Italy	0.76	1961	0.24	1972
Japan	0.77	1970		
Belgium	0.79	1961	0.84	1972
Netherlands	0.84	1960		
Finland	0.86	1971		
Germany	0.87	1961	0.89	1971
United States	0.88	1960	0.92	1972
Hong Kong	0.89	1971		
Sweden	0.91	1970	0.92	1972

[1] The index is calculated according to the formula $\frac{a}{a+b}$, i.e.,

$$\frac{\text{Salaried employees} + \text{wage earners}}{(\text{salaried employees} + \text{wage earners}) + (\text{employers} + \text{workers on their own account})}$$

[2] The first column is an index calculated on the basis of the earliest available data for each country. Thus, the time period runs from 1960 to 1971. The second column provides comparative figures for 6 countries.

Source: All indices, except for Turkey, are calculated on the basis of data available in the *Yearbook of Labor Statistics,* Geneva: International Labor Office, 1973, pp. 146–277. The index for Turkey is based on data available in the *Statistical Yearbook of Turkey,* 1973, Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, p. 53.

Afghanistan is missing; furthermore, CB, DH and MK are indicated by India.

productive forces (see also Chapter 4).

2. The category employers and workers on their own account become proletarized and begin to work as wage earners (this again is a more frequent phenomenon in underdeveloped countries) or employers become fewer, owing to monopolization of capital (mostly in countries with higher level of development of the productive forces). An additional factor that could effect movements between categories is, of course, the expanding tertiary sector in many countries.

As exhibited in Table 5–3, the lowest index was obtained for Thailand (0.30 for 1970) and the highest for Sweden (0.91 for 1970). After Sweden, Hong Kong follows with 0.89 for 1971.

The figures obtained by the index of labor marketization and exhibited in Table 5–3 indicate several interesting facts.[17]

(1) In the societies with large rural sectors the index tends to be low, showing that labor marketization is low. Since there is no material basis in these societies for employment of labor power in industrial sectors, only a very small cross-section of the population is registered as wage earners and naturally large sections of the population are registered as workers on their own account.

(2) In societies with major industrial sectors, where the need for labor power is great, the number of workers on their own account is relatively low and the capital is rather monopolized, so that the number of employers becomes fewer and the index of labor marketization tends to be larger. This indicates, in other words, that there is a considerably larger labor market where the supply of and the demand for labor power is large and that the relations of production are different than in societies with a lower index.

(3) The index of labor marketization does not *necessarily* follow the development of the productive forces appropriate to the country. A higher index may be obtained in countries with relatively low level of development of the productive forces but with a large amount of foreign investment that utilizes the cheap labor power available in the country. Hong Kong (Index 0.89 for 1971) seems to illustrate this phenomenon.

(4) A diachronic study of indices available from different years for our given countries suggests that there is a continuous alteration with regard to labor marketization—more precisely, more and more people are employed as either salaried employees or wage earners, while the number of employers and workers on their own account diminishes.

5.3.3.2. Scale Transformation of GINI index

Before cross-tabulating inequality variables with labor marketization and development of the productive forces in order to obtain a subtypology with regard to characteristics of the basis, we should like to touch upon one more problem, in addition to those which have been already discussed with respect to the Gini index of land distribution. It is obvious that inequality of land distribution has different social and economic implications in different societies.

The same level of inequality of land distribution (that is, nearly the same Gini index) will have more severe social and political implications in countries where a larger proportion of the population depends on land for their living than in countries where a smaller proportion of the population depends on land for their living. As an example, the inequality of land distribution in the United States and Costa Rica is nearly the same in terms of the Gini index (see Table 5–2). We would suggest, however, that the inequality of land distribution is much more harmful to the Costa Rican people, both socially and economically, than to the people of the United States. As a matter of fact, a majority of the Costa Ricans, in contrast to Americans, depend on land for their living (58 % of the male labor force is in agri-

culture, whereas the corresponding figure for the United States is 8 %). (Taylor & Hudson 1972:332–334.)

In order to overcome at least some part of this difficulty, we shall introduce a scale transformation of the Gini index of land distribution, so as to take account of the population composition with regard to male population working in agriculture. The scale transformation will be realized by the following formula:

$$\frac{GINI_L \times P_L + GINI_{INC} \times (100 - P_L)}{2 \times 100}$$

where $GINI_L$ is the Gini index of land distribution,

$GINI_{INC}$ is Gini index of sectoral income distribution,

P_L is male population working in agriculture (in %).

The formula has the additional advantage of counterbalancing the Gini index of sectoral income distribution, since this index is multiplied in our formula by the proportion of the male population *not* working in agriculture. Furthermore, a combination of these two inequality indices makes it possible better to approximate the indices for communities with incomplete statistical information. Thus, with regard to the Gini-index of land distribution, we have obtained an average mean of 55.66 for language/culture communities classified as high on the development of the productive forces variable. The average mean for language/culture communities classified as low on the same variable was 61.25. For the Gini-index of income distribution the average means obtained are 15.12 and 31.78 for language/culture communities with high and low levels of development of the productive forces, respectively. The estimated indices for communities with incomplete statistical information were calculated by multiplying the average means for the appropriate category of communities and the proportion of male population working in the agricultural sector, respectively.

In Table 5–4 we display the results obtained after our scale transformation. For those language/culture communities where only one index was missing the results are indicated within parentheses ( ). These language/culture communities are Belgium, France, Greece (Gini index of land distribution is missing), Yugoslavia and Iran (Gini index of sectoral income distribution is missing). For those language/-culture communities for which both indices are missing, the estimated results are indicated within brackets [ ]. These language/culture communities are Afghanistan, Lebanon and Hong Kong. Thus the reader should always be aware of the fact that the approximative results given in parentheses, and particularly in brackets are only tentative and should be used with special caution.

5.3.4. A Cross-Tabulation: Inequality Index by Labor Marketization

Before we present our sub-typology concerning the basis obtained through a

Table 5—4: Scale Transformation of Inequality Indices

Language/ Culture Community	Inequality Index after scale transformation	Authentic Index for Land	Income
Costa Rica	28.83	78.2	29.3
Afghanistan	[28.41][1]	—	—
Thailand	26.67	46.0	43.0
Iran	(24.80)	62.5	—
Lebanon	[23.26]	—	—
Turkey	22.36	59.2	24.7
India (MK,CB,DH)	21.91	52.2	22.5
Greece	(19.77)	—	19.5
Mexico	19.61	69.4	45.7
Italy	17.22	73.2	22.2
Hong Kong	[16.63]	—	—
Yugoslavia	(15.71)[2]	43.7	—
France	(14.95)	—	21.3
Finland	14.61	35.1	25.6
Japan	10.82	47.0	14.9
Germany	9.78	66.8	12.2
United States	8.41	71.0	12.2
Netherlands	8.18	57.9	10.2
Belgium	(7.48)	—	11.9
Sweden	6.85	50.6	5.6

[1] For those language/culture communities for which both indices are missing, the estimated results are indicated within brackets [ ].

[2] For those language/culture communities where only one index is missing, the results are indicated within parentheses ( ).

cross-tabulation of the level of development of the productive forces and the relations of production, we shall cross-tabulate the inequality variable (obtained through scale transformation) and the labor marketization variable as a basis for further systematization of our communities. The cross-tabulation renders the scattergram exhibited in page 123.

In the scattergram we have plotted the inequality index vertically and the labor marketization horizontally. The figures appropriate to each community are transferred from Tables 5—4 and 5—3, respectively. Furthermore, for the language/culture communities for which we have two labor marketization indices from two different years, the index for the later year is used in the scattergram. The distribution obtained shows that high figures on the inequality variable correspond to low figures on the labor marketization variable and vice versa. The best *post hoc* clustering of the communities is obtained when the distribution is trichotomized as shown in the scattergram. Thus, the communities are more or less equally distributed into the three cells which are indicated for convenience as (I), (II) and (III). The first cell denotes communities with high inequality and low labor marketization index, the second one denotes communities with low inequality and low labor

Table 5–5: Scattergram: Inequality Index by Labor Marketization



marketization index, and finally the third one refers to communities with low inequality and high labor marketization index. We shall discuss the predominant properties of these types in section 5.3.5., where we shall present our subtypology for classifying different kinds of bases in our communities.

5.3.5. A Basis Sub-Typology

In Table 5–6 we display a cross-tabulation of the level of development of the productive forces (plotted vertically) and relations of production (plotted horizontally). The first variable is dichotomized as high and low (see Table 5–1), whereas the second variable is trichotomized (see Table 5–5). Consequently, we obtain a property-space with 6 cells, of which only three, (B2)[18], (B3) and (B4), are occupied by *Atlas* communities.

Cell (B2) is characterized by a high level of development of the productive forces, low labor marketization and a low inequality index. Cell (B3) exhibits a high level of development of the productive forces, high labor marketization and a low inequality index. Finally, cell (B4) shows a low level of development of the productive forces, low labor marketization and a high inequality index.

Before we elaborate on the three types of relevance for the *Atlas* communities, some general remarks are in order with respect to the subtypology. As seen in Table 5–6, there is a particular relation between productive forces and relations of production: (B1) and (B6), two cells on one diagonal, are empty, indicating that a high level of development of the productive forces is historically incompatible

Table 5–6: A Basis Sub-Typology

Level of Development of the Productive Forces	Labor Marketization by GINI I Lo LM + Hi GINI	 II Lo LM + Lo GINI	 III Hi LM + Lo GINI
High	B1	B2 Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Yugoslavia *Industrial Societies*	B3 Finland, Sweden, United States, West Germany *Early Post-Industrial Societies*
Low	B4 Calcutta, Costa Rica, Delhi, Greece, Iran, Lebanon, Mexico, Mysore, Thailand, Turkey *Dual economies*	B5	B6

Note: Missing are Afghanistan and Hong Kong. B stands for Basis.
Key: Lo = Low, Hi = High, LM = Labor Marketization, GINI = Gini index of inequality.

with a combination of a low labor marketization and high inequality, whereas a low level of development of the productive forces is incompatible with high labor marketization and a low inequality index (all comparisons being relative, both synchronically and diachronically). Again historically, development of the forces of production has implied increasing labor marketization and diminishing inequality, and vice versa. This relationship, however, should not be considered as monotonous and linear. On the contrary, changes in this relationship take place by alternating leaps, in a dialectical way. This historical process is illustrated by the difference between cells (B2) and (B3): not all countries with a high level of development of the productive forces have attained high labor marketization. High labor marketization is generated by the *internal* mechanisms of development of the productive forces, once a certain level of this development has been exceeded.

We can now discuss some important characteristics of the *Atlas* communities with regard to cells (B2), (B3) and (B4). Let us begin with (B4): in this cell we have 10 *Atlas* language/culture communities which surely are different in terms of several economic, social and political qualifiers but nevertheless share some common characteristics in terms of the sub-typology generated here. Firstly, they all have a low (in relative terms) level of development of the productive forces. This means several things: low level of industrialization and unequal resource exploitation, among others. Such a country's diminutive industrial sector is dominated by so-called montage, or assembly-plant industries, where semi-fabricated details and parts are imported and put together within the country. Another peculiarity of these countries is their tendency to supply external markets with their own superfluous labor capacity. Human resources are also limited in terms of education and know-how. High inequality indices indicate that several aspects of the forces of production are unequally distributed. Inequality of land and income distribution are provided by the Gini indices used here. Another type of inequality may be mentioned: the distribution of technical know-how and professional learning favor only a limited group of people, while leaving other groups in ignorance and dependency. In fact, low labor marketization indicates that there are large agricultural sectors where the practice of agricultural activities for one's own subsistence is common. The term *Dual Economies* (DE) is an appropriate designation for these countries.[19] We find this term suitable precisely in order to stress the salient differences between various cross-sections of the society as an economic and socio-political system.

The difference between cells (B2) and (B3) is that the former has low labor marketization, whereas the latter has high. This difference most probably is due to the fact that countries placed in cell (B2) have larger population groups that are occupied in agricultural activities and/or are self-employed (see Taylor & Hudson 1972:332–334). Finland has a large forestry, a sector classified as agricultural, in which people are not self-employed but are wage earners. Most probably that is the reason why Finland was placed in cell (B3), although she has a large "agricul-

tural" sector like the countries of cell (B2). According to our theoretical assumptions, the difference between these cells signifies that in countries placed in cell (B2) *larger proportions* of the overall population, as compared with countries placed in cell (B3), are salaried employers or wage earners and their labor power has become a market commodity which is being sold and bought on a market. As for the common characteristics of these two cells, their level of development of the productive forces is high and their inequality index is low. Furthermore, the level of development of the productive forces is *higher* for cell (B3) countries than for (B2) (see Table 5—1). All these countries have high industrialization and advanced technology. In the case of (B3) (except for Finland) we may talk about the onset of a "technical and scientific revolution" (Richta 1972), referring basically to an advanced use of electronics, computer systems and other highly sophisticated capital-intensive methods and processes in the production of material wealth. An outstanding feature of (B2) countries is either their dependency on a rather large (but highly mechanized and effective) agricultural sector and/or the late onset of the technical and scientific revolution (except for Japan and France, of course).

It is extremely interesting to observe in cell (B3) that while the inequality index is low, indicating a tendency for equality in terms of land and income distribution, labor marketization is higher, indicating a tendency for increasing monopolization of capital, leading eventually to inequality. The Atlas countries placed in cell (B2) may be designated as *Industrial Societies* (IS), whereas the communities placed in cell (B3) may be called *Early Post-Industrial Societies* (EPIS).

5.3.6. The Superstructure

As we have seen in section 5.2.1, the conception of superstructure refers to a *multidimensional* set of variables. To our mind, there are at least two possible methods of operationalizing such variables in order to obtain a typology of countries.

(1) One may use the method provided by factor analysis. In that case, a great number of dimensions (or variables) which are considered as important elements of the main variable are to be collected and factor analysed. This method is not at all used in the present study.

(2) One may select only a few dimensions which are *dominant* elements of the main variable. Dominant elements of a main variable under inquiry stand out as decisive for the functioning of other elements of the main variable.

For the purpose of the present chapter we have chosen the second method and have selected three dimensions (or variables) that we think constitute not only main segments of the superstructure but which also influence the operation of the superstructure in general. These three variables are 1) political system style, 2) ideological orientation and 3) extent of interest articulation by associational groups. As a source of empirical data we shall use, in this section, Arthur S. Banks' and Robert B. Textor's (1963) *A Cross-Polity Survey,* which is a large data catalogue for a great number of countries. The labels of our three variables

are also, in the first place, borrowed from Banks and Textor. Some critical remarks with respect to the theoretical conceptualization of these variables will be introduced in connection with the definition and description of these variables.

Political system style: with regard to this variable Banks and Textor write:

> In this raw characteristic we attempt to discriminate between those polities that have mobilized or partially mobilized their resources (human and otherwise) to meet what are perceived to be compelling problems of national urgency, and those that have not. (. . .) Communist nations are, by doctrine, committed to a mobilizational style, but are by no means the only nations so committed. It should also be noted that a "developmental" ideological commitment is by no means invariably supported by a "mobilizational" system style.
>
> (Banks & Textor 1963:82)

For us a distinction between mobilizational and non-mobilizational political systems denotes something more than mobilization or non-mobilization of only *material* resources. We agree with Lars Rudebeck, a Swedish political scientist, in his distinction of "mobilization-oriented" and "vested-interest-oriented" political systems (to be compared with Banks' and Textor's mobilizational and non-mobilizational)—a distinction which emphasizes the system's ability to maintain communication channels between masses and power-elites open, and to create confidence and mobilize enthusiasm and motivation among the masses for the development and the well-being of the country (Rudebeck 1970). It is thus important to keep in mind *how* the masses are mobilized and armed in order to fight various economic, social and political problems. As the Norwegian social scientist Egil Fossum puts it:

> Such dimensions [i.e. political system style as mobilizational or non-mobilizational] can only say something about the potential for change and not the direction of change. It is absolutely necessary to discuss this concept in its specific contents. This is obvious for the simple fact that it matters enormously if the masses on their way out of the old are mobilized as marxist-leninists, populists or Christian democrats.
>
> (Fossum 1970:24)[20]

Therefore, we think it is important to add the second aspect suggested by Rudebeck to the definition of the political system style. Enrichment of the definition of political system style implies that we should be careful not to code Communist nations as mobilizational by definition.

A well-known problem in this context is that politically leading groups do not practice the slogans that they make public. Another problem is, of course, the role played by anti-mobilizational groups of various kinds.[21] For the purpose of our typology, however, our language/culture communities will be coded simply as mobilizational or non-mobilizational with respect to this variable.[22] Nevertheless, we of course use these two concepts, not in a limited sense as Banks and Textor do, but with the connotations revealed in our discussion above.

Ideological Orientation is the second variable used to operationalize the super-

structure. Three categories are relevant to our typology: 1) doctrinal, 2) conventional, and 3) traditional.[23]

In this context, by *Doctrinal Ideological Orientation* we understand a Marxist-oriented legitimation of the political system. That is to say, the class-struggle and the progressive character of the proletariat as the motor of societal change are accepted as the legitimizing myth of the overall political system (Freedman 1968).

As its legitimizing myth of the political system, *Conventional Ideological Orientation* holds institutions of social contract, majority will, and democracy. Parliamentary democracies of Western Europe may be the typical examples of this type of ideological orientation (Binder 1962:40 ff.).

By *Traditional Ideological Orientation* we mean a political system which offers the Order of God or some "traditional authority" (Weber 1964:341 ff.; Binder 1962:44) as the main legitimizing myth of the system. In this type of ideological orientation religious beliefs are dominant in several segments of the society. Thus, this has a decisive role in the formation of subjective culture.

The third variable chosen to operationalize the superstructure is *Interest Articulation by Associational Groups.* Banks and Textor have borrowed this concept from the theoretical model set forth by Gabriel A. Almond in *The Politics of the Developing Areas,* 1960 (Almond & Coleman 1970; Almond & Powell 1966). Almond describes associational interest groups as:

> . . . the specialized structures of interest articulation—trade unions, organizations of businessmen or industrialists, ethnic associations, associations organized by religious denominations, civic groups, and the like. Their particular characteristics are explicit representation of the interests of a particular group, orderly procedures for the formulation of interests and demands, and transmissions of these demands to other political structures such as political parties, legislatures, bureaucracies.
>
> (Almond and Coleman 1970:34)

We consider this variable an important one for our typology (and shall return to the question of its significance later) but we must point out that we are not thereby necessarily making concessions to the theoretical model from which this variable is borrowed.[24]

The three variables chosen here to operationalize the superstructure—political system style, ideological orientation and interest articulation by associational groups—embrace at least two elements that are important to understand. (1) The first two variables help us to see how a certain cultural environment is dominant in a given society. In a society, a given political system style and a given ideological orientation generate a certain type of dominant cultural environment, which in turn gives people to understand *what is to be considered* as good or bad. Thus, information about political system style and ideological orientation makes it possible to suggest hypotheses about patterns found in subjective culture. (2) The third variable (as to some extent the first variable) gives information about the degree of *interest consciousness,* which in many cases is identical with *political consciousness.* Interest consciousness is presumably organized in such a way that its orga-

nization is *tolerated* and *permitted* by the political system and its ideological orientation. These two elements—dominant cultural environment and society's capacity to take care of various interest groups—affect several other processes and structures in the superstructure. Information about these two elements may generate information about other elements of the superstructure; we may, for instance, gain a better understanding about what kinds of laws are passed and why, or about the type of cultural policy adopted and why, or about the type of developmental approach used and the reason behind it. Of course, objective information generated by such a typology cannot be used to understand every specific part of the superstructure but it can certainly give a general idea about the social structure as a whole. Thus, for macro-sociological purposes it can be applied with advantage.

5.3.7. A Sub-Typology of Superstructure

After having presented and defined the three constituent variables we can now show a cross-tabulation of the variables which produces a property space with 24 cells. For the sake of simplicity, however, the property space is exhibited with only 10 cells (see Table 5—7). This was possible since not all the 24 cells are relevant for our language/culture communities. On the left side of the typology we have only one community, Yugoslavia, which is coded in terms of only the two first variables; it was regarded as ambiguous with respect to the third characteristic (Banks & Textor 1963:89).

The rest of the communities are on the "non-mobilizational" side and are either conventional or traditional in terms of ideological orientation (cells (IV) and (V)). Those communities that are non-mobilizational and conventional may further be placed in one of three categories (significant, moderate and limited: cells (VI), (VII) and (VIII), respectively) in terms of their interest articulation by associational groups. And finally, those communities which are non-mobilizational and traditional are either limited (cell (IX)) or negligible (cell (X)) in terms of interest articulation by associational groups. Cells (II) and (III) are non-existent, among our *Atlas* communities, at least. Thus, we can reduce the typology to six cells, as exhibited in Table 5—8.

Cell (S1)[25] in the typology is characterized by a mobilizational political system style and doctrinal ideological orientation. It is not, however, qualified in terms of interest articulation by associational groups. Cells (S2), (S3) and (S4) are non-mobilizational and conventional with regard to the first two qualifiers. The third variable differentiates the cells so that (S2) is qualified as significant, (S3) as moderate and (S4) as limited with respect to interest articulation by associational groups. The last two cells, (S5) and (S6), are non-mobilizational and traditional in terms of the first two variables. The third variable differentiates the cells so that (S5) is qualified as limited, and (S6) as negligible with respect to interest articulation by associational groups.

Table 5–7: Political System Style by Ideological Orientation by Interest Articulation by Associational Groups



Note: Hong Kong is excluded due to lack of information.
S = Significant M = Moderate L = Limited N = Negligible

We have thus assembled information on 21 language/culture communities for this subtypology of superstructure. The distribution of the *Atlas* countries with regard to this subtypology is also displayed in Table 5–8. Specific characteristics of the cells will be discussed in the next section where we shall present the final overall typology. Nevertheless, two remarks should be made at this stage.

In Table 5–7 cell (II) is indicated as non-existent among the *Atlas* communities. A spontaneous question arises here: why is this so? Under the light cast by the historical evidence it seems reasonable to suggest that there is a given historical relation between specific types of political system style and ideological orientation. Whenever "doctrinal" is defined in terms of Marxist-oriented ideology, we find a certain harmony between doctrinal ideological orientation and mobilizational political system style. But if the political system changes its style, for instance toward non-mobilizational, the previous harmony will turn into contradiction, and various types of reactions will emerge (e.g., cultural and other antagonistic activities against the political system). On the other hand, if "doctrinal" is defined in terms of fascist-oriented ideology, we are likely to find a certain contradiction with

Table 5–8: A Sub-Typology of Superstructure

Political System Style by Ideological Orientation by Interest Articulation

Political system style	Mobilizational	Non-mobilizational				
Ideological orientation	Doctrinal	Conventional			Traditional	
Interest articulation by associational groups		Significant	Moderate	Limited	Limited	Negligible
	(S1) Yugoslavia	(S2) Belgium Finland France Italy Japan Netherlands Sweden United States West Germany	(S3) Greece Lebanon Mexico Turkey	(S4) Calcutta Costa Rica Delhi Mysore	(S5) Iran	(S6) Afghanistan Thailand

Note: S stands for superstructure. Hong Kong is omitted.

a mobilizational style or a certain harmony with non-mobilizational political system style.

As for cell (III) in Table 5—7, we may say that conventional or traditional ideological orientations in general, as found in historical experience, tend to be non-mobilizational, but are not necessarily so. Nevertheless, none of the *Atlas* communities fell into this cell. Furthermore, we can also observe that there is a certain relationship between ideological orientation and interest articulation by associational groups: for instance, negligible interest articulation historically coincides with a traditional ideological orientation whereas significant interest articulation is reserved—naturally, also for historical reasons—for societies with a conventional ideological orientation.

5.3.8. A Final Typology

In this section we shall present a final typology concerning important dimensions of the basis-superstructure conception. The typology is not "final" in the sense that it provides an ultimate macro-typology, but the term final is used here rather to indicate that the typology is the final version to be presented in *this* study. It is based on a combination of the two sub-typologies presented previously—the B and the S sub-typologies. By cross-tabulating (B2), (B3) and (B4) of the basis sub-typology with 6 cells (S1 to S6) of the typology for superstructure, we obtain a 18-cell typology, displayed in Table 5—9.

Our language/culture communities occupy 7 cells (BS1 to BS7)[26] out of the 18 cells generated by this cross-tabulation.

Before we introduce a cell-by-cell treatment of the typology, a word of caution is in order: as the reader realizes, it is difficult, not to say impossible, to make a penetrating and *uncontroversial* typology of societies. This is clearly not our aim, either. What we are striving after is to give more color to and to flesh out the abstract schema presented earlier. What we are presenting here and merely thumbnail sketches. Such thumbnail sketches may be controversial in themselves, but they nevertheless reflect our interpretation of the context. Moreover, any penetrating and uncontroversial analysis and documentation remains beyond the scope of the present study. At this point we shall make a cell-by-cell treatment in order to see various similarities and dissimilarities between the cells and thereby between the communities placed in different cells.

Basis-Superstructure 1: This cell refers to industrial societies with a mobilizational political system and doctrinal ideological orientation. Yugoslavia is the only language/culture community appropriate to the cell. Data available to us give evidence that Yugoslavia well fits the characteristics of the cell, except for one aspect. If we talk about mobilization only in terms of mobilization of resources for economic development and change, then the label is appropriate to Yugoslavia. If, however, we also want to include openness of communication channels between masses and political power-holders, then the label is somewhat idealizing. There is

Table 5–9: A Macro-Typology with Respect to Basis/Superstructure

Political system by ideological orientation by interest articulation through associational groups

Productive forces by inequality index by labor marketization

	S1	S2	S3	S4	S5	S6
B2	BS1 Yugoslavia *Hi PF* *Lo LM Lo G* *Mobiliza-* *tional* *Doctrinal*	BS2 Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands *Hi PF* *Lo LM Lo G* *Non-Mobi-* *lizational* *Conventional* *Significant*				
B3		BS3 Finland, Sweden, United States, West Germany *Hi PF* *Hi LM Lo G* *Non-Mobiliza-* *tional* *Conventional* *Significant*				
B4			BS4 Greece, Lebanon, Mexico, Turkey *Lo PF* *Lo LM Hi G* *Non-Mobili-* *zational* *Conventional* *Moderate*	BS5 Costa Rica, India (CB, DH,MK) *Lo PF* *Lo LM Hi G* *Non-Mobili-* *zational* *Conventional* *Limited*	BS6 Iran *Lo PF* *Lo LM Hi G* *Non-Mobili-* *zational* *Traditional* *Limited*	BS7 Thailand *Lo PF* *Lo LM Hi G* *Non-Mobili-* *zational* *Traditional* *Negligible*

Note: Afghanistan and Hong Kong are omitted.
Key: B = Basis, *S* = Superstructure, *Hi* = High, *Lo* = Low, *PF* = Productive Forces, *LM* = Labor Marketization, *G* = Gini-index of inequality.

evidence in the literature[27] that in this second sense the Yugoslavian political system style is not very effectively mobilizational. Nevertheless, it must be strongly affirmed that Yugoslavia is the most mobilizational community among our *Atlas* communities. Here we expect that the superstructure is very insistent in diffusing the main values of its ideological orientation but perhaps not to the same extent motivated to train people to be critical toward these values and their implementations. Stress should be given to the qualifier doctrinal as the dominant superstruc-

tural character of Yugoslavia. Connected with this matter is the ambiguity of the case of Yugoslavia with respect to interest articulation by associational groups, because many types of interest articulation are subordinate to the doctrinal rule of the political system.

Basis-Superstructure 2 and 3: it may be appropriate to treat these two structural situations together—thus reducing the property space. They have almost the same characteristics, except one: namely, (BS2) has lower labor marketization than (BS3). (BS2) includes France, Belgium, Italy, Netherlands and Japan, whereas (BS3) embraces West Germany, the United States, Finland and Sweden. As we shall see, the differences between these two cells are rather small and are of a quantitative character. The same types of sociological phenomena may be found in both cells. This seems to be so for at least two reasons.

(1) Similar circumstances evoke similar processes in the basis: i.e., (a) countries placed in these cells have a high level of development of the productive forces, and (b) labor marketization is increasing in countries placed in these cells (see Table 5—3). We know that the countries placed in (BS2), and thereby coded as low with respect to labor marketization, for which we have comparative figures on labor marketization are to be coded nearly as high as (BS3) countries.

(2) Several similar superstructural circumstances are observable for all countries placed in (BS2) and (BS3), respectively. The main reason for this is the historical development of the countries in question. Which are the *dominant* macrosociological characteristics, in terms of basis-superstructure in these societies?

Here we should like to stress the word "dominant", since we are working with concepts referring to factors which, within their wide range, capture and dominate several other societal processes. Secondly, our knowledge about the microprocesses which are directly generated by these macro-processes is limited. Keeping in mind the theoretical frame of reference described for the purposes of this chapter, we naturally begin to look at the whole process with reference to the development of the productive forces. We have already established that the level of devolopment of the productive forces is high in these communities. This requires (or causes) at least two things: on the one hand, further development of the productive forces, possible only through involvement of *larger units* in the production of material wealth; we need more capital, investments, larger corporations, etc. On the other hand, in the given stages of their development, especially on these high levels, the productive forces lead to *higher labor marketization.* At the same time, the emergence of larger units further augments labor marketization since large units tend to become larger, and one of the ways of getting there is to absorb smaller units (this process is what is being called monopolization of capital). Corporations make up the larger units, which in this case implies private ownership and control of the productive forces. The state may be one of the large-unit owners.

One contradiction is apparent here: on the one hand, the productive forces become more *societal* in the sence of involving more people, more societal re-

sources, etc., and on the other hand, they become more *privatized.*

The political system keeps and develops its non-mobilizational style: the *Welfare State* mentality expands, and measures are taken *from-above* in order to achieve any social goals. Objectively related to this process is, of course, the pacifying role probably played by commercial mass media and the advertizement sector. Accordingly, the main values of the conventional ideological orientation are reproduced and circulated on a mass level: the dominant cultural environment propagates slogans such as democracy, individual freedom and equality, while the facts of the case may be different.

The interest articulation by associational groups is encouraged since it has a stabilizing effect with regard to domestic conflicts. Conflicts become "institutionalized". Institutions, organizations and rules are established in order to keep domestic peace and to regulate conflict-solving within the framework of a conventional ideological orientation.

All the processes briefly described here are dependent on and supplement each other in a more or less dialectical fashion, so that the whole structure is kept working. It is our belief that these macrosociological processes influence, directly or indirectly, subjective culture in general, and concepts referring to basis- and superstructure-oriented objects, in particular. We should like, however, to *stress* that the structural processes described with respect to these two cells reveal *only* dominant macro-sociological characteristics which are common to the societies of these cells. Naturally we are aware of the fact that there are various types of difference *between* the language/culture communities placed in these two cells. Such differences are structural, historical and cultural. Nevertheless, any investigation of characteristics which are specific to given language/culture communities remains beyond the scope of our inquiry.

Basis-Superstructure 4 and 5: Structural similarities between these two cells are even more accentuated than those between the previous two cells. Thus, we find it suitable to discuss 4 and 5 together.

Language/culture communities suitable to cell (BS4) are Greece, Lebanon, Mexico and Turkey. Cell (BS5) includes Costa Rica and the Indian communities—i.e., Calcutta, Delhi and Mysore. Here, the level of development of the productive forces is low and the inequality index is high: this means that large cross-sections of the population subsist under unsatisfactory economic and social conditions. The development of the productive forces is not sufficient to give better living conditions to the majority of the people within a reasonable time horizon.

As a matter of fact—for historical reasons—the ideological orientation adopted by the ruling classes is conventional; that is, it emphasizes value-orientations such as democracy, equality, welfare for everybody, freedom, etc.—i.e., value-orientations similar to the ones found in (BS2) and (BS3).

For communities placed in the two *previous* cells, this type of ideological orientation would seem to be more or less in harmony with the basis: i.e., the main-

tenance of the value orientations is supported and rendered possible by the conditions found in the basis. For communities placed in cells (BS4) and (BS5), however, the situation is the opposite. Several and considerable cross-sections of the population are put under cross-pressures generated by the contradictions between miserable conditions found in the basis of the society, on the one hand and expectations and aspirations propagated by the superstructure, on the other hand.

The political system style is non-mobilizational; both developmental resources and, in particular, large sections of the population are made to remain inertial with regard to activities furthering societal change.

Interest articulation by associational groups is the only dimension which slightly separates these two cells from each other. Interest articulation by associational groups is moderate in (BS4) and limited in (BS5). The fact that this dimension is more accentuated in (BS4) countries than in (BS5) countries may be due to the proportion of the population which is involved in industrial activities. This proportion is higher in (BS4) countries (see Textor & Hudson, 1972:329–331).

Small differences between these two types of countries in terms of this variable would not, however, seem to involve significant differences between two social structures. It is evident that the countries placed in the cells (BS4) and (BS5), respectively, exhibit more similarities than dissimilarities with respect to the characteristics of social structure on which we are focusing.

Basis-Superstructure 6 and 7: Here again, cells (BS6) and (BS7) are similar to each other; the only difference is observed in terms of interest articulation by associational groups, which is limited in the former cell and negligible in the latter. We believe that this difference may be considered a minor factor and thus the two cells may be treated together. We have Iran in cell (BS6), and Thailand in cell (BS7). Here we shall not elaborate on the characteristics of the basis, since what has been said earlier concerning low levels of the development of the productive forces, low labor marketization and high inequality index applies to these two cells, as well.

The characteristic which is noticeably different from other characteristics treated up to now is the traditional ideological orientation common to both cells. The interaction between traditional orientation and the circumstances that are dominant in the basis produces the main characteristics of these social structures.

As already mentioned (see section 5.3.6), the traditional ideological orientation is defined as the arbitrary ordination of the Order of God or other "traditional authorities" as the main legitimizing myth of the political system. Of course, many substructures are penetrated by this ideology; it dominates the overall structure of society. The political system is non-mobilizational and uses religious belief for the purpose of legitimizing societal circumstances existing in society. Thus, the dominating groups tend to maintain that the low level of development of the productive forces, inequality in terms of land and income distribution, etc., which contribute to the misery of people, are sent by God, who thereby punishes the sins of the people. The best thing to do in order to obtain a better and more decent human life, according to this outlook, is to rely on God and his representatives in the coun-

try. Fatalism and passiveness dominate the intellectual life of the masses. Depending on political trends and on the political activities of the politically conscious cross-sections of the population, some measures may be taken toward "modernization" of the political system (i.e., adoption of certain reforms by using the political model of conventional ideological orientation).

It is our belief that these structural circumstances influence the individual in his evaluation of objects (phenomena, values, structures, things, etc.) embraced by the basis-superstructure conception.

5.4. A Discussion of the Relationship Between Concepts of Basis-Superstructure and the Macro-Typology

This section will be devoted to a discussion concerning the relationship between the macrosociological typology introduced above and subjective culture—more precisely, concepts referring to the basis-superstructure conception as indicated by the *Atlas of Affective Meanings*. In other words, this explorative discussion concerns the relationship between *objective* macrosociological structures and the *subjective* meanings of concepts relating to these structures. As the reader realizes, the objective data presented and the macrosociological typology constructed refer only to the *dominant* structural characteristics of the *Atlas* communities. What does "dominant" mean in this context? A dominant structural characteristic is a characteristic which embraces, influences and/or dominates several other societal characteristics. Such societal characteristics can be studied in terms of sociological, economic and historical variables or factors. To give an example, the variable of productive forces is a dominant variable in the sense that any change in the productive forces leads to changes in terms of several other variables. That is to say, the variable of productive forces in an overall variable with a wide domain of dominance.

By focusing on dominant structural variables, we can make assumptions and generate other structural variables which may be interesting in a given scientific context. It should be stressed that a typology constructed by using dominant structural variables (1) is especially fruitful in *explorative* inquiries, (2) can classify communities on the basis of dominant and overall macro-variables only, (3) cannot generally give direct information about other specific circumstances found in the society.

At the very beginning of this chapter, we pointed out that the concepts studied in the concept category of basis-superstructure have generally wide connotations

(see below). Consequently, any discussion concerning the relationship between the typology and the meanings of the concept category must necessarily remain on a macro level and concern hypotheses with reference to general and overall macrosociological processes.

The subjective data under consideration are exhibited in Tables 5—10 (pp. 140—141) and 5—11 (pp. 142—143). Table 5—10 displays standardized E-P-A composite scores. (See Chapter 1 for basic *Atlas* measures). As we know from elementary statistics, scores are standardized in order to secure the comparability of scales of measurement—in our case, E, P and A composite factor scores. One of the effects of standardization, however, is that differences between composite scores occasionally become less accentuated or smaller. One way of avoiding such a pitfall is to compare standardized composite scores with raw composite scores. In Table 5—11 we exhibit raw composite scores. Furthermore, it should be noted that the data is exhibited in such a way that communities are arranged according to the results obtained in the final typology.

Here, we shall not discuss every single score displayed in the tables. Instead, we should like to focus on the data set as a whole and to concentrate our attention upon general and overall relationships.

Our first hypothesis concerns the relationship between objective macrostructures and concepts with wide connotations, while the second and the third concern correspondences and discrepancies between objective macrostructures as a whole and subjective culture. However, before we focus on the first general hypothesis to be explored we should like to define a concept pair which will be used in the following discussion: correspondence vs. discrepancy. Both concepts are used in order to characterize the relationship between the objective typology and the subjective meaning of the concept category.

Whenever the ideals, value orientations, attitudes, beliefs, etc., which are fostered and propagated by the dominant institutions of the social structure are *positively* evaluated, we say that there is a *correspondence* between the objective social structure and the subjective culture. There is a *discrepancy* between the objective social structure and the subjective culture whenever the ideals, value orientations, attitudes, beliefs, etc., which are fostered and propagated by the dominant institutions of the social structure are *negatively* evaluated.

The first hypothesis to be explored is the following:

Only concepts with wide connotations can be used in order to understand the relationship between social structure and subjective culture.

A brief glance at Tables 5—10 and 5—11 will reveal that certain concepts have wider connotations than others. A comparison between, for instance, SOCIALISM and MACHINE may illustrate what we mean by wider connotation. SOCIALISM as a word is a linguistic representation of a political ideology and a way of understanding human societies and existence. The concept itself, embracing a large number of ideas, phenomena, structures, processes, etc., refers to several important facets of human existence and thus also acquires a wide-ranging

connotation. The word MACHINE, on the other hand, refers primarily to an artifact with given characteristics which are common to different types of machines. Of course, the concept for which this word is a linguistic representation, has a *certain* connotation, but nevertheless, a connotation narrower than the connotation of SOCIALISM.

It seems, however, that *several* concepts with narrow connotations may be used together as a concept with a wide connotation, if they are considered together as logically connected concepts. Thus, MACHINE, LABORATORY, AUTOMATION and EDUCATION, taken together, constitute general patterns and trends which may be assessed in terms of the macrosociological typology. Thus, we can state that a concept like SOCIALISM makes more sense than a concept like MACHINE, when their subjective meanings are to be analysed in terms of a macrosociological typology. Nevertheless, this statement should not discredit the usefulness of concepts with narrower connotations in macrosociological contexts.

The second hypothesis may be formulated as follows:
There may be a correspondence between objective structure as a whole and subjective culture.

If we now look at the three concepts with wide connotations, namely CAPITALISM, COMMUNISM and SOCIALISM, in Tables 5—10 and 5—11, we can observe that there is a clear relationship between objective and subjective data. This relationship, however, indicates correspondence for certain countries and discrepancy for others. In the context of the second hypothesis we are assessing, we should like to focus on those relations which indicate correspondence. Relations of discrepancy will be elaborated in connection with the third hypothesis.

The best comparison may be made between Yugoslavia (BS1) and the United States (BS3). The first one being typically doctrinal and the second one typically conventional, we find in Yugoslavia that COMMUNISM is positively evaluated (E—Z = 1.3; E = 2.4) whereas the opposite is the case in the United States (E—Z = −2.9; E = −2.3). SOCIALISM follows the same pattern. As for CAPITALISM the pattern is supported, probably only partly: in Yugoslavia CAPITALISM is very negatively evaluated (E—Z = −2.2; E = −1.9); however, in the United States it is also somewhat negatively evaluated (E—Z = −1.0; E = −0.2). This may be due to several factors: it may in part be due to the discrepancy between objective structures and subjective culture that we shall discuss below. But this may also due to the fact that the word CAPITALISM is not used in the United States as directly contrasted with COMMUNISM and SOCIALISM. Other concepts, such as freedom, private enterprise, etc., may be the appropriate contrasts. The word CAPITALISM in itself may not necessarily be evaluated positively since the image produced by the superstructure makes use of other concepts.

We think that this pattern as a whole gives evidence for the fact that superstructures dominant in these two social structures have been successful in indoctrinating their own value orientations to urbanite and male high-school teen-agers. Furthermore, as we can see in Tables 5—10 and 5—11, the same pattern is found

Table 5–10: E–Z, P–Z and A–Z Scores for Given Concepts and Communities

		Capitalism			Communism			Socialism			Democracy		
		E–Z	P–Z	A–Z	E–Z	P–Z	A–Z	E–Z	P–Z	A–Z	E–Z	P–Z	A–
BS1	YS	−2.2	−1.3	0.3	1.3	2.1	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.6	1.0	0.9	−0.2
BS2	FR	−0.4	0.7	−0.0	−1.6	−0.3	−1.1	−0.5	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.1
	BF	−0.2	0.4	−0.5	−0.6	1.3	0.9	0.5	1.0	1.0	0.3	0.3	−0.3
	IT	−0.8	0.3	−0.5	−0.7	−0.4	−0.7	−0.8	−0.5	−0.4	1.0	0.8	−0.1
	JP	0.1	1.2	1.1	−1.2	0.9	−1.1	−0.6	0.1	−0.7	0.8	0.8	0.7
	ND	−0.4	1.2	0.5	−1.1	1.3	0.5	−0.6	0.3	0.1	0.9	0.0	−0.1
BS 3	FF	−1.0	0.6	−0.5	−1.6	1.1	−1.4	−1.5	0.1	−1.5	−0.1	0.4	−0.4
	GG	−0.2	0.5	0.4	−1.1	0.4	0.5	−0.4	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.2
	AE	−1.0	0.7	0.1	−2.9	0.1	0.6	−0.8	0.2	−0.1	0.7	1.5	0.9
	SW	−1.3	−0.3	−0.6	−1.2	0.0	0.4	−0.8	−0.4	−0.3	1.0	0.5	0.2
BS4	GK	−1.4	−0.8	−1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	−1.1	−0.1	−0.4	0.7	1.2	0.0
	MS	−1.2	1.1	−0.7	−1.2	0.7	−0.4	0.0	0.5	−0.2	0.4	1.3	−0.3
	LA	−0.4	0.2	−0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.8	−1.4	0.9	1.4	−1.1
	TK	0.4	0.0	−0.4	−1.4	0.4	−0.7	−1.1	−0.1	−1.5	0.9	0.7	0.5
BS5	CS	−0.1	1.2	0.5	−1.9	0.6	0.9	−0.6	0.5	0.7	1.0	0.6	−0.4
	DH	0.2	0.8	−1.3	−0.7	0.3	0.7	0.5	1.1	−1.5	0.6	0.7	−0.3
	CB	−1.4	0.1	−0.1	0.5	1.1	0.8	0.3	1.1	0.3	−0.0	1.3	0.4
	MK	0.5	−0.3	−0.4	−1.4	0.1	0.7	0.2	−0.0	0.1	0.3	0.6	0.3
BS6	IF	0.4	0.7	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	−0.0	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.5	0.3
BS7	TH	−1.3	1.1	−0.6	−1.8	1.0	−0.7	−0.6	0.4	−0.3	−0.9	0.8	−0.3

Table 5–10 (cont.)

		Factory Worker			Poor People			Rich People			Machine		
		E–Z	P–Z	A–Z	E–Z	P–Z	A–Z	E–Z	P–Z	A–Z	E–Z	P–Z	A–
BS1	YS	0.7	1.2	−0.0	−1.2	−0.4	−0.6	−1.7	−1.9	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.7
BS2	FR	0.0	0.1	0.6	−0.8	−1.4	−1.3	−1.4	−0.1	−1.1	0.3	1.6	1.5
	BF	−0.1	0.6	0.5	−1.5	−1.1	−0.3	−0.8	−0.7	−1.2	−0.4	1.7	1.7
	JP	−0.6	−0.5	0.2	−1.5	−1.3	−1.4	0.2	0.8	1.1	0.4	2.7	0.5
	IT	0.2	0.3	1.3	−1.2	−1.9	−1.1	−0.4	−0.6	−0.6	0.9	1.0	1.5
	ND	−0.3	0.7	−0.1	−0.9	−0.7	−0.3	−0.5	−0.3	−0.6	0.2	1.7	1.4
BS3	FF	−0.7	0.8	−1.0	−0.9	−0.9	−0.7	−0.9	0.0	−0.8	0.1	1.6	0.1
	GG	−0.6	0.6	0.4	−0.6	−1.3	−1.1	−0.6	0.2	−0.3	0.0	2.1	2.0
	AE	0.2	0.4	0.9	−1.1	−2.3	−0.8	−0.4	0.3	0.1	0.6	1.2	1.7
	SW	−0.2	0.2	−0.5	−0.2	−1.5	−1.0	−0.8	−0.4	−0.7	0.4	0.1	0.8
BS4	GK	0.5	1.1	1.5	0.1	−1.2	−0.2	−0.5	0.3	−0.9	0.7	1.0	0.8
	MS	−0.4	−0.6	−0.2	−0.2	−0.7	0.2	−1.0	−0.4	−0.7	0.3	0.7	0.5
	LA	0.2	0.2	−0.3	−1.2	−0.9	1.1	−0.3	−0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	−1.3
	TK	0.3	0.9	0.3	−1.6	0.1	−0.5	−0.2	0.8	−0.1	0.5	1.8	−0.4
BS5	CS	0.8	0.0	0.9	−0.7	−1.8	−1.8	−0.9	0.3	−0.4	0.7	1.4	1.4
	DH	0.5	0.9	−1.1	−2.2	−3.1	1.8	−0.3	0.8	−0.4	0.5	0.5	−1.0
	CB	0.2	0.9	1.7	0.2	−1.9	−0.1	−1.2	−0.0	−0.7	0.3	1.3	0.9
	MK	−0.0	−0.5	−0.1	−0.6	−0.8	−1.0	0.3	1.0	0.1	−0.2	2.0	1.4
BS6	IF	0.8	1.4	1.8	−0.8	−2.3	−1.4	−0.4	0.8	−0.3	0.6	1.9	0.9
BS7	TH	−0.8	0.4	−0.8	−1.5	−0.1	−0.3	0.9	1.3	−0.8	0.3	1.9	−0.1

Labor Unions			Worker			Middle Class			Banker		
E–Z	P–Z	A–Z	E–Z	P–Z	A–Z	E–Z	P–Z	A–Z	E–Z	P–Z	A–Z
0.3	0.5	−1.0	1.2	1.3	0.0	−0.3	−0.4	−0.1	−0.8	−1.2	0.4
-0.1	1.0	0.0	0.4	1.1	0.8	−0.5	0.1	−0.4	−0.9	0.6	−1.4
-0.5	0.6	0.7	0.1	1.3	1.0	0.1	0.2	0.0	−0.2	−0.1	−1.0
-0.3	−0.3	−0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2	−0.6	−0.8	−0.4	−0.4	−0.7	0.5
-0.4	0.9	1.0	−0.4	0.7	0.3	−0.4	−0.5	−0.2	−0.1	0.6	0.2
-0.5	0.6	−0.7	0.1	0.9	0.1	−0.1	0.2	0.0	−0.8	0.6	−1.1
-0.4	0.9	−0.7	−0.2	1.2	−0.7	−0.0	0.3	−0.3	0.1	0.9	−0.8
-0.2	1.4	1.3	−0.2	1.4	0.5	0.0	0.2	−0.3	0.0	0.8	−0.6
0.3	1.2	0.9	0.5	0.2	1.5	0.1	−0.1	0.6	0.2	0.1	−0.5
0.8	0.8	0.3	0.0	0.8	−0.5	−0.3	−0.5	−0.5	0.2	0.1	0.7
0.4	1.0	0.2	0.8	0.8	1.4	0.6	1.2	0.2	−0.2	0.1	−0.7
-0.1	0.8	0.2	0.8	0.9	0.6	0.2	0.2	−0.1	−0.4	0.1	0.0
1.0	1.5	−0.6	0.9	1.1	−1.0	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.5	1.2	−0.8
0.1	−0.5	−0.0	−0.2	−0.2	0.5	−0.2	0.7	0.2	−0.4	−0.2	−0.1
0.3	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.9	1.3	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.3	−0.1	1.1
0.0	0.8	−1.2	0.8	0.5	−0.5	−0.9	−0.7	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4
0.1	1.1	0.9	0.4	0.4	1.2	0.1	−0.7	0.2	−0.5	0.3	0.1
1.0	0.7	−0.0	0.2	0.2	0.7	0.3	−0.4	−0.7	0.6	0.6	−0.2
0.9	1.2	1.2	0.8	1.2	1.2	0.0	−0.6	−0.2	0.2	−0.4	0.6
0.1	1.2	−0.1	−0.2	0.6	−0.7	0.2	0.3	−0.3	0.8	1.1	−0.6

Laboratory			Automation			Education		
E–Z	P–Z	A–Z	E–Z	P–Z	A–Z	E–Z	P–Z	A–Z
0.4	0.4	−0.6	0.7	1.3	1.5	1.0	1.2	−1.2
0.0	−0.0	−0.2	0.1	0.3	0.9	0.8	0.4	0.8
0.5	0.8	−0.1	−0.0	0.7	1.1	1.0	1.1	−0.8
-0.1	0.3	−1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	−0.1	0.8	−0.6
0.3	0.2	0.0	0.6	0.6	1.4	0.4	0.0	−1.4
0.8	0.9	1.1	−0.0	1.0	0.9	0.1	0.9	−0.1
0.3	0.3	−0.3	0.1	0.1	0.9	−0.2	0.6	−1.1
0.8	1.0	−0.1	0.7	0.7	1.4	0.5	0.3	−0.1
0.7	1.0	0.3	−0.0	0.6	1.7	1.1	1.7	0.6
0.4	0.0	−0.2	0.2	−0.0	0.7	−0.4	−0.8	−0.4
0.6	−0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	1.4	1.0	0.5	1.2
0.5	−0.1	0.4	0.7	1.1	1.4	1.2	1.2	0.4
0.5	1.0	−2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.3	−0.2
0.5	0.9	−0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.9	0.6
0.9	1.3	0.1	0.2	0.5	0.7	1.2	0.9	0.5
0.7	1.6	−1.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	1.3	−1.5
0.3	0.4	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3	2.0	2.0
0.5	1.1	−0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.9	1.9
1.0	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.9	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.8
0.2	−0.2	−0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.1	−0.5

Table 5–11: E, P and A Composite Scores for Given Concepts and Communities

		Capitalism			Communism			Socialism			Democracy		
		E	P	A	E	P	A	E	P	A	E	P	A
BS1	YS	−1.9	−0.2	0.1	2.4	2.1	0.3	1.6	1.2	0.3	2.0	1.3	−0.2
BS2	FR	0.2	0.9	0.4	−1.0	0.2	−0.4	0.1	0.7	0.6	0.9	0.5	0.5
	BF	0.3	0.6	−0.1	−0.1	1.1	0.7	1.0	0.9	0.7	0.9	0.5	0.0
	IT	−0.2	0.8	0.0	−0.1	0.3	−0.1	−0.1	0.3	0.1	2.0	1.1	0.2
	JP	0.5	1.1	0.7	−0.7	0.9	−0.5	−0.2	0.5	−0.3	1.2	0.9	0.5
	ND	0.1	1.3	0.8	−0.5	1.4	0.7	−0.1	0.6	0.4	1.4	0.4	0.3
BS3	FF	−0.7	1.0	−0.1	−1.5	1.4	−1.0	−1.4	0.6	−1.1	0.4	0.8	−0.1
	GG	0.6	1.0	0.7	−0.6	0.9	0.7	0.3	1.3	1.0	1.8	1.2	0.5
	AE	−0.2	1.4	0.1	−2.3	1.0	0.4	0.0	1.1	0.0	1.6	2.0	0.7
	SW	−0.4	0.2	−0.0	−0.4	0.3	0.5	−0.1	0.2	0.1	1.4	0.5	0.4
BS4	GK	−0.7	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	−0.3	0.5	0.3	1.9	1.1	0.5
	MS	−0.4	1.2	−0.1	−0.4	1.0	0.1	0.8	0.9	0.2	1.3	1.3	0.1
	LA	0.4	0.8	−0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	1.2	−1.0	1.9	1.6	−0.9
	TK	0.8	0.3	0.1	−0.4	0.6	−0.1	−0.2	0.3	−0.7	1.1	0.8	0.7
BS5	CS	1.0	1.6	1.0	−1.1	1.2	1.4	0.4	1.1	1.2	2.3	1.2	0.4
	DH	1.0	1.0	−0.8	0.3	0.7	0.0	1.3	1.1	−0.9	1.3	0.9	−0.4
	CB	−0.7	0.6	0.5	1.4	1.4	1.1	1.1	1.4	0.7	0.8	1.5	0.3
	MK	0.8	0.0	0.0	−0.4	0.2	0.4	0.7	0.2	0.2	0.7	0.5	0.4
BS6	IF	1.8	0.7	1.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3	0.4	1.3	1.5	0.6	1.4
BS7	TH	−0.6	1.1	−0.3	−1.0	1.0	−0.3	0.1	0.7	−0.1	1.6	0.9	−0.1

Table 5–11 (cont.)

		Factory Worker			Poor People			Rich People			Machine		
		E	P	A	E	P	A	E	P	A	E	P	A
BS1	YS	1.7	1,5	−0.1	−0.6	0.4	−0.5	−1.3	−0.6	−0.0	1.1	1.0	0.3
BS2	FR	0.6	0.5	0.8	0.2	−0.5	−0.5	−0.8	0.3	−0.4	0.8	1.4	1.4
	BF	0.4	0.7	0.4	−1.1	−0.2	0.0	−0.3	0.0	−0.5	0.1	1.3	1.1
	IT	1.1	0.7	0.9	−0.6	−0.7	−0.3	0.4	0.2	−0.0	1.9	1.2	1.0
	JP	−0.2	0.1	0.3	−1.0	−0.4	−0.7	0.6	0.9	0.7	0.8	1.9	0.4
	ND	0.2	0.9	0.3	−0.3	−0.1	0.1	−0.0	0.2	−0.1	0.7	1.7	1.4
BS3	FF	−0.3	1.2	−0.6	−0.7	−0.3	−0.3	−0.6	0.5	−0.4	0.6	1.9	0.4
	GG	0.1	1.1	0.7	−0.0	−0.5	−0.9	0.1	0.8	−0.0	0.8	2.4	2.3
	AE	1.1	1.3	0.7	−0.3	−0.8	−0.4	0.5	1.0	0.1	1.5	1.8	1.1
	SW	0.4	0.4	0.0	0.4	−0.3	−0.2	−0.0	0.2	−0.0	0.9	0.4	0.7
BS4	GK	1.7	1.1	1.1	1.2	−0.1	0.4	0.4	0.7	0.1	1.8	1.0	0.8
	MS	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.7	0.1	0.4	−0.1	0.3	−0.1	1.1	1.0	0.5
	LA	1.2	0.9	−0.5	−0.5	0.2	0.3	0.6	0.5	−0.2	1.3	0.9	−1.0
	TK	0.7	0.9	0.6	−0.5	0.4	0.0	0.4	0.9	0.2	0.8	1.6	0.0
BS5	CS	2.0	0.8	1.4	0.3	−0.3	−0.6	−0.0	1.0	0.4	1.9	1.7	1.7
	DH	1.2	1.0	−0.7	−1.0	−1.0	0.5	0.6	1.0	−0.4	1.3	0.9	−0.7
	CB	1.1	1.2	1.6	1.1	−0.8	0.5	−0.6	0.6	0.2	1.1	1.5	1.1
	MK	0.5	−0.1	0.1	0.1	−0.2	−0.2	0.7	0.6	0.2	0.4	1.2	0.6
BS6	IF	2.3	1.1	2.5	0.2	−0.9	−0.3	0.7	0.7	0.6	2.0	1.3	1.7
BS7	TH	−0.0	0.7	−0.3	−0.8	0.4	−0.1	1.6	1.2	−0.3	1.1	1.6	−0.0

Labor Unions			Worker			Middle Class			Banker		
E	P	A	E	P	A	E	P	A	E	P	A
1.2	1.0	−0.7	2.2	1.5	−0.1	0.4	0.4	−0.1	1.1	1.0	−0.2
0.4	1.1	0.4	0.9	1.1	1.0	0.0	0.5	0.1	−0.4	0.8	−0.6
0.0	0.7	0.6	0.6	1.1	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.3	−0.4
0.4	0.3	0.1	1.1	0.8	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.4	0.1	0.5
0.0	0.9	0.7	0.0	0.8	0.3	−0.0	0.1	−0.0	0.3	0.7	0.2
0.0	0.8	−0.2	0.6	1.1	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4	−0.2	0.9	−0.5
0.0	1.2	−0.3	0.3	1.5	−0.3	0.5	0.7	0.1	0.6	1.3	−0.4
0.5	1.8	1.6	0.6	1.7	0.8	0.8	0.7	−0.0	0.7	1.3	−0.3
1.2	1.8	0.6	1.4	1.1	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.4	1.1	1.0	−0.2
1.2	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.8	0.3	0.6
1.5	1.0	0.6	2.0	0.9	1.1	1.7	1.1	0.5	0.8	0.6	0.1
0.8	1.0	0.4	1.6	1.1	0.6	1.1	0.7	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.3
2.1	1.7	−0.6	1.9	1.4	−0.8	1.2	0.8	−0.3	1.5	1.5	−0.7
0.6	−0.1	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.7	0.4	0.9	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.3
1.5	1.2	1.2	1.9	1.4	1.6	1.5	1.1	0.9	1.4	0.7	1.5
0.9	1.0	−0.8	1.5	0.8	−0.5	0.1	0.2	−0.2	1.0	0.7	−0.1
0.9	1.4	1.1	1.3	0.9	1.3	1.0	0.0	0.7	0.3	0.8	0.7
1.1	0.5	0.1	0.6	0.3	0.4	0.7	−0.0	−0.1	0.9	0.5	0.1
2.5	0.9	1.9	2.3	0.9	2.0	1.3	0.0	0.7	1.6	0.1	1.4
0.8	1.1	−0.0	0.6	0.8	−0.3	0.9	0.7	−0.1	1.6	1.1	−0.2

Laboratory			Automation			Education		
E	P	A	E	P	A	E	P	A
1.2	0.9	−0.5	1.6	1.6	0.8	2.0	1.5	−0.9
0.6	0.4	0.3	0.6	0.6	1.0	1.3	0.7	1.0
1.1	0.8	0.1	0.5	0.7	0.8	1.7	1.0	−0.3
1.2	0.7	0.3	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.4	0.6	−0.5
0.3	0.5	−0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.9	−0.2
1.3	1.1	1.3	0.4	1.1	1.1	0.6	1.1	0.3
0.4	0.7	0.1	0.7	0.6	1.1	0.3	1.0	−0.7
1.8	1.4	0.2	1.6	1.2	1.8	1.4	0.8	−0.1
1.6	1.7	0.3	0.8	1.3	1.2	2.1	2.2	0.5
0.8	0.3	0.2	0.7	0.3	0.7	0.3	0.3	0.1
1.7	0.5	0.6	1.4	0.7	1.1	2.2	0.8	1.0
1.3	0.5	0.5	1.5	1.2	0.9	2.0	1.3	0.5
1.5	1.4	−1.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	0.9	−0.7
0.9	1.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	1.0	0.7
2.1	1.6	0.8	1.3	1.1	1.2	2.5	1.4	1.1
1.4	1.4	−0.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	1.3	−0.9
1.2	0.9	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.3	2.1	1.8
0.8	0.7	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6	0.6	0.7
2.5	0.7	1.6	2.2	0.8	1.8	2.5	0.6	1.6
0.5	0.3	−0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3	0.5	−0.2

throughout all our data, even if there are some exceptions and even if the contours of the pattern are not as clear as in the case of Yugoslavia and the United States. Moreover, the four concepts, MACHINE, LABORATORY, AUTOMATION and EDUCATION, taken as a set and all in one way or another referring to productive forces, are evaluated positively in most societies, with very few exceptions. We can then suggest that in all social structures the development of the productive forces is considered vital for the well-being of the country. This is emphasized by all political systems without necessarily at the same time indicating anything about the distribution of opportunities and of outputs among the people.

The third main hypothesis to be explored, and which we believe is important when studying the relationship between total social structure and subjective culture in terms of concepts with wide connotations, is the following:
There may be a discrepancy between objective structure as a whole and subjective culture.

Such a discrepancy may become manifest through two principal processes, in given historical periods and with reference to *given* social classes or groups:

(1) The first process is the case of *progressive thinking,* or *progressive awareness* with respect to political and other issues. Given social structures are changed by practice which sometimes is planned in conceptual terms based on certain ideas and on historical experience. According to this explanatory model in its Marxist version, the superstructure produces ideas, structures and institutions in order to maintain the status quo, but certain cross-sections of the population do not accept the impositions of the superstructure and begin to produce ideas of their own and their corresponding institutions in order to change the status quo. Discrepancy then is said to exist between the dominant objective social structures and the subjective culture of a given social group or class. In less faithfully Marxist terms one might speak of the superstructure itself as containing some forward-looking, progressive elements which at least on the ideological level seek to identify forces of societal transformation, but which are constrained in practice by other structural factors. Some observers think of the Scandinavian countries in these terms. If such ideological themes in part of the superstructure penetrate effectively downward to teenage schoolboys such as those rendering our subjective data (see below), then we might find some "progressive thinking" in these countries.

(2) The second process is the case of *reactionary thinking,* or the unwillingness to adjust one's own attitudes and thinking to the dominant objective social structure. Seen historically, changes in the objective structure take place first and then there occurs a certain discrepancy between these changes and subjective culture. A rather well-known example of this process in our own time refers to the context of the Cultural Revolution in Red China. The discrepancy between the new social structure and the old subjective culture was clearly identified and efforts to eliminate the discrepancy were mobilized on a mass level.

In the context of our study, the historical social groups whose subjective culture is under inquiry are often middle-class, urbanite and male high school teen-agers.

Although we accept that there are limitations in the assumption that our teen-agers can represent the whole of the middle classes, we would suggest that subjective cultures of these teen-agers have many characteristics in common with their parents. As the reader will remember, this fact was also suggested by our theoretical frame of reference in Chapter 2. In this sense and to a certain extent we could see the types of discrepancies described above in the context of the middle classes and their role in the overall politics of society. More precisely, we should like to suggest that middle classes (or the bourgeoisie, in the general sense of the word) may play a progressive or a reactionary role in different historical periods, and that this could be seen in subjective culture. The two concepts LABOR UNIONS and WORKER, in particular, give some empirical support to our theoretical assumptions, which in the future should be verified through cross-cultural *and cross-class* based data.

Nevertheless, we must at this stage limit ourselves to the data available to us. Before we look at the two concepts of LABOR UNIONS and WORKER, however, we should like to relate our discussion to an interesting comparative macro study of four Nordic countries by Stein Kuhnle, a Norwegian social scientist (Kuhnle 1975). In an attempt to explain some of the differences in the initial political mobilization rates between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden in terms of the history of independence and the history of the representative organs, Kuhnle generates some hypotheses which are in a way similar to hypotheses explored in the present context. Political mobilization rates are, thus, related to two structural variables in an historical perspective. We quote Kuhnle:

> In a system with a long continuity of representative organs, combined with a long history of independence, a *gradual* increase in political participation may be expected. People in general are supposed not to be as "politicized" as in countries having experienced colonization. Political leaders have not had to mobilize the people against any common enemy, while most leaders in "occupied" countries are supposed to make persistent attempts to rally the support of the whole population in efforts to eject uninvited visitors from the country.
>
> (Kuhnle 1975:13)

Furthermore, with respect to democratization in terms of organs of representation and voting right, Kuhnle writes:

> Elite groupings that have themselves been denied the right and opportunity to govern will not have the same fears of steps towards democratization.
>
> (Kuhnle 1975:14)

The social group in question, that is, political leaders, plays different types of roles depending on the historical structural givens of the society. Kuhnle's hypotheses, which are confronted with empirical data, give further feasibility and support not only to our hypotheses but also to our way of exploring hypotheses.

In the context of our data as summarized in Table 5—9 there seems to be a clear horizontal division in the typology between (BS3) and (BS4) structures, separating in particular (BS2) and (BS3) on the one side from (BS4, 5, 6 and 7) on the other.

Two characteristics of these two kinds of social structure should especially be stressed. (BS2) and (BS3) are characterized by a *high* level of the development of the productive forces and a relative absence of political repression or a presence of at least some aspects of the parliamentary tradition. On the other hand, the second group of structures, especially (BS6) and (BS7), are characterized by a low level of the development of the productive forces and the presence of some political repression in order to maintain the status quo. The question arises: what is the *subjective* thinking of the middle classes within these objective structures with respect to the two concepts, LABOR UNIONS and WORKER? By looking at the results exhibited in Tables 5—10 and 5—11, we can suggest that:

(a) In societies where the majority of the people are expected to be satisfied (at least relatively) with the high level of development of the productive forces and the social and political circumstances produced by the social structure, the middle classes evaluate these two concepts negatively. They are satisfied with the objective conditions and do not like any presumptive threats that may be felt with reference to LABOR UNIONS and WORKER. Perhaps this is an instance of what we have called "reactionary thinking". Consequently, there is a certain *discrepancy* between objective structures and subjective culture.

(b) In societies where the majority of the people are expected to be dissatisfied (at least relatively) with the low level of development of the productive forces and the social and political circumstances produced by the social structure, the middle classes evaluate those two concepts *positively*. They are aware of the miserable conditions existing in the society and produce a type of subjective thinking which is positive toward alteration of the status quo. LABOR UNIONS and WORKER may be instruments to accomplish such a change. Middle class thinking seems to be "progressive" in these communities. Thus, we observe a certain *discrepancy* between objective structures and subjective culture.

CHAPTER 6
Unsolved Problems and Outlooks: Closing Remarks

6.1. Introduction

In Chapter 1 we introduced the *Atlas of Affective Meaning* and the semantic differential technique by which the *Atlas* was constructed. Furthermore, we presented the main objective of the inquiry: exploration of hypotheses which can contribute to the understanding of the relationship between objective structural factors and subjective evaluation of objective reality. We also discussed the research procedure. Finally, we pointed out some methodological problems in connection with the research.

In Chapter 2, we further elaborated the claims and aims of our inquiry. We introduced and discussed a general frame of reference which helped us both to see connections by which subjective culture can be related to objective social structure, and to generate relevant variables to be used in order to understand patterns found in the *Atlas* data.

In Chapter 3 we focused on kinship concepts. In order to understand patterns of kinship concepts in the *Atlas,* we investigated social tensions and contradictions generated by the interaction between two variables, level of development of the productive forces and type of family structure. The results obtained gave evidence that the approach used in this chapter is feasible and fruitful.

In Chapter 4 we investigated so-called labelling concepts through an analysis of social tensions and contradictions generated by the interaction of two variables, ethnic fractionalization and strain-generating unemployment. A historical perspective was also introduced in connection with the main concern of the chapter.

In Chapter 5 we constructed a macrosociological typology in order to classify the language/culture communities involved in the *Atlas.* By using the typology we investigated some basis-superstructure concepts which cover concepts from technology to ideology. The interesting results obtained in this chapter proved that the approach used is fruitful for the explorative purposes of the chapter, and feasible for future inquiries into subjective culture.

In the present chapter, we should like to present a closing discussion both of questions revealed, but not answered by the present study, and of questions which should be focused on the contexts of future inquiries, as a follow-up to our pioneering and exploratory investigation. The five questions that we shall present in

this closing chapter are the following:

1) the need for information on specific intra- and inter-nuclear family contradictions and relevant variables in each given society; 2) the importance of knowing the specific historical development of each society with regard to labelling concepts; 3) the importance of class-oriented analysis in understanding the relationship between subjective culture and objective structural circumstances; 4) problems of class-consciousness; 5) the number and range of the concepts available in the *Atlas*.

6.2. Intra- and Inter-Nuclear Family Contradictions and Relevant Variables

In Chapter 3, we elaborated four types of objective structures, each compared for certain given structural characteristics and generating a specific state of affairs. We investigated the relationship between these objective structures and the evaluation of given kinship concepts in semantic space. We explored the following hypotheses:

1. The extended type of family structure does not necessarily function harmoniously and without generating any social tensions and contradictions when the level of development of the productive forces is high.
2. The nuclear type of family structure does not normally function harmoniously and without generating serious social tensions and contradictions whenever the level of development of the forces of production is high.
3. The extended type of family structure does normally function harmoniously, and without generating serious social tensions and contradictions whenever the level of development of the productive forces is low.
4. Whenever we have a low level of development of the productive forces and a nuclear type of family structure in a society, it is expected that no particularly general tensions and contradictions in the context of interkinship relations are generated. On the contrary, we may expect indifference in attributing affective meaning to kincepts.

We thus established relations between these objective structures and the evaluation of kinship concepts in semantic space. We also pointed out, however, that *such relations can be specified and particularized in terms of the given types of intra- and inter-nuclear family contradictions in each given society.* In order to explore such specific relations, we need to know the dimensions around which specific intra- and inter-nuclear family contradictions become crystallized. These dimensions may be rather varying: in certain societies age may constitute the dominant dimension of contradiction, whereas in others sex may be the dominant one. Other dimensions such as urban-rural differentiation or labor-power struc-

ture may also be important factors in this context. Depending upon the specific level of development of the productive forces and the specific circumstances of the superstructural institutions dominant in the society, these dimensions may be dominant and active in varying degrees and combinations. In future inquiries, one should, for example, identify the country-specific dimensions dominant in each society—each society then being placed into one of the structural conditions discussed in Chapter 3. Thereafter one should try to find out country-specific *and* cross-nationally common dimensions of societies within the frame of the typology generated in this study. To achieve this task would require not only *detailed* information on the family structure of each society but also more differentiated samples (that is, in terms of social classes and cohorts for collection of *Atlas* data).

6.3. Importance of Knowing the Specific Historical Development of Each Society with Regard to Labelling Concepts

The hypotheses explored in Chapter 4, as well as in Chapter 3, must be assessed in very *general* terms, i.e., as if the *Atlas* middle class communities were fairly homogeneous societies. Furthermore, in investigating some sections of subjective culture, e.g., labelling concepts, the need for knowledge on the historical development of given societies is crucial. This fact became rather clear in Chapter 4. Through a cross-tabulation of the two main variables, ethnic fractionalization and strain-generating unemployment, we generated at least three structural conditions which are relevant to an understanding of the location of labelling concepts in semantic space. An important factor in this context was the introduction of historical perspective, indicating the socio-historical development of the subjective evaluation of given labelling concepts. Nevertheless, owing to the exploratory character of this inquiry, and to the specific characteristics of the *Atlas* data available, we did not go into the historical details of each language/culture community in connection with our study of labelling concepts.

It certainly would nevertheless be worthwhile to attempt to systematize the historical givens of each society using the hypotheses explored here and our frame of reference as starting points. A very important scientific element to be introduced in future studies, then, is a class-oriented approach in order to see how the subjective cultures of different social classes are influenced by given structural circumstances and historical development.

6.4. On the Necessity of a Class-Oriented Analysis

In Chapter 1 we indicated the specific character of the sample used in collecting the *Atlas* data. In order to obtain restricted but roughly equivalent samples across the language/culture communities involved, teenage male students in average high schools in urban settings were used as respondents (see also Appendix 1). Taking into account the discussion presented in Chapter 2, the data obtained through this sample may be used as a rough equivalent of data on the middle class. More precisely, the youngsters involved are assumed to be influenced by, and to represent the value orientations and attitudes of the middle class, at least with regard to general ideological, political and social issues. Nevertheless, we also emphasized the fact that such restricted data prevent any comparisons between the subjective cultures of different social classes. At this point we use the term class in a rather general sense; a discussion in depth of the concept of class is beyond the scope of the present inquiry. One should not, however, limit a discussion of this concept to a more or less abstract understanding of it, but on the contrary, look for possibilities of collecting data from different social and geographical groups, e.g., workers, immigrants, peasants, intellectuals, populations of local communities, etc., in inquiries subsequent to the present study. The general frame of reference presented in Chapter 2 and the theoretical discussion in Chapter 5, which takes off from this frame of reference, would seem to offer considerable possibilities for handling cross-class data in a cross-cultural perspective.

Only by investigating data from different social classes may we be able to reach a better understanding of *specific and general* relations between structural and historical factors, and subjective culture.

6.5. The Question of Class-Consciousness

Related to the need for analysing cross-class data on a cross-cultural level in order to study relationships between objective factors and subjective culture is the question of class-consciousness. "Class-consciousness" is essentially a Marxian term. It indicates the state of consciousness about the objective class situation, or the class interest, of a given social class, as held by the very members of this class. In other words, class-conscious members of a class are conscious about their own class-situation. The opposite of class-consciousness is expressed by the term's twin-pair false-consciousness. Our purpose here is not, however, further to describe and discuss this Marxian conception (see, for example, Lukács 1971:93–137; Popper 1969: Chapter 16). We should merely like to point out the relevance and the feasibility of this concept in any inquiry into the relationship between objective

structural factors and subjective culture where we have access to class-differentiated data.

In fact, what this Marxian term boils down to, basically and simply, is the relationship between objective reality and subjective perception and evaluation of this very objective reality. In Marxist social theory, the correspondence between these objective and subjective elements finds expression in class-consciousness, whereas a discrepancy is expressed by false-consciousness.

A discussion relating to this interesting question was presented in Chapter 5. An empirical extension of this discussion would, however, require access to class-differentiated *Atlas* data. Thus, one could, for example, construct typologies systematizing, on a cross-national level, social factors promoting or impeding correspondence/discrepancy between objective reality and subjective evaluation of this reality. At this point it should be mentioned that the concept of *predicament,* suggested and defined for sociological purposes by Ulf Himmelstrand, promises a great deal in this context (Himmelstrand 1974 c).

6.6. Number and Range of the Concepts Available

The last question that we wish to mention in this closing chapter concerns the range and amount of data available in the present *Atlas.*

The immense amount of data is indicated by C.E. Osgood:

> The atlas project has generated a tremendous amount of information. With some 40 subjects in each of some 25 cultures judging each of some 600 concepts against 13 SD scales, we have about 7,800,000 "bits" of raw data. Even when these raw data are statistically compressed into summary measures—the three factor composite scores (means of 40 subjects X 4 scales on each) and the mean scores on the familiarity scale—we still have some 60,000 items of information to deal with. And when this basic information is then amplified by the 10 or so derived measures included in the atlases, the total information units to be dealt with comes to about 200,000. Obviously this mass of numbers has to be organized into chunks and formats that can be encompassed and comprehended by human minds.
>
> One way of chunking the data was to assign the 620 atlas concepts, with some overlapping, to approximately 50 categories of manageable size for analysis—these being organized under 12 "super categories"...
>
> (Osgood 1971:46)

As the reader will realize, we have in this study used only three concept categories—two of them were formed and defined by us—out of the total of approximately 50 categories. Put in other terms, only some 70 concepts were used out of the total of 620 *Atlas* concepts. This means that a large range and amount of concepts remain to be investigated. That is to say, while the present investigation stops here, much is left to be done in the future.

NOTES

Notes to Chapter 1

1. The cardinal work to be referred to is *The Measurement of Meaning,* 1957, by Osgood et al. Another work, shorter but nevertheless good, is "Exploration in semantic space: A personal diary" (see Osgood 1971). Moreover, there is a large amount of literature on the semantic differential technique, on cross-cultural study of affective meanings and on critical considerations about the technique: see, for example, Himmelstrand 1965:343–348; Himmelstrand 1967; Jakobovitz 1967; Kostić & Das 1971; Miron 1969; Nordenstreng 1969; Osgood 1964; Osgood 1967; Osgood 1969 a; Osgood 1969 b; Osgood et al. 1975; Tanaka 1967; Tanaka & Osgood 1965.

2. See Appendix 1 for information relating to the *Atlas* samples.

3. See Appendix 2 for a list of the 23 language/culture communities, and Appendix 3 for a list of the 47 concept categories.

4. It should be noted at this point that most of the L/C communities included in the *Atlas* are autonomous political and economic entities of their own. Some few exceptions may be found, however. India is represented by three regions, Delhi, Calcutta and Mysore, each having own language and culture. Furthermore, two samples from Mexico are included in the *Atlas,* that is, Mexico as a nation and Yucatan. The latter is excluded in the following discussions.

5. It should be kept in mind that one could also look for "clusters" within the entire "universe" of 620 concepts since *any* manageable set of categories (nebulae) is necessarily *arbitrary.*

6. The present study is by no means an inquiry into the methodology of cross-national comparative research. The literature on that subject is abundant. Here, we merely name certain works which should be considered as among the more important contributions in that area: Allardt 1966, Deutsch 1960, Marsh 1967, Merritt & Rokkan 1966, Rokkan et al. 1969, Vallier 1973 a.

7. Perhaps the most prominent scholar among those who focused on social structure as a whole for the purpose of comparing societies was Karl Marx. His cross-comparative approach is found primarily in *The German Ideology* (1845–1846), *The Manifesto of the Communist Party* (1847–1848), *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859), and of course, *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations* (1857–1858). See Marx & Engels 1968, Marx & Engels 1969:108–137, Marx 1970 and Marx 1964, respectively. Moreover, see Warner 1973:49–75 for a review of Marx' approach.

8. This term should not be confused with "total institutions", a term used by Erving Goffman, *Asylums,* 1961. Goffman's term has connotations other than the one used in cross-national comparative contexts. See Goffman 1968:17. For the usage of the term in cross-national comparative studies see Vallier 1973 b.

9. The majority of cross-national comparative studies have as their objects of study one or several aspects of society. Comprehensive bibliographies are available in, for example, Stein Rokkan et al., *Comparative Survey Analysis,* 1969 and Ivan Vallier, (ed.), *Comparative Methods in Sociology,* 1973a.

Notes to Chapter 2

1. What the *individual* thinks and feels about a certain object, e.g., "Father", is in fact a function both of what he thinks and feels about *his own* father, and of his picture of the cultural image which is attributed to "Father". It is nearly impossible for us to indicate the extent to which these two factors contribute to the results obtained in the AAM. It seems that this proportion is dependent on at least two factors: the individual's personal characteristics and the kind of concept that is being evaluated. Nevertheless, the results that we find in the AAM represent language/culture communities (within the given methodological frame) and certainly not the single individuals.
2. Of course, it is not "the probability", but the exposure itself that influences the AAM.
3. The terminology used in this context by the students of this problem is rather diversified, and one can distinguish terms such as "adolescent society", "youth culture", "peer culture", "adolescent subcultures", etc. (Andersson 1969:18). Moreover, a variety of approaches to the sociological study of youth can be differentiated. "The theory of institutional integration of young people", the approach maintaining "built-in problems of the generation concepts", "the theory of the socio-cultural and socio-contextual conditioning of young people's behaviour patterns and attitudes", the approach of "youth as a socially deviant group", "a neo-Marxist theory of youth" are the major sociological approaches that may be indicated (Rosenmayr 1972).
4. The interested reader may refer to Andersson 1969, Rosenmayr 1968 and Rosenmayr 1972.
5. Evidence is also given by Zygulski 1972.
6. James Coleman, in his *The Adolescent Society,* 1961, maintains the view that the problems of youth research should be approached in the context of an adolescent culture.
7. See Chapter 3.
8. The vital role of the family as a socializing agent is occasionally reduced, for instance in the Kibbutzim of Israel.
9. The interested reader may read about the family and its social functions in any handbook or textbook of sociology.
10. A questionnaire concerning, among other things, this matter has been sent to the *Atlas* data-collectors in the various countries. Although we have not received answers from all the countries, those questionnaires which were returned yield a certain amount of information about the specific recruitment patterns of the *Atlas* youngsters. See Appendix 1.
11. The term popular ideology should not be confused with "populism", which has a specific connotation and denotation. For the latter term see Ionescu and Gellner (eds.), *Populism,* 1970.
12. For a general discussion on the basis-superstructure conception and the dominant cultural environment see Chapter 5.
13. Herbert Schiller, in his *Mass Communications and American Empire,* 1970, has drawn attention to interesting aspects in the context of Western mass-culture and mass communications. H. Marcuse has assessed several aspects of this problem, especially in *One-Dimensional Man,* 1964.
14. The use of jagged, double-ended arrows is borrowed from Robert Dahl, 1973:79.
15. We prefer to use the term "theoretical frame of reference" instead of the term "theory" in this context. Theoretical frame of reference is a modest label in terms of scientific claims but nevertheless a useful one. The Uppsala sociologist Kaj Håkanson in his book *Socialism som Självstyre,* 1973, advanced several arguments as to why it is reasonable to consider the Marxist conception of society as a frame of reference and not as an ultimate theory.
16. Professor Ulf Himmelstrand has in his so called Faculty Lecture elegantly demonstrated how the Marxist frame of reference filled in "empty boxes" which were neglected by the previous sociological traditions. See Himmelstrand 1974 a.

Notes to Chapter 3

1. See Appendix 3 for a complete list of concept categories available in the *Atlas*.
2. See Appendix 2 for a complete list of language/culture communities and the language used in each community.
3. We are, of course, aware of the fact that in the relevant literature available today we can find several other major conceptualizations of types of family structure: the dichotomy of conjugal and consanguine types of family structure, emphasizing the difference between families by marriage and families by blood, is one of the earliest formulations, advanced by Ralph Linton (1936). In his important work *Social Structure* (1949), George Murdock introduced the nuclear and the composite types of family structure. A subdivision of the composite type into polygamous and extended stresses both the relative importance of the nuclear type of family structure and the fact that nuclear families may be associated by blood or by marriage. Talcott Parsons (1943) has elaborated the dichotomy between nuclear and extended which we prefer to use in this study. Meyer Nimkoff's (1960) extended-independent dichotomy should also be mentioned here.
4. For a more detailed discussion on various theoretical aspects of this variable see Chapter 5.
5. We are, of course, aware of the fact that the relationship between the development of the forces of production and the type of family structure is not unilateral but bilateral. That is, they influence each other in a dialectical way where the direction of this dependency is also dependent on other structural factors. A rather well-known case where the family structure had an important impact upon the development of the productive forces is that of Japan (Goode 1963:323–325). For the relationship between family structure and the productive forces (and the relations of production) see Greenfield 1961, Goode 1963, Habakkuk 1960, König 1970, Nimkoff & Middleton 1960.
6. The present author was able to observe such changes during a study visit to Albania in the summer of 1973.
7. See footnote 4, above.
8. Murdock's typology covers a great number of small communities. This usage of small sized communities as units makes it difficult for us to apply Murdockian typology to our *Atlas* communities, which are much larger and complex structures, and often nation-states.
9. Unfortunately, the literature on this matter is *not always* explicit. Sometimes the investigator is obliged to formulate results from various sources in which there is implicit information relevant to our typology. For the purposes of our typology the following literature has been consulted: for the European and the Nordic *Atlas* communities Goode 1963:chapter 2 and Brams 1955, in general. More specifically, for France Michel 1960 and 1967, Rodman 1967; for Belgium de Bie et al., 1968; for Germany Lamousé 1969, Lupri 1969; for the Netherlands Kooy 1963–1964; for Sweden Dahlström 1967, Haavio-Mannila 1971; for Finland Haavio-Mannila 1971; for Hong Kong Wong 1972:148; for Thailand Smith 1971:130 and Phillips 1965: chapter 1; for Japan Ariga 1965, Blood 1967, Campbell 1972 (for his critical view on Japanese kinship interaction as presented in Blood's book), Koyama 1960, Goode 1963 and Vogel 1968. For Turkey Cuisenier 1964; Lerner 1965 and Lewis 1966 give some information about "modernization" processes which also affect the family structure to some extent. Besikci 1970 provides an analysis of the structural changes in the societal life of nomadic peoples of Eastern Anatolia. There is reason to believe that the traditional extended family structure is becoming nuclear, at least in urban settlements. See also Magnarella 1972. For Greece Lambiri 1965, Safilios-Rothschild 1967 and 1972, Sanders 1967:319; furthermore, see Bardis 1955. For Iran Keller & Mendelson 1971, Vieille 1966. For Lebanon Baer 1964:57 69, Khalaf 1971:247, and in addition, Goode 1963: chapter 3. For Mexico Penalosa 1968, Lewis 1959. For Afghanistan the literature available to us was very deficient on this matter; see, however, Hanifi 1971. For Indian communities Delhi, Calcutta and Mysore Goode 1963: chapter 5, Gore 1968, Kapadia 1966: chapter 12, Orenstein 1961, Ross 1961 and Sirinivas 1942. For

Yugoslavia Buric 1963–1964, Buric 1972, Buric & Zecevic 1967, Erlich 1966, Halpern 1963 and 1967, Kostic 1957 and Prokic 1963–1964. Due to lack of information, Costa Rica is not included in the typology.

10. The statistical data used in this context are taken from the *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, Eds., New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972. References to the tables in the *Handbook* from which our data derive are given below in connection with the coding categories for each variable:
Coding Classes
1) Gross National Product (GNP)
Code: 0. under $ 1 billion
1. $ 1– 4.9 billion
2. $ 5– 9.9 billion
3. $ 10– 29.9 billion
4. $ 30–124.9 billion
5. $ 125 billion +
Table 5.4 in the *Handbook*
2) Per Capita Gross National Product (gnp)
Code: 0. under $ 100
1. $ 100 – 299
2. $ 300 – 599
3. $ 600 – 1199
4. $ 1200 – 1999
5. $ 2000 +
Table 5.5 in the *Handbook*
3) Industrial Share of Gross Domestic Product (%)
Code: 0. under 10
1. 10 – 19
2. 20 – 29
3. 30 – 36
4. 37 – 39
5. 40 +
Table 5.11 in the *Handbook*
4) Agricultural Share of Gross Domestic Product (%)
Code: 0. 41 +
1. 40 – 31
2. 30 – 21
3. 20 – 16
4. 15 – 8
5. under 8
Table 5.11 in the *Handbook*
5) Distribution of Male Labor Force: Percentage in Mining and Manufacturing
Code: 0. under 6
1. 6 – 12
2. 13 – 20
3. 21 – 31
4. 32 – 42
5. 42 +
Table 5.8 in the *Handbook*
6) Distribution of Male Labor Force: Percentage Agriculture
Code: 0. 69 +
1. 58 – 68
2. 44 – 57
3. 24 – 43
4. 14 – 23
5. under 14
Table 5.9 in the *Handbook*

7) Enrollment in Higher Education (Student Per Million Inhabitants)
Code: 0. under 1000
1. 1100 – 2000
2. 2100 – 4900
3. 5000 – 8900
4. 9000 – 19000
5. 20000 +
Table 4.4 in the *Handbook*
8) Literacy (in % of Total Population)
Code: 0. under 21
1. 21 – 30
2. 31 – 50
3. 51 – 70
4. 71 – 90
5. 91 +
Table 4.5 in the *Handbook*
9) Scientific Journals
Code: 0. under 50
1. 50 – 99
2. 100 – 399
3. 400 – 999
4. 1000 – 1499
5. 1500 +
Table 5.6 in the *Handbook*
10) Energy Consumption (Per Capita in Kilograms)
Code: 0. under 201
1. 201 – 400
2. 401 – 1000
3. 1001 – 3000
4. 3001 – 6000
5. 6001 +
Table 5.7 in the *Handbook*
Data on the distribution of male labor force in mining and manufacturing for Lebanon and Afghanistan, in Table 5.8 in the *Handbook,* are missing. Nevertheless, using the figures on distribution of male labor force in agriculture, we have estimated the percentage of male labor force in mining and manufacturing for these two countries: 10.0 for Lebanon and 5.0 for Afghanistan are reasonable figures. Thus, on this variable, Lebanon was coded as 1 and Afghanistan as 0.

11. See footnote 4, p. 154.

12. Surely, one crucial aspect of the concept productive forces is that as they progressively develop, productive forces become more societal and "the producing individual appears as dependent, as belonging to a greater whole" (Marx 1973:84). We are thus aware of the fact that our operationalization of the concept does not explicitly take into consideration this aspect of the productive forces.

13. Relevant problems of operationalization are discussed by Hans Zetterberg (1965).

14. Mysore, Calcutta and Delhi language/culture communities are coded as India. Hong Kong is excluded since the data are very incomplete. The source for statistical data is Taylor & Hudson 1972.

15. We suggest that this hypothesis should most probably be verified in all societies, capitalist or socialist, with extended type of family and high level of development of the productive forces, where no efforts—e.g., a cultural revolution—are made to change repressive and reactionary aspects of the extended family and to regulate mutual requirements and interaction of these two structural conditions.

16. A similar view can be found in Allardt (1965).

17. In this connexion, the interested reader may refer to Karl Marx (1970:20–22) in order to assess analytical macrosociological structures impeding development of the productive forces in these countries.

18. This measure has been used in Chapter 4, where we investigate Labelling Concepts. See also Chapter 1 for methodological considerations.

19. Nevertheless, we have also investigated kincepts by way of using degree of polarization of clusters of the given kincepts. The results suggest that more detailed objective data on kinship relations are necessary in order to understand various patterns explored by the analysis.

Notes to Chapter 4

1. The term is from Karl Marx, *Kapitalet,* Vol. I, pp. 555–566. See also Castles & Kosack 1972; Gorz 1970; Lind 1972; Marshall 1973:6–10; Persson 1972; Persson 1973.

2. The term "caste", used mainly in the Indian context, also occurs frequently in studies of racial relations. John Dollard (1937) uses the term in the context of the United States. He talks about "white caste" and "black caste" when studying a Southern town. In this study, we shall omit this term for several reasons: a central reason is that the *Atlas* data from Indian communities–Delhi, Calcutta, Mysore–are not analysed in this chapter (because (1) the *Atlas* data are only partially complete and, (2) it is difficult to obtain adequate and systematized quantitative and qualitative data from these specific areas of India). Another complementary motive is the complexity of the term caste: in order to deal with its various aspects, we would be forced to allocate it much too much space. Here, it is sufficient to maintain that castes comprise a social system involving hierarchy and hereditary specialization as central elements and that it may be a basis for differentiation of groups of people in the context of racial ideology.

3. Michael Banton, 1967, writes:

> Racial differences seem to have been recognized from the earliest periods of human history, to judge by prehistoric cave paintings and the decorations in ancient Egyptian tombs . . . Discrimination against strangers and particularly against dark-skinned people is probably of equal antiquity. (p. 12)

Banton suggests, however, that any account of these views can be extended to include Aristotle, who maintains, for instance, that slavery is a "natural state of affairs". Banton quotes Aristotle:

> Those who are so much inferior to others as is the body to the soul, and beasts to men, are by nature slaves and benefit, like all inferiors, from living under the rule of a master". (p. 12)

Information from medieval Europe is rather diversified. We find in Banton, 1967, that

> Arnold J. Toynbee . . . has maintained that the spirit of mediaeval European Christendom was free from race feeling, regarding the stranger and the heathen as potential converts to Christianity. But there is evidence to the contrary. Martin Luther's writings on the Jews and the Turks belong with the mediaeval tradition and they never imply that Christ died for Turks and infidels or that Jews belong to the one people of God. (p. 13)

It can be remarked here that what Luther had in mind was not a racial dimension but a religious one. Oliver C. Cox, 1948, however, is much more direct about the early views on racial antagonism. He writes:

> There seems to be no basis for imputing racial antagonism to the Egyptians, Babylonians, or Persians. At any rate, the Greeks were the first European people to enter the stream of eastern Mediterranean civilization, and the possibility of racial exploitation did not really occur until the Macedonian conquest. Our point here is, however, that we do not find race prejudice even in the great Hellenistic empire which extended deeper into the territories of colored people than any other European empire up to the end of the fifteenth century.
>
> The Hellenic Greeks had a *cultural,* not a racial, standard of belonging, so that their basic division of the peoples of the world were Greeks and barbarians–the barbarians having been all those persons who did not possess the Greek culture, especially its language". (pp. 322–323. Emph. added.)

As for the Roman Empire Cox continues:

> In this civilization also we do not find racial antagonism, for the norm of superiority in the Roman system remained a cultural-class attribute. The basic distinction was Roman *citizenship,* and gradually this was extended to all freeborn persons in the municipalities of the empire. (p. 324. Emph. added)

Furthermore, Cox also maintains that in the Middle Ages there was no trace of racial antagonism in Europe.

4. This thesis had already been emphasized strongly by the ethnologist Franz Boas in 1911, when his *The Mind of Primitive Man* appeared. See, for example, Peter I Rose's (1970) short review of the development of race studies. For a brief review and critique of dominant trends in the study of race relations see the "introduction" in Pierre L. van den Berghe's *Race and Racism: A Comparative Perspective,* (1967). See also Kenneth Little (1952).

5. Banton 1970, van den Berghe 1967, Schermerhorn 1970, Peter I Rose 1970, Shepherd and Le-Melle 1970 and "Dimensions of the racial situation" 1971.

6. There have been objections against the position taken by Cox. Marvin Harris (1968), in his *The Rise of Anthropological Theory,* stated that Cox' hypothesis "can find no support in ethnographic facts. Folk racism, a popular system of prejudice and discrimination directed against one endogamous descent group by another, is probably as old as humanity" (p. 81). Objections of this sort do not, however, discredit Cox' statements and hypotheses, for at least two reasons: (1) The phenomena that Harris is referring to as racism are actually only a kind of ethnocentrism which under certain social conditions lead to intergroup conflicts, and (2) "Folk racism" is *not* an *ideology* of racial antipathy generated by a whole superstructure. See also Ulf Himmelstrand's (1974b) discussion on tribalism; compare the latter with the term folk racism. Moreover, see Banton 1969:21–22.

7. The first emphases is by Cox, whereas the second one is by the present author.
In a footnote Cox writes:

> It should be noted that the Portuguese felt they were superior because they were Christians, not because they were white. In an address to his men just before they attacked an unsuspecting west-coast community, the captain of a caravel declared: ". . . although they are more in number than we by a third yet they are but Moors, and we are Christians one of whom ought to suffice for two of them. For God is He in whose power lieth victory, and He knoweth our good wills in His holy service".
>
> (Cox 1948:327)

8. Cox uses the term in a very narrow sense. As we know, imperialism embraces a diversity of aspects. The issue of imperialism as a hegemony over other cultures was elaborated by V.I. Lenin in *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism,* 1917. For monopoly capitalism and race relations see Chapter 9 in Paul A. Baran's and Paul M. Sweezy's *Monopoly Capital* (1968). John Gerasis' article "Imperialism and Revolution in America" (1967) is also interesting in this context. Gerasis analyses the economic, political and sociopsychological background for US imperialism. A comprehensive book on this subject is *Essays on Imperialism,* 1972, by M. Barratt Brown.

9. For the origin of the term see Harris 1968:164.

10. The proportion of these two elements, and their relative roles in a given dominant cultural environment would be yet another question. Here, however, we shall not develop this aspect further.

11. Taylor and Hudson quote *Atlas Norodov Mira,* published by the Department of Geodesy and Cartography of the State Geological Committee of the USSR. Data given by the *Atlas Norodov Mira* will be one of the indices that will be adopted from Taylor and Hudson, when we in section 4.3.1. classify *Atlas* language/culture communities.

12. A few examples can be given: in France the legal status of these people is rather obscure. Various terms are used: "la main d'oeuvre étrangère" "immigrant" or sometimes simply "Nord-Africains". In West Germany, the term "Gastarbeiter" is common and emphasizes the temporary character of these people within the country. Holland prefers the term "immigrant"

and thereby does not denote any definite policy. The Swedish term "invandrare" is defined more clearly. The following works may be consulted: *Le Monde Diplomatique,* February 1970; Marshall 1973; Schwarz 1971.

13. Terms such as "immigrant labor", "immigrant labor-power", "immigrant workers" and "Gastarbeiter" should be understood as synonyms in this study. To the definition of the term may be added that in the highly industrialized countries the introduction of external labor power is indispensable for the optimal operation of the economy.

14. See the terminology introduced in Chapters 3 and 5.

15. The most expressive tendencies of this type have occurred in Great Britain and in West Germany.

16. Data collected in Sweden and Denmark suggested that the immigrant workers constitute rather isolated minority groups, many of whom intend to return home after having saved enough money to ensure their future. See *Gaestearbejder I København,* 1970; Trankell 1971; Westin & Kvart 1971; Westin 1973; Abadan 1972; Hofstede & Kranenburg 1974; Morokvasic 1972; *Some Growing Employment Problems in Europe* 1973: Chapter IV.

17. We have here a variety of situations: Black Americans are either employed in low-paying jobs or are unemployed; some minority groups are for various reasons settled in underdeveloped areas of a country and therefore automatically have disadvantageous jobs. The immigrant workers of European communities are normally offered low-paying and low-status jobs in which the indigenous population is not interested.

18. Our translation.

19. A common viewpoint that follows is that the racial prejudice is strongest among the members of the working-class. This attitude is expressed, for instance, by a Norwegian newspaper, *Dagbladet,* quoted by O. Brox:

> . . . several of Labour's supporters, more than any other party's voters, support Powell as the Conservative prime minister, shows a survey made by The Times. This underlines the proposition one has already heard, that is, racial prejudice is strongest among the members of the working-class. . . It is the youngest workers who stood by Enoch Powell as prime minister . . . It was he who made himself famous through the slogan "a white Britain" and by advocating the stopping of all immigration and sending back as many as possible of the colored people who are already in the country.
>
> (Brox 1972:9). [Our translation.]

The view that racial prejudice is strongest among the members of the working-class was elaborated, in a scientific way, by Lipset, as early as 1960 (Lipset 1963). Lipset maintained that the lower strata are relatively more authoritarian than the middle class and thus have "a tendency to view politics and personal relationships in black-and-white terms, . . . a readiness to follow leaders who offer a demonological interpretation of the evil forces (religious or political) which are conspiring against" them. (Lipset 1963:115). Lipset's assumptions and conclusions have been criticized by, among others, Miller and Riessman (1961). See also Lipset's (1961) answer to Miller and Riessman.

20. In economics, the question of unemployment and of other related concepts, e.g., employment and underemployment (disguised employment) is rather complicated and problematic. See for example Gunnar Myrdal 1968: Chapter 21. For a short introduction to problems of world labor see *Population and Labour,* 1973.

21. Taylor and Hudson 1972.

22. We have had the opportunity of independently cross-checking two of the WHSP's sources. The third one, *Atlas Norodov Mira* was not accessible. Both Roberts 1962 and Muller 1964 contain long lists of geographical distribution of native speakers. In Roberts see pages 112–120 and in Muller 1964 see Appendix C. Data available in Muller are especially dependable with the exception of certain African communities and East European societies; fortunately none of them are *Atlas* communities. Political motives might lie behind the distored data.

23. Taylor and Hudson write:

> Some introductory remarks in *Atlas Norodov Mira* may stimulate suspicions of bias in the data, but an examination of the residuals in the regressions reported above evince no particular patterns dividing Western and Eastern nations. The differences seem to be matters of interpretation on what precisely are the boundaries of a group. Do the Chinese speak Chinese or do they speak Mandarin, Wu, Cantonese, and so on? In spite of Soviet efforts to underplay ethnic differences within its boundaries, the USSR ranked high in the table. Somewhat surprising is the omission by the Russians of blacks in the United States; for this country the Soviet data have been adjusted to include nonwhites from the 1960 census and fractionalization was increased from .357 to .505.
>
> (Taylor and Hudson 1972:216)

24. The index of fractionalization is used to measure ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity and is calculated according to the following formula:

$$F = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left(\frac{n_i}{N}\right)\left(\frac{n_i - 1}{N - 1}\right)$$

where n = the number of speakers of the i:th language and N= the total number of people in the population. (Taylor and Hudson 1972:216).

25. The literature on the American ethnic differentiation is extensive. In 1960 the Negro population comprised only 10 % of the overall population of the U.S. There is no doubt that the US is highly differentiated on this variable. See, for example van den Berghe 1967: Chapter IV.

26. Ethnic differentation in Mexico is investigated by *inter alia* van den Berghe, 1967: Chapter II. Van den Berghe gives evidence that ethnic differentiation is not an unimportant issue in Mexico.

27. The United States, also a highly industrialized country, has, however, had a slightly different historical development. True, a great number of people immigrated to the United States also after the Second World War. The inflow of immigrants to the US was *not only,* as it was in Europe, primarily caused by the so called pull-effect of the *expanding* and external-labor demanding US-industrialization, but quite to the contrary, it was also caused by the push-effect of the labor-exporting countries. The pull-effect of the US also had its origin in the myth of "American Prosperity". See for example, Oscar Lewis' *La Vida* where he describes ambitions and hopes of those who want to move to the promised land. Data about the expansion of Japanese economy may be found in Halliday & Cormack 1973 and Sautter 1973.

28. Except for Japan.

29. The extremity that we are signifying as low should actually be indicated as NONE, since to the countries in question *no inflow* of immigrant labor is taking place.

30. Ethnicity in the context of imported labor-power refers to ethnic differentiation often in terms of language, religion, color, living style, etc.

31. It should be noted that the words box and cell are used as synonyms.

32. (4) and (6) are figures given by Employment Office statistics.

33. We have primarily checked with the following national statistical sources:
    a) *Statistical Yearbook* 1966, and *Statistical Yearbook* 1970, of Iran,
    b) *Recueil de Statistiques Libanaises* 1971,
    c) *Statistical Yearbook Thailand,* 1970–1971. Reports titled *Report of the Labor Force Survey,* published bi-monthly, are very unreliable, at least as far as the figures of unemployment are concerned. Although data found in these sources cannot, on a cross-national level, be relied on, we point out that the figures of unemployment reported are very high.

34. It is clear that *Yearbook of Labor Statistics,* which also uses national sources for data collection, is careful in reporting unreliable data. Thus, nothing is won by referring to the national figures that are available but are not utilized by ILO.

35. Data from India will not be used. See footnote 2 in this chapter.

36. *Yearbook of Labor Statistics* gives no percentages for France and Greece. Although it is possible to calculate these percentages, we prefer not to, since such an operation is too risky, due to partial and inadequate data available from the various sources.

37. Böhning 1972, *Annuaire Statistiques de la France,* 1966: Chapter 3.

38. See for example, Jolly 1971:203; Myint 1965; Myrdal 1968: chapter 21; Althabe 1967; Franklin 1969; Islam 1964.

39. For possible types of exchange between the members of the extended family see Igbozurike 1973. Impact of structural factors such as intensive urbanization or migration on the interpersonal relations within the extended family with reference to the Nigerian context was investigated by Plotnicov 1970.

40. An interesting case is that of Delhi, Calcutta and Mysore (Indian communities), which are not included in the present chapter. In these communities both BUDDHISTS and HINDUS are evaluated positively, although only one of these religions is dominant in the respective language/culture communities.

41. In A. Kimball Romney et al. 1972, different aspects of rank-orderings of hierarchical cluster analysis are presented. See, in particular, Rapoport & Fillenbaum 1972.

Notes to Chapter 5

1. One obvious advantage of our typology is that it gives generative openings that can enable the researcher to introduce and to develop conceptual tools useful in analyses from different *class* perspectives without being forced to abandon the cross-national comparative level. This point will be made clearer in the last section of the present chapter.

2. Students of sociology are assumed to be familiar with major contributions to sociological theory. Any comparison of various sociological works will show the uniqueness of the historical materialistic conception in providing a total picture of society. Compare for example, Weber's *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization,* 1947 (part I of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*) (Weber 1964), or Parsons' *The Social System,* 1951 (Parsons 1970) with major contributions of Marx and Engels, as referred to in the present chapter. For a summary of several other contributions to sociological theory see R. Aron's *Main Currents in Sociological Thought,* 1965 (Aron 1971). See also our footnot 16 in Chapter 2, p. 153.

3. The range of our presentation may be judged as either narrow or wide, depending on what one has in mind: the reader who is aware of the richness of literature on, and of the multiplicity of problems treated within the historical materialistic frame of reference may consider our presentation as too brief. Considering the limitations of a relatively brief presentation, others might prefer an even shorter resumé using only page-references to appropriate literature. From that perspective our presentation may seem too long. Between these opposite views we take a middle way.

4. It has been suggested that this distinction embraces certain phenomena and excludes others. Language is one of the latter. See for example Stalin 1954, Schaff 1967:141–155, Marx & Engels 1968:42, Kolakowski 1968:42–51, Gramsci 1971:349 and 450 f. This is, however, a very controversial point; for a rather brief discussion, see Håkanson 1973:231–235, where he touches particularly on the question of *science* within the historical materialistic frame of reference. Nevertheless, any detailed investigation of such problems is beyond the scope of our study.

5. Reread this passage by Marx, already quoted above:

> The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life . . . At *a certain stage of development,* the material productive forces of society came into *conflict* with the existing relations of production . . . From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their *fetters.*
>
> (Marx 1970:21 Emph. added.)

6. Marx writes:

> The more deeply we go back into history, the more does the individual, and hence also the producing individual, appear as dependent, as belonging to a greater whole: in a still quite natural way in the family and in the family extended into the clan (Stamm); then later in the various forms of communal society arising out of the antitheses and fusions of the clans. Only in the eighteenth century, in "civil society", do the various forms of social connectedness confront the individual as a mere means towards his private purposes, as external necessity. But the epoch which produces this standpoint, that of the isolated individual, is also precisely that of the hitherto most developed social (from this standpoint, general) relations.
>
> (Marx 1973:84).

Furthermore, three basic categories of societal existence, namely production, consumption and distribution, were excellently explained in terms of dialectics in the same work (Marx 1973:85–100).

7. At this stage the interested reader may refer to other works in order to find more elaborate discussions on this subject. Liedman (1973:76–91) represents an interesting discussion which is a further elaboration of the fragmentary considerations presented by Lenin 1914, (Lenin 1963:160–162). See also Marx (1973:100–108).

8. Various UN-publications, Banks & Textor 1963, and Taylor & Hudson 1972.

9. There is another possibility, however: without paying attention to objective and existent situations, one may *suggest* that a typology could be constructed by using various legislative and political categories (e.g., it is said that in Yugoslavia the forces of production are owned by *society,* etc.); this would not, however, be adequate for our purposes.

10. The Gini index is based upon the Lorenz curve. Taylor and Hudson describe the curve:

> The curve is built with pairs of cumulative percentages. For example, if 25 percent of the households have 10 percent of the income, 50 percent have 20 percent, and 75 percent have 30 percent, then we have five points since none of the households have none of the income and all together have 100 percent. By drawing x and y axes to read from zero to 100 percent, we can plot the five points to obtain a distribution of income in our hypothetical economy. (By convention, the x values are placed to the left of the y axis to suit our notion of reading from left to right.) If our hypothetical economy had total equality, i.e. if 25 percent of the households had 25 percent of the income, 50 percent had 50 percent, 75 percent had 75 percent, and assuming the units of the two axes to be of the same length, the Lorenz curve would be a straight line at a 45° angle.
>
> (Taylor & Hudson 1972:212)

11. See Taylor & Hudson 1972:211 for kinds of difficulties in cross-national comparisons with regard to inequality of income distribution.

12. See Taylor & Hudson 1972:214. Another, additional shortcoming was pointed out to me by Dr. Pablo Suarez: the same or nearly the same index may be obtained for two countries whose land distribution patterns are completely different. In a country where we have *very* few large farms and *many* small farms we can obtain nearly the same index as in a country where we have farms of more or less equal size. It should, however, be remembered that these difficulties can be solved or at least controlled if we have sufficient data showing the size and the number of farms in given countries. Thus, we may be able to adjust the definition of what is a "large" farm and what is a "small" farm.

13. See the quotation from Marx in footnote 6, in the present chapter.

14. Interesting discussions relating to some of the perspectives given here may be found in Popovic 1968, Djilas 1969.

15. Naturally, various definitional precisions should be introduced, especially with regard to the category capitalist. I am grateful to Dr. Pablo Suarez for his stimulating suggestions on the construction of this index.

16. The interested reader may check with figures available in the *Yearbook of Labor Statistics* 1973:146–277.

17. It should be noted here that we are interested in *relative* figures. That is to say, we should like to *compare* figures obtained for the individual *Atlas* communities. The figures obtained refer fundamentally to given states in the economic structure of societies, and thus favor synchronic cross-national comparisons in a given historical period or diachronic intranational comparisons for a given society. Although *absolute* figures may be interesting in themselves, their scientific fruitfulness is to some extent limited, since the two extremes of the index are ± infinity and thus are theoretical and/or definitional figures.

18. (B) stands for Basis.

19. The reader should remember at this point that we are not using this term as part of Western-produced theories of development. With respect to generative causes behind dual economies we have completely different views than those of the so called modernization theorists. See for example: Eisenstadt 1964 and 1966, Lerner 1958, W.W. Rostow, 1960; for a critical examination, see Frank 1969 and 1972 and Wertheim 1973.

20. Fossum further elaborates the relationship between mobilization and bureaucracy, pointing out types of outcomes produced by alternative prioritization of these two concepts in the context of political development for change.

21. The circumstances that led to the Cultural Revolution in Communist China provide a living example of this observation. As we know, the Cultural Revolution was a movement against all elements who opposed themselves to the idea of mobilizing the broad masses in the construction of a new society. Such elements were party persons in authority, persons in the administrative bureaucracy, some ex-landlords, etc. See for example Baum & Bennett 1971, Hinton 1972, Robinson 1970, Han Suyin 1970.

22. Banks and Textor use three categories: in addition to the two categories we use, they include "limited mobilizational" as the third category. Since none of our *Atlas* communities can be coded as "limited mobilizational", this category will be excluded in our typology.

23. Banks and Textor use two additional categories: developmental and situational.

24. Almond has designed a theoretical framework from a structural-functional approach to comparative politics. The model was further developed in *Comparative Politics* (1966) by Almond and Powell. A critique of functionalism as a scientific method is beyond the scope of the present study. A bibliography of critical contributions is to be found in Nettl 1966.

25. (S) stands for Superstructure.

26. (BS) stands for Basis-Superstructure.

27. Only two books among a great many works will be mentioned here: *The New Class*, by Milovan Djilas (1957) is now a classic. *The New Class in Crisis*, by Nenad D. Popovic (1968), provides an extensive description of Yugoslavian ideology and politics and is rich in details. It should be noted, however, that these two writers, among many others, have a normative orientation. Their criticism of the Yugoslavian society is based on ultimate ideals. It is clear that such a normative starting point cannot fully be used in a comparative study such as ours.

Appendix 1: Information collected through the questionnaire

Comments

In order to obtain more information about certain background data on the youth samples of the *Atlas*, and about recruitment patterns which exist in selection to the schools from which the samples were drawn, we have sent a questionnaire to all the main participants who have contributed to the data collection. Only 12 language/culture communities returned the questionnaire in question. This is, of course, not a good result. Nevertheless, there are various natural reasons which may have caused such an unsatisfactory return frequency: several years have passed since the occasion of testing, several of the main participants who have contributed to the data collection are now involved in other activities, etc. Fortunately, we have found one interesting pattern with respect to the questionnaires: there is a satisfying geographic dispersion, so that it is possible to obtain some idea about the background samples across *continents*. Furthermore, there is also a certain representativeness with regard to the macrosociological typology generated in Chapter 5. Therefore, certain results obtained through the questionnaire and useful in this inquiry will be reported.

Table 1 gives information relating to the samples used. It should be kept in mind that the results reported in this table are not based on statistical data but are obtained primarily through subjective estimates by the respondents. Yet, the results obtained remain interesting.

Here, we should like to comment on social class category of the youth samples. It is clear that the concept of social class is controversial and it is rather difficult to operationalize the theoretical concepts such as middle class, working class, etc. As the reader realizes, the strata (or groups, or classes, whatever the appropriate label may be) referred to in questions 1 through 4 are overlapping with respect to several dimensions. This is, certainly, one of the reasons why the sum of the percentages given for each language/culture community is not necessarily equal to one hundred. The results reported nevertheless give evidence that there is, in fact, an approximate equivalence between samples, in the sense that most of the youngsters come from the so called middle strata. Again, very few come from the so called underprivileged and from the so called privileged strata. Figures given for the United States are somewhat different. Althouth 65 % of this sample is from middle strata, 95 % of the sample is from privileged strata. That is, middle strata and privileged strata (richer families, higher ranked bureaucrats, etc.) are overlapping: the reason behind this is most probably the fact that the sample was chosen in a small city with agricultural industries located in a wealthy agricultural area. The table also indicates that the rural element in our samples is limited. The Japanese sample, however, is very different from the other samples: 90 % of the youngsters in the sample come from rural or at least from first-generation-in-urban-settlement families. The proportion in question is 45 % in the Swedish sample; this is most probably due to the local characteristics and structural changes which have taken place in the sample area during recent decades. Sture Källberg, a Swedish journalist, has in his very interesting book, *Report from a Swedish Village,* 1969, described local characteristics and structural changes which have taken place in an area only a few miles from the sample area (Källberg 1972). Källberg's analysis applies perfectly to the Swedish sample area, as well.

The information reported in Table 2 relates to recruitment patterns in the schools where *Atlas* data was collected. In 5 countries data come from all-boys schools, and in 4 countries from schools which are integrated with regard to sex. Finally, data from 3 language/-culture communities come from both segregated and integrated schools. Segregation with regard to race and caste seems to be irrelevant for most of the communities, except for the USA and Delhi, whose data come from *integrated* schools. As for the recruitment patterns regarding religion, in most of the communities data are collected in integrated schools, except for Delhi (only Hindus). Costa Rican data come from both Catholic and public schools.

To summarize: the results obtained through the questionnaire indicate that the *Atlas* samples are roughly comparable. The Japanese sample, however, is somewhat different with regard to rural aspects. The Swedish sample can perhaps also be considered slightly exceptional, with its 45 % rural or first-generation-in-urban-settlement families.

Table 1. Information Relating to Samples

Question	Results are Given in Approximative Percentage of the Total Sample for 12 Language/Culture Communities, at the Time of Testing												
	USA	Costa Rica	West Germany	Belgium	Netherlands	Sweden	Italy	Yugoslavia	Delhi	Thailand	Hong Kong	Japan	Mean (%)
1. What percent were rural (or first generation in urban settlement)?	20	15	10	20	15	45	20	15	20	25	15	90	26
2. What percent came from slums, underprivileged strata, etc.?	5	25	10	5	5	5	20	5	5	5	25	0	10
3. What percent came from so called middle strata?	65	55	50	80	60	45	50	85	70	75	55	80	64
4. What percent came from privileged strata (richer families, higher ranked bureaucrats, etc.)?	95	20	10	5	40	5	10	10	5	5	20	20	20
5. What percent in your sample do you think exhibited a distinct youth subculture deviating from the dominant culture in your country?	10	10	50	5	5	35	10	0	10	35	15	50	20

Table 2. Information Relating to Recruitment Patterns in the Schools where Atlas Data were Collected

The school chosen was:	Positive answers are indicated by (x) for 12 language/culture communities												
	USA	Costa Rica	West Germany	Belgium	Netherlands	Sweden	Italy	Yugoslavia	Delhi	Thailand	Hong Kong	Japan	Total
1. Segregated regarding sex (all-boys school)		x	x	x			x		x	x	x	x	8
Integrated regarding sex (girls and boys)	x	x			x	x	x	x			x		7
2. Segregated regarding race or caste	x								x				2
Integrated regarding race or caste		x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x	10
Question irrelevant–No differentiation exists		x							x				2
3. Segregated regarding religion	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x	11
Integrated regarding religion													
Question irrelevant–No differentiation exists													

Appendix 2: General Indices and Two-Letter Key for 23 Language/Culture Communities

Key	Location, Language	Site of Collection	Language Family	Geographic Region
AD	Afghanistan, Dari	Kabul	Indo-European (Iranic)	West Asian
AE	United States, American English	Illinois State	Indo-European (Germanic)	North American
BF	Belgium, Flemish	Brussels	Indo-European (Germanic)	West European
CB	Calcutta (India), Bengali	Calcutta	Indo-European (Indic)	South Asian
CS	Costa Rica, Spanish	San Jose, Liberia, C. Queseda	Indo-European (Romance)	Central American
DH	Delhi (India), Hindi	Delhi	Indo-European (Indic)	South Asian
FF	Finland, Finnish	Helsinki	Finno-Ugric	North European
FR	France, French	Paris, Strasbourg	Indo-European (Romance)	West European
GG	Germany (West), German	Munster	Indo-European (Germanic)	West European
GK	Greece, Greek	Athens	Indo-European (Greek)	Mediterranean
HC	Hong Kong, Cantonese	Hong Kong	Sino-Tibetan	East Asian
IF	Iran, Farsi	Tehran	Indo-European (Iranic)	West Asian
IT	Italy, Italian	Padova	Indo-European (Romance)	Mediterranean
JP	Japan, Japanese	Tokyo	Japanese	East Asian
LA	Lebanon, Arabic	Beirut	Afro-Asiatic (Semitic)	Mediterranean–W.As.
MK	Mysore (India), Kannada	Mysore City, Bangalore	Dravidian	South Asian
MS	Mexico, Spanish	Mexico City	Indo-European (Romance)	Central American
ND	Netherlands, Dutch	Amsterdam	Indo-European (Germanic)	West European
SW	Sweden, Swedish	Uppsala	Indo-European (Germanic)	North European
TH	Thailand, Thai	Bangkok	Kadai	South East Asian
TK	Turkey, Turkish	Istanbul	Altaic	Mediterranean–W.As.
YC	Yucatan (Mexico), Spanish (Mayan)	Ticul, Chablekal, Kom Chiem	Indo-European (Romance)	Central American
YS	Yugoslavia, Serbo-Croatian	Belgrade	Indo-European (Slavic)	Mediterranean–E.Eu.

Appendix 3: 47 Categories of Atlas Concepts (by XII Supercategories)

I TIME
- A. Age continuum
- B. Months, seasons
- C. Time units
- D. Future-present-past

II EGO IDENTIFICATIONS
- A. Kinship
- B. Races, religions, continents, directions, –isms
- C. Female–male
- D. In-group, alters, out-group
- E. Intimacy–remoteness

III ABSTRACT SYMBOLISMS
- A. Emotions
- B. Numbers
- C. Colors
- D. Geometricals
- E. Days

IV CONCRETE SYMBOLISMS
- A. Natural and potentially aesthetic
- B. See–hear–touch–smell–taste–(ables)
- C. Means–expressives–ends

V ENVIRONMENTALS
- A. Food objects
- B. Animals
- C. Habitations

VI CARNALITIES
- A. Body parts
- B. Body characteristics, processes
- C. Sex and sensuality
- D. Health, sickness

VII HUMAN ACTIVITY
- A. Occupations
- B. Commercial, economic
- C. Work–play
- D. Success–failure

VIII INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS
- A. Private–public
- B. Social status
- C. Moral–immoral
- D. Inter–group relations
- E. Affiliative–achievement

IX SOCIETY
- A. Institutions
- B. Modern–trans–traditional technology
- C. Modern–trans–traditional values

X COMMUNICATIONS
- A. Literacy
- B. Language and literature
- C. Communications

XI PHILOSOPHY
- A. Philosophicals
- B. Supernaturals
- C. Idealism–realism
- D. Concrete–abstract
- E. Cognitive–gut

XII THINGS AND STUFFS
- A. Static, dynamic nature
- B. Static, dynamic artifacts
- C. Stuffs

Source: Osgood 1971:47.

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